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The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) provides for a 
close relationship between the International Criminal Court (Court) and the United 
Nations Security Council (Security Council). This relationship is demonstrated through 
Security Council exercise of referrals and deferrals. This dissertation discusses first, the 
Security Council referrals of the situations in Darfur, Sudan and Libya. Second, the 
Security Council passing of resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003), which deferred the 
Court from commencing any investigations or prosecuting of any crimes that could 
have arisen as a result of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. 
     This dissertation argues that  the Security Council has exercised referrals and 
deferrals contrary to the Rome Statute, the Charter of the United Nations (the Charter), 
and the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the Court and the Security Council 
(Relationship Agreement) as envisaged by the drafters of the Rome Statute.  
     It concludes by stating  that, the relationship between the Court and the Security 
Council is at a crossroad because the latter has failed to exercise referrals and deferrals 
in the manner provided for in the Rome Statute and as envisioned during the drafting of 







































OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
1.0 Introduction  
The authors of the Rome Statute envisioned a close relationship between the Court 
and the Security Council. This relationship is realised through the Negotiated 
Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United 
Nations (Relationship Agreement).The Relationship Agreement not only sets out the 
terms on which the Court and Security Council should relate but also lays 
obligations on both entities to respect each other’s mandates and to cooperate in 
order to achieve mutual obligations.
1
 These mutual obligations are prosecuting 
serious international crimes which concern the international community and 
maintaining international peace and security.  
     The Court was established by the Rome Statute to determine individual criminal 
responsibility and punish perpetrators of egregious human rights violations. Article 1 
of the Rome Statute states: ‘A court is hereby established .It shall be a permanent 
institution and shall have power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most 
serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute … .’ Pursuant to 
article 5 of the Rome Statute, ‘the Court has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and aggression.’
2
  
 On the other hand, the Security Council plays the role of maintaining 
international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. Article 24 (1) of 
the Charter reads that:  
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer 
on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security 




                                                          
1
 Article 3 of the Relationship Agreement reads: ‘The United Nations and the Court agree that, with a 
view to facilitating the effective discharge of their respective responsibilities, they shall cooperate 
closely …and consult each other on matters of mutual interest pursuant to the provisions of the 
present Agreement and in conformity with the respective provisions of the Charter and the Statute.’ 
2
 Presently, the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression after the Rome 
Statute is amended and the amendment is ratified by at least a third of the state parties. 
3
 United Nations ‘Charter of the United Nations’ available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml#article24, accessed on 21 July 2014. 
2 
 
     It is important to note that, while the Court has the role of prosecuting serious 
international crimes which shock the international community, the Security Council 
maintains international peace and security pursuant to Chapter VII powers of the 
Charter. Consequently, their primary roles overlap because the crimes that fall within 
the jurisdiction of the Court have the ability to threaten international peace and 
security.
4
 It is worth noting that, the prosecution of perpetrators who commit 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or acts of aggression deters potential 
criminals from committing serious international crimes which may destabilise 
international peace and security. 
5
 In this regard, the Security Council and the Court 
require mutual collaboration for effective discharge of their roles.  
     The Rome Statute acknowledges the role that the Security Council plays in 
maintaining international peace and security through empowering it to exercise 
referrals and deferrals . 
     This chapter commences the discussion on the relationship between the Court and 
the Security Council in the context of referrals and deferrals. It does this by 
examining the provisions of the International Law Commission’s Draft Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Draft Statute of the Court), the Ad Hoc Committee of 
the Court and the reports of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court (Preparatory Committee). It evaluates the delegates’ 
views on the relationship of the Court and Security Council at the Rome Conference 
as well as the provisions of the Rome Statute that regulate the said relationship. 
     This chapter lays a basis for discussions in chapters Three and Four which 
focuses on how the Security Council exercised referrals and deferrals and evaluates 
whether this exercise complied with how the drafters of the Rome Statute envisaged 
them and the provisions of the Rome Statute itself. 
 
                                                          
4
 Paragraph 3 of the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court 
and the United Nations. 
5
 L Condorelli and S Villalpando ‘Relationship of the Court with the United Nations’ in Antonio 




     To understand how the relationship between the Court and the Security Council is 
structured, it is necessary to evaluate the drafting history of the relationship between 
the Court and the Security Council. 
1.1 The road to the establishment of the Court 
The United Nations General Assembly (General Assembly) established the 
International Law Commission whose aim was to research on the viability of 
establishing an international organ to prosecute genocide.
6
 The International Law 
Commission negotiated the Draft Statute of the Court, which laid the basis for future 
discussions on the proposed Court. Additionally, the International Law Commission 
proposed the establishment of an International Criminal Court and of an Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Ad Hoc 
Committee) whose mandate was to review the substantive decisions of the Draft 
Statute of the Court. 
7
 Following the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, the General 
Assembly established the Preparatory Committee to consolidate the drafts. Finally, 
the General Assembly held a United Nations’ Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of the International Criminal Court  (Rome Conference), which was 
characterised by extensive discussions on the drafts of the establishment of the Court 
by states, and lead to the adoption of the Rome Statute.
8
 
(a) International Law Commission, Ad Hoc Committee and Preparatory 
Committee 
The International Law Commission envisaged a close relationship between the Court 
and the Security Council.  Article 2 of the Draft Statute of the Court states that: 
‘[t]he President with the approval of the state parties to this Statute (“State parties”) 
may conclude an agreement establishing an appropriate relationship between the 
Court and the United Nations.’9 
                                                          
6
 M Bassiouni ‘The journey to a permanent International Criminal Court’ in M Bassiouni (ed) 
International Criminal Court: Compilation of United Nations Documents and Draft Statute before the 
Diplomatic Conference (1998) page xvii. 
7
Coalition for the International Criminal Court ‘History of the ICC’ available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=icchistory accessed on 20 July 2014 para 2. 
8
 M Bassiouni ‘The journey to a permanent International Criminal Court’ in M Bassiouni (ed) 
International Criminal Court: Compilation of United Nations Documents and Draft Court Statute 
before the Diplomatic Conference (1998) page xvii. 
9
 United Nations ‘1994 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court’ 2005 available at 
http://legal.un.org/InternationalLawCommission/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_4_1994
.pdf, accessed on 20 July 2014 page 15. 
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        The Preparatory Committee negotiated for a close relationship between the 
Court and the Security Council. Article 2 of the Preparatory Committee reiterated the 
provisions of the International Law Commission’s Draft Statute of the Court, which 
sought a close relationship between the Court and the United Nations which was to 
be enforced through an agreement.
10
 
    Similarly, the Ad Hoc Committee considered the relationship as ‘an essential 
condition of the universality and moral authority of the new institution and, as well 
as of its financial and administrative viability.’
11
 
    Consequently, the Ad Hoc Committee viewed the relationship as the source of 
credibility and legitimacy for the Court and also as a way of facilitating the work of 
the Court. Thus, the Relationship Agreement was viewed as a way of promoting 
cooperation between the two institutions.  
(b) The Rome Conference  
The relationship between the Court and the Security Council was a contentious topic 
during the negotiation of the Rome Statute. At the initial stages of the negotiation, 
many delegates viewed the relationship between the Court and the Security Council 
as a threat and an impediment against the achievement of either the Court or the 
Security Council objectives. 
      A vast majority of delegates at the Rome Conference heavily debated upon the 
Security Council’s proposed power of referrals and deferrals. The debate ranged 
between two opposing factions; one side opposed the relationship between the two 
on the basis that the Court was an independent judicial body which had to be 
insulated from political interference with regard to its functions. Conversely, the 
supporters of the Security Council argued that the jurisdiction of the Court would 




        As the negotiations proceeded, the majority of the delegates supported a 
relationship between the Court and the Security Council but subject to conditions. 
                                                          
10
 ‘The Court shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations by an agreement to be 
approved by the State Parties to this Statute and concluded by the President on behalf of the Court.’  
11
 M Bassiouni The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court: an Article by Article 
Evolution of the Statute from 1994- 1998 (2005) page 17. 
12
 H  Olasolo The Triggering Procedure of the International Criminal Court (2005) page 17. 
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Canada, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Lesotho, Belgium, 
Brazil and Denmark opted for a close relationship between the Court and the 
Security Council only if the latter respected the Court as an independent legal 
institution.  A Canadian representative stated: ‘The Court would need to have a 
constructive relationship with the United Nations, while preserving its independence 
and impartiality. The Security Council could play a useful role in referring matters to 
the Court.’
 13  
        Additionally, China supported the need for a close relationship between the 
Court and the Security Council, as long as the provisions of the Rome Statute were 
not contrary with the provisions of the Charter.
14
 On the other hand, Australia 
supported a relationship between the two entities only if the Court acknowledged the 
Security Council’s primary role in maintaining peace and security. The Australian 
representative stated: ‘There must also be a workable relationship between the Court 
and the Security Council, recognizing the Council's primacy in matters relating to 
international peace and security.’
 15 
During the Rome Conference, the Rome Statute 
was adopted after ratification by 160 states.
16
  It emphasised the importance for close 
interactions between the Court and the Security Council. 
(c) The relationship between the Rome Statute of the Court and the Security   
Council 
 Paragraph 8 of the preamble of the Rome Statute states as follows: ‘Determined to 
these ends and for the sake of present and future generations, to establish an 
independent permanent International Criminal Court in relationship with the United 
Nations system, with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes … .’  
                                                          
13
 United Nations ‘Diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court Rome .Summary records of the plenary meetings of the  Committee of the Whole.  
A/CONF.183/13’ available at 
http://legal.un.org/Court/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v1_e.pdf, accessed on 10 July 
2014, page 54. 
14
 United Nations ‘Diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court A/CONF.183/13’, page 100. 
15
 United Nations ‘Diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court. Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Committee of the Whole.  
A/CONF.183/13’ available at 
http://legal.un.org/Court/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf ,accessed on 12 July 
2014, page 43. 
16
 International Criminal Court ‘What is the Rome Statute?’ available at http://www.Court-
cpi.int/en_menus/Court/about%20the%20court/frequently%20asked%20questions/Pages/3.aspx, 
accessed on 10 July 2014, paragraph 1. 
6 
 
     In addition, article 2 of the Rome Statute provides that: ‘The Court shall be 
brought into relationship with the United Nations through an agreement to be 
approved by the Assembly of State Parties to this Statute and therefore concluded by 
the President of the Court on its behalf.’  
      The need for a close relationship between the Court and the Security Council was 
important for a number of reasons. First, in punishing perpetrators who commit 
serious international crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
the Court contributes towards maintaining international peace and security. 
17
 
Secondly, in referring a situation to the Court, the Security Council extends the 
jurisdiction of the Court over non-state parties to the Rome Statute.
18
 Thirdly, the 
Court relies on the Security Council for enforcement of its decisions.
19
 The Security 
Council promotes the credibility and legitimacy of the Court when it enforces its 
decisions under article 86 of the Rome Statute. This dissertation will discuss at 
length the referrals and deferrals under articles 13(b) and 16 of the Rome Statute of 
the Court in Chapters Three and Four. 
      The Rome Statute, therefore, lays out the foundation of the relationship between 
the Court and the Security Council through; paragraph 8 of the preamble and article 
2 of the Rome Statute. Additionally, articles 13(b) and 16 of the Rome Statute 
further acknowledge the relationship between the two institutions while laying out 
the conditions and the nature of the relationship between the Court and the Security 
Council. 
     After the adoption of the Rome Statute, the President of the Assembly of Parties 
of the Court and the Secretary General of the Security Council signed the 




                                                          
17
 L Condorelli and S Villalpando ‘Relationship of the Court with the United Nations’  in  Antonio 
Cassese et al The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; A Commentary  page 222. 
18
 Pursuant to article 12 of the Rome Statute, the Court can only exercise its jurisdiction over state 
parties or over non state parties when they declare to accept Court’s jurisdiction. 
19
 L Caflisch Promoting justice human rights and conflict resolution through International Law 
(2007) page 87. 
20
 Coalition for the International Criminal Court ‘A universal court with global support ,cooperation 
agreements and enforcement ,cooperation with the United Nations’ available at 
http://www.Courtnow.org/?mod=agreementsun ,accessed on 14 July 2014 para 3. 
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(d) The Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal 
Court and the United Nations 
Presently, the Relationship Agreement provides for a close relationship between the 
Court and the United Nations. The purpose of the Relationship Agreement is to bring 
the two entities into a relationship pursuant to the Rome Statute and the Charter.
21
 
The Relationship Agreement obliges the Court and the Security Council to cooperate 
closely to ensure the attainment of their objectives. The effect of the Relationship 
Agreement is that it ties the Security Council to the Court therefore, both 
independent organisations have the obligation to cooperate with each other to ensure 
the effective discharge of their functions pursuant to the provisions of the 
Relationship Agreement, the Charter and the Rome Statute. 
22
 
1.2 Objectives of the study 
The objectives of this study are to examine the interaction between the Court and the 
Security Council which is demonstrated through referrals and deferrals, then to 
evaluate whether the Security Council has exercised this relationship in accordance 
with the provisions of the Rome Statute as envisaged during the drafting of the 
Rome Statute. 
1.3 Research questions 
This study seeks to answer: 
(a) Whether the Security Council exercised referrals and deferrals in accordance 
with the provisions of the Rome Statute, the Charter and as envisaged by the 
drafters of the Rome Statute. 
(b) How the Security Council’s exercise of the power of referrals and deferrals 
has affected the relationship between the latter and the Court. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
This research is conducted from primary and secondary resources. The primary 
sources will include the Rome Statute, the Charter, the Relationship Agreement, the 
International Law Commission’s Draft Statute of the Court and the reports of the 
                                                          
21
 Article 1 of the Relationship Agreement which reads that: ‘The present Agreement, which is 
entered into by the United Nations and the International Criminal Court … defines the terms on which 
the United Nations and the Court shall be brought into relationship.’ 
22
 The Relationship Agreement Op cit (no) 1. 
8 
 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. It 
also includes cases which arose from the situations in Darfur and Libya, while the 
secondary sources entail textbooks on international criminal law and the Security 
Council, journals will be drawn from the Court and United Nations websites. 
 1.5 Chapter outline 
Chapter One introduces the relationship between the Court and the Security Council 
by examining how the crafters of the Rome Statute envisaged that relationship, and 
how legislation provides for the relationship at present. 
      Chapter Two provides an overview of how the Security Council’s exercise of 
referrals and deferrals was envisaged during the making of the Rome Statute.  
      Chapter Three examines the Security Council power of referrals under article 
13(b) of the Rome Statute. It examines how the Security Council exercised its power 
of referral in the situations in Darfur and Libya. It deals with the issues that arose 
from these referrals, such as the failure of states to cooperate with the Court for 
effective prosecution of President Omar Al-Bashir and Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi for 
crimes against humanity. Moreover, it looks at the failure of the Security Council in 
both situations to back up the referrals. Finally, the chapter examines the 
enforcement mechanisms available to the Court and whether the Security Council 
has enforced the Court’s decisions. 
      Chapter Four, evaluates the deferral of investigations by the Security Council to 
the Court under article 16 of the Rome Statute. Generally, this chapter focuses on 
Security Council deferral resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487 (2003) which grants 
immunity to United Nations peacekeepers from non-state parties, thus excluding 
them from the jurisdiction of the Court. First, it begins by examining the Security 
Council deferral powers and the conditions to be fulfilled before the exercise of a 
deferral. It examines whether the Security Council resolutions on deferral were 
consistent with the provisions of the Rome Statute.      
      Chapter Five concludes by stating that the Security Council has exercised 
referrals and deferrals contrary to the provisions of the Relationship Agreement, the 
Charter, the Rome Statute and as envisaged by the crafters of the Rome Statute. 
Consequently, it argues that the relationship between the Court and the Security 
9 
 
Council is at a crossroad and proceeds to recommend for the two international 
organisations to improve their relationship. 
 





REFERRALS AND DEFERALS AS ENVISAGED BY THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW COMMISSION AND THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE 
 
 2.0 Introduction  
As mentioned in Chapter One, the drafters of the Rome Statute envisioned a close 
relationship between the Court and the Security Council. This interaction was 
essential to facilitate mutual achievement of each of the independent organisations’ 
objectives. 
      This chapter focuses on the provisions of the International Law Commission’s 
Draft Statute of the Court and the reports of the Preparatory Committee on referrals 
and deferrals. It seeks to provide a background to how the drafters of the Rome 
Statute envisioned the Security Council’s exercise of referrals and deferrals. It also 
evaluates the views of the delegates at the Rome Conference on the proposed powers 
of the Security Council to refer situations and defer prosecutions and investigations. 
     The chapter commences by laying out the provisions of referrals and deferrals as 
provided for by the International Law Commission and the Preparatory Committee. 
It argues that the crafters of the Rome Statute envisaged for the Security Council to 
refer situations within the jurisdiction of the Court to the latter and halt 
investigations and prosecutions as a way of maintaining international peace and 
security. However, the exercise of referrals and deferrals was subject to conditions 
laid out in the Draft Statute of the Court and the reports of Preparatory Committee. 
For instance, when exercising referrals, the Security Council has to adopt a 
resolution pursuant to the provisions of the Charter. Further, it has to refer a 
‘situation’ as opposed to a ‘matter’.  
      On the other hand, the Security Council can only exercise deferrals sparingly 
when the pursuit of justice interferes with the attainment of peace. Just like referrals, 
deferrals must be adopted through a formal Security Council resolution. For a 
deferral to be valid, there must be a threat to peace, a breach of peace or an act of 
aggression at the time of its adoption. Lastly, the Security Council can halt the 
Court’s investigations or proceedings for only a year, but this is renewable, 
11 
 
depending on whether the prior conditions on which the deferral was first adopted 
still exist. 
2.1 Referrals as envisaged by the International Law 
Commission and the Preparatory Committee 
(a) The  International Law Commission 
Initially, a vast majority of states at the Rome Conference for the establishment of 
the Court were against the Security Council referral of situations for prosecution to 
the Court, unsurprisingly, many states objected strongly against the Security 
Council’s power to defer Court’s investigations and prosecutions.  The delegates 
perceived referrals as an interference of the work of an independent judicial body.
23
 
      However, the Draft Statute of the Court recognised the importance of a 
relationship between the Court and the Security Council. It recognised the essence of 
referring ‘matters’ to the Court article 23(1) of the Draft Statute of the Court read 
that: ‘Notwithstanding article 21, the Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this 
Statute with respect to crimes referred to in article 20 as a consequence of the 
referral of a matter to the Court by the Security Council acting under chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations.’        
       The Draft Statute of the Court therefore envisioned a close interaction between 
the two entities which was demonstrated through the referral of ‘matters’ by the 
Security Council to the Court. However, the Court had to seek permission from the 
Security Council before it exercised jurisdiction on matters or situations within its 
jurisdiction over which the Security Council was acting upon.
24
The only cure to the 
foreseen power imbalance between the Court and the Security Council was to 
acknowledge the role played the Security Council in maintaining peace and security 
and thus allow the latter to exercise referrals in a way that would not affect the 
independence of the Court.
25
 
                                                          
23
  N White and R Cryer ‘The Court and the Security Council; an uncomfortable relationship’ in Jose 
Doria et al (eds) The Legal Regime of the International Criminal Court. Essays in Honour of Igor 
Blishchenko page 464. 
24
 S Kim ‘Maintaining the independence of the International Criminal Court: The legal and procedural 
implications of article 16 deferral request’ (2011) 29 Agenda Internacional 175- 212. 
25
 K Ambos ‘Establishing an International Criminal Court and an International Criminal Code. 
Observations from an International Law Viewpoint’ (1996) 7 EIJIL 519-544. 
12 
 
         As the negotiations proceeded, delegates supported the Security Council 
referral of ‘situations’ as opposed to ‘matters’ to the Court in order to obviate the 
need to create more ad hoc tribunals for prosecution of egregious human rights 
violations. Sweden stated as follows: ‘The Security Council, under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, should indeed be able to refer to the Court 
situations in which crimes under the Court's jurisdiction appeared to have been 




        It is evident from this discussion that the International Law Commission 
envisaged a close interaction between the two international organisations through the 
referral of matters and the deferral of the Court’s judicial proceedings. The 
discussion on whether the Security Council was to refer ‘situations’ as opposed to 
‘matters’ will be discussed in the subsequent subsection. 
(b)    The Preparatory Committee’s discussion one the referral of ‘matters’ or 
‘situations’ by Security Council to the Court  
The Preparatory Committee was not certain on whether the Security Council should 
refer matters or situations to the Court. Pursuant to article 10(1) of the Preparatory 
Committee:  
[N]otwithstanding article 6, [7] [and [9], the court has jurisdiction in accordance with this 
statute with respect to crimes [referred to][specified] in articles [as a consequence of the 
referral of ][on the basis of a [formal]decision to refer a [matter] [situation] in which one or 
more crimes appear to have been committed  to [the Prosecutor of] the Court by the Security 
Council[acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations] in accordance with 
the terms of such referral.]
27  
    The debate on whether the Security Council should refer ‘situations’ or ‘matters’ 
to the Court arose at this stage, as mentioned earlier, the draft statute of the Court 
allowed the Security Council to refer ‘matters’. Many delegates opposed for the 
Security Council to refer ‘matters’ to the Court as the term was considered to be 
                                                          
26
 United Nations ‘Diplomatic conference of Plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court A/CONF.183/SR’ available at 
http://legal.un.org/Court/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v3_e.pdf ,   accessed on 12 July 
2014 page 100. 
27
 United Nations ‘Diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court A/CONF.183/2’ available at 
http://legal.un.org/Court/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf, accessed on 12 July 
2014 page 26. 
13 
 
limited in scope and would subsequently affect the independence of the Court to 
prosecute, thus the term ‘situation’ was preferred as it was general in nature and 
would not interfere with  the independence of the Court.
28
  
The Draft Statute of the Court, proposed for the Security Council to refer ‘matters’ 













 Bosnia and Herzegovina
35
 and other 
delegates preferred for the Security Council to refer ‘situations’ to the Court as 
opposed to ‘matters’. It was agreed that the Security Council could only refer 
situations to the Court in order to respect the office of the Prosecutor of the Court 
and hence promote the independence of the Court.
36
 
      However, other states opposed the exercise of referral by the Security Council to 
the Court. India expressed the lack of support for the Security Council referrals. The 
Indian representative argued that referring situations to the Court was unnecessary 
because the Court could exercise jurisdiction through the initiation by the Prosecutor 
and by state party referrals.  India stated as follows; ‘[T]he Security Council had set 
up ad hoc tribunals because no appropriate judicial mechanism had existed to try 
such crimes at the time, but with the establishment of the Court, States parties would 
have the right to refer cases to it. The Council did not need to refer cases ... .’
37
 
       From the reports of the Preparatory Committee, it is evident that the spirit of the 
Rome Statute was to create a close interaction between the Security Council and the 
Court through the referral of situations which would maintain international peace 
and security as it preserved the independence of the Court.  
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2.2 Deferrals as envisaged by the International Law 
Commission and the Preparatory Committee 
(a) Deferrals under the International Law Commission 
The Draft Statute of the Court formed a basis for future negotiations of the Security 
Council power of deferrals in the Ad Hoc Committee and the Preparatory 
Committee. Article 23 (3) of the Draft Statute of the Court provided as follows: ‘No 
prosecution may be commenced under this Statute arising from a situation which is 
being dealt with by the Security Council as a threat to or breach of the peace or an 




     Although the Draft Statute of the Court acknowledged the role of the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, it also proposed a vertical relationship 
between the Court and the Security Council. Evidently, article 23(3) of the Draft 
Statute for the Court imposed certain obligations on the Court before the latter 
exercised jurisdiction which was that, the Court had to ascertain whether the Security 
Council was dealing with a situation which threatened international peace and 
security and then refrain from exercising jurisdiction in such a given situation.  
     Delegates opposed this provision because it meant that the Court had to seek the 
Security Council’s permission before it exercised jurisdiction upon a situation which 
the Security Council was dealing with. The Court’s request was subject to a veto by 
any of the permanent members of the Security Council.
39
  
     Seeking permission from the Security Council before exercising jurisdiction on a 
situation would obstruct the Court from conducting judicial proceedings because, as 
already mentioned, the request was subject to a veto and the process of requesting 
would considerably delay the Court in fulfilling its objectives. Further, it would have 
made the Court to be dependent on the Security Council, this would affect the 
independence of the Court. 
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(b) Deferrals  under the Preparatory Committee  
During the negotiation of the Security Council’s power of deferrals, majority of the 
delegates were of the view that deferring the Court’s investigations and prosecutions 
was unnecessary because it amounted to a political interference in the work of an 
independent legal institution.  
     Many states including, Nigeria, Malawi, Philippines amongst others, argued that 
allowing the Security Council to defer the Court’s investigations or prosecutions 
would interfere with the independent functioning of the Court. 
40
 Other states 
opposed the Security Council’s exercise of deferrals as there was fear of the 




      India objected strongly to the involvement of the Security Council in the judicial 
proceedings of the Court, therefore it did not support referrals and deferrals of the 
Security Council to the Court. The Indian representative stated as follows: 
‘The power to block proceedings was even harder to accept .On the one hand, it was argued 
that the Court was to try crimes of the gravest magnitude, yet on the other, it was argued that 
the maintenance of international peace and security might require that those who committed 
such crimes should be permitted to escape justice, if the Council so decided.’
42
  
Singapore made a proposal which found middle ground between states who were 
against the Security Council’s exercise of deferrals and those who strongly believed 
that the Security Council should be allowed to halt the investigations or prosecutions 
of the Court. The Singapore compromise made it harder for the Security Council to 
misuse the power of deferrals.
43
  The proposal allowed the Security Council to halt 
investigations or prosecutions of the Court only after passing a formal resolution 
which was subject to a veto by any of the permanent members. The Singapore 
compromise read as follows: 
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 ‘No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute 
 where the Security Council has, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
 Nations, given a direction to that effect.’
 44
 
On the other hand, Canada agreed with the Singaporean proposal and added a time 
limitation before the exercise of deferrals. Canada proposed that: 
‘No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this statute for 
a period of twelve months where the Security Council has been acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, notified the Court to that effect. Notification that the 
Security Council is continuing to act may be renewed at twelve months intervals.’
45
 
 A deferral was envisaged to be exercised in limited occasions when the attainment 
of justice would interfere with the maintenance of peace and security.
46
 The 
Canadian proposal enabled the Court to proceed with legal proceedings after a year, 
if the Security Council did not request a renewal.  
       The time limit avoided the probable seizing of the situations by the Security 
Council over an undefined period of time which would have had the effect of 
delaying the Court from exercising its judicial activities.         
      A huge majority of states in the Rome Conference supported the Canadian and 
Singaporean proposals as the formal request by the Security Council to the Court 
acknowledged the independence of both of the entities. Further the limitation of time 
enabled the Court to proceed with its judicial activities after the lapse of twelve 
months in the absence of a formal request of an extension by the Security Council. 
     The Canadian proposal was widely supported by the delegates who agreed that it 
was necessary for the Security Council to temporarily suspend legal proceedings if 
they affected the maintenance of international peace and security.
47
    
Conclusion 
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At the initial stages of the negotiations of the Rome Statute delegates were opposed 
to the involvement of the Security Council in the work of the Court. They perceived 
the involvement of the Security Council as an interference of a political organ in the 
work of an independent judicial body. However, as the negotiations of the Rome 
Statute proceeded, delegates agreed for the Security Council to refer situations and 
defer investigations and prosecutions subject to certain conditions.  
     Both referrals and deferrals were to be adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter 
through a formal Security Council resolution. The Security Council could only refer 
situations as opposed to matters to the Prosecutor of the Court. Finally, with regard 
to deferrals, the Security Council could only defer an investigation or prosecution for 
twelve months which was subject to a renewal through a Security Council resolution. 
      From the above discussion, it is evident that the founders of the Rome Statute 
were apprehensive about the interference of the Security Council in the work of the 
Court. However, mechanisms were put in place to ensure that the Security Council 
did not misuse the powers of referrals and deferrals. The subsequent chapters discuss 
whether the Security Council has complied with the said mechanism in the exercise 







THE SECURITY COUNCIL EXERCISE OF REFERRALS IN 
DARFUR AND LIBYA 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have set out at length how the crafters of the Rome Statute 
envisaged a close interaction between the Court and the Security Council as a way of 
ensuring successful prosecution of serious crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction and 
maintaining international peace and security. 
     This chapter focuses on the Security Council referral of the situations in Libya 
and Darfur to the Court and the issues arising from them. It discusses firstly, the 
failure of state parties and non-state parties to fulfil their arrest and surrender 
obligations arising from the Rome Statute and the Charter respectively; secondly, the 
failure of the Security Council to cooperate with the Court after the latter sent the 
Security Council a finding pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute. The finding 
informed the Security Council of two things, first the non-cooperation of state parties 
and secondly, that non-state parties had to comply with obligations emanating from 
the Security Council resolutions and the provisions of the Rome Statute. 
      It argues that for successful referrals, the Court requires cooperation from state 
parties, non-state parties and the Security Council. The failure of these entities to 
cooperate has made both the Darfur and Libyan referrals unsuccessful up to date.      
This chapter is divided into five parts. The first part briefly highlights how the 
Security Council can exercise jurisdiction, it then discusses the history of the onflicts 
in Darfur and Libya; the chapter proceeds to examine the state’s obligations arising 
from the Security Council referrals. It studies the need for states to cooperate with 
the Court and the enforcement mechanisms available to the Court after the Security 
Council refers situations to the latter. Also, it examines whether the Security 
Council’s has enforced the said mechanisms after referring the situations to the 
Court. Finally, the chapter concludes by stating that the inaction of the Security 
Council to respond to the states non-cooperation, strains the relationship between the 
two international organisations contrary to what the authors of the Rome Statute 
envisaged, the provisions of the Rome Statute and the Relationship Agreement. 
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Consequently, in the nine years after the Security Council referral of the situation in 
Darfur, President Omar Al-Bashir (Al-Bashir) has not been surrendered to the Court. 
Similarly, in the Libyan case, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Al-Islam) has not been 
surrendered to the Court, in the five years after the Security Council referred the 
situation in Libya to the Court.   
 3.2 The Security Council exercise of referrals  
The Prosecutor of the Court can exercise jurisdiction only in the following instances: 
first, through a state party referral, second, when the Security Council refers a 
situation to the Court acting under article 13(b) of the Rome Statute and third, when 
he or she acts in their own accord to initiate investigations. 
      Pursuant to article 13(b)
48
 of the Rome Statute, the Security Council has the 
power to refer situations in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court has been committed.  
      When the Security Council refers a situation to the Court, it has to comply with 
the conditions arising from the Rome Statute. First, the Security Council can only 
refer ‘situations’ in which one or more crimes have been committed according to the 
Rome Statute of the Court. As previously mentioned in Chapter Two of this thesis, 
the crafters of the Rome Statute preferred the term ‘situation’ to ‘matter,’ because the 
former would uphold the independence of the Court. Second, the Security Council 
must act under Chapter VII of the Charter when referring situations to the Court. 
Subsequently, the referral of a situation to the Court should be exercised after the 
Security Council has established the existence of a breach of peace or threat to 
peace.  
      The effects of Security Council referrals are that, firstly, it enhances international 
criminal justice through extending the jurisdiction of the Court over non-state 
parties. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Court extends over all states irrespective of 
whether they are parties to the Rome Statute or not.
49
 Secondly, the Security 
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Council’s referrals to the Court increases the legitimacy of the Court as it obviates 
with the need to create ad hoc tribunals to investigate and prosecute the situations in 
Darfur and Libya.
50
 Thirdly, Security Council’s referrals can be viewed as a tool for 
maintaining international peace and security
51
 thus, the Darfur and Libya referrals 
can be viewed as measures of restoring international peace and security without the 
use of force as stipulated under articles 39 to 41 of the Charter.
52
  
     So far and at the time of writing this thesis, the Security Council has referred only 





     With regard to the situation in Darfur, Sudan the Prosecutor applied for a warrant 
of arrest against Al-Bashir. The Pre-Trial Chamber issued a warrant of arrest against 
him for crimes against humanity and war crimes.
55
 The Pre Trial-Chamber issued a 
second warrant of arrest against Al-Bashir for committing genocide.
 56
 Presently, the 
war in Darfur between the Sudanese government and the rebel forces still persist. 
57
 
Subsequently, nine years after the Security Council referral of the situation in Darfur 
to the Court, and five years after the Court issued a warrant of arrest against Al-
Bashir, the suspect has not been prosecuted to the Court. 
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      In the Libyan situation, the Pre-Trial Chamber I issued warrants of arrest against 
Al-Islam, Muammar Gaddafi
58
 and Abdullah Al-Senussi.
59
 Al-Islam was charged 
with murder and persecution as crime against humanity
60
  while Abdullah Al-
Senussi was charged with murder and crimes against humanity. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber I decided that complementarity rendered the Court’s proceedings against 
Abdullah Al- Senussi inadmissible because Libya was conducting proceedings 
against him for the same charges.
61
On 21 May 2014, the Appeals Chamber ruled that 
the case against AI- Islam was admissible before the Court and reiterated Libya’s 
obligations to surrender him.
62
Therefore, Libya is yet to surrender Al-Islam to the 
Court. 
3.3 Background to the conflicts  
3.3.1 Darfur 
The conflict in Darfur arose between the Sudanese government and rebel groups. 
The conflict resulted in many deaths, displacement of people and wanton destruction 
of property.
63
The United Nations Human Rights Experts called for the Security 
Council to take effective measures to end egregious human rights violations in 




      The Security Council requested the Secretary General to establish an 
International Commission of Inquiry to investigate the human rights violations and 
to determine if genocide had occurred. The Commission identified the perpetrators 
and proposed for the Security Council to refer the situation in Darfur to the 
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Prosecutor of the Court.
65





On 18 February 2011, the Libyans protested against the Muammar Gaddafi’s 
dictatorship.
67
 Gaddafi responded by using excessive force against the Libyan people 




      The Security Council, invoking its Chapter VII powers under the Charter, passed 
sanctions on Gaddafi and his family and referred the situation to the Court.
 69
 The 
Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Libya, a travel ban, freezing of the 
assets of Gaddafi, his family members and some military officers.
 
 
3.4 State obligations  
3.4.1 Non-state party cooperation 
International law does not impose any obligations to third states who have not 
ratified a treaty. Customary international law recognises that states can be bound to 
the terms of a treaty only if they expressly consent to it as provided in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.
70
 
       Theoretically, as non-state parties to the Rome Statute, Sudan and Libya have no 
obligations arising from the Rome Statute.  
      Conversely, there are two ways in which non-state parties are obliged to 
cooperate with the Court: firstly, when the non-state party enters into an ad hoc 
arrangement with the Court under articles 12(3)
71
 and 87(5) (a) and (b) of the Rome 
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 Secondly, non-state parties have an obligation to cooperate with the Court 
emanating from the Security Council resolutions as members of the United Nations. 
In referring the situations in Darfur and Libya, the referrals obliged both non-state 
parties to cooperate with the Court because they are members of the United Nations.  
      Paragraph 2 of the Security Council 1593(2005) resolution that referred the 
situation in Darfur reads: 
 ‘Decides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall 
cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor 
pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute 
have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other 
international organizations to cooperate fully;’ 
73 
Similarly, the Security Council resolution in the situation in Libya reiterated the 
same provisions
74
, thereby making it compulsory for the two countries to comply 
with the Security Council directions. 
      Cooperation obliges states to act in good faith with a view to fulfilling 
international obligations.
75
Both Sudan and Libya have obligations to cooperate with 
the Court and these obligations stem from their membership to the United Nations. 




      As high contracting parties to the Geneva Conventions, Sudan and Libya are 
obliged to act in accordance with the provisions of the Charter in cases of egregious 
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 The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court are similar 
to those that state parties to the Geneva Conventions agreed to respect.
78
  
     Therefore, the Security Council decision requiring non-state parties to cooperate 
with the Court blurs the distinction between state and non-state party obligations 
because all states are obligated to cooperate with the Court.
79
  
 3.4.2 International cooperation with the Court 
In identifying issues related to the prosecution by international criminal tribunals. 
Antonio Cassese likens the International Criminal Court of Yugoslavia to ‘a giant 
without arms and legs — it needs artificial limbs to walk and work.’
 80
 Similarly, the 
Court requires cooperation from the Security Council, state parties, non-state parties 
and international organisations in order to effectively fulfil its functions, otherwise 
the Court’s decisions are likened to the proverbial harmless toothless watchdog. The 
Court requires the Security Council to enforce its decisions when states fail to 
cooperate with it with respect to referrals.  
      Lack of cooperation from state and non-state parties hinders the Court from 
prosecuting serious crimes. The failure of the Security Council to enforce its 
decisions makes it more difficult for the Court to try accused persons or even avail 
them before the Court because it requires and relies on the cooperation of the state 
parties and other entities in locating indicted persons, arresting, detaining and 
surrendering of the accused persons to the Court for trial.   
      State parties to the Court are required to provide full cooperation at all times 
when so requested by the Court during investigations and prosecutions unless the 
information so requested may affect the states national security.
81
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     The obligation of state parties to cooperate with the Court stems from article 86 
of the Rome Statute which states, ‘State Parties shall … cooperate fully with the 
Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.’ 
 3.4.2.1 The travelling tyrant 
After the issuance of the arrest warrant on Al-Bashir, the Registrar of the Court made 
cooperation requests and submitted them to all state parties to arrest and surrender 
him if he visited their territories.
82
 Nonetheless, Al-Bashir travelled to territories of 



















 None of the countries 
complied with the provisions of the Security Council resolution 1593(2003) or with 
the cooperation requests to execute outstanding arrest warrants of Al-Bashir. 
       As mentioned earlier, in 3.4 of this chapter, both state parties and non-state 
parties to the Court have an obligation to cooperate with it. These obligations arise 
from the Rome Statute with regard to state parties and from the Charter with regard 
to non-state parties. The Pre-Trial Chamber II stated as follows in that regard: 
 ...[O]nly States Parties to the Statute are under an obligation to cooperate with the Court.  ... 
[N]on-States Parties may decide to cooperate with the Court on an ad hoc basis... . This 
                                                          
82
 International Criminal Court ‘Report of the registry on the decision on the prosecution's urgent 
notification of travel in the case of The Prosecutor v. Omar Al-Bashir ICC-02/05-01/09’ available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1803812.pdf , accessed on 27 July 2014 para 1. 
83
Xan Rice ‘Chad refuses to arrest Omar Al-Bashir over genocide charges’ The Guardian 22 July 
2010 available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/22/chad-refuses-arrest-omar-al-bashir, 
accessed on 21 July 2014 para 3. 
84
Human Rights Watch ‘Malawi; arrest Sudanese President or bar his entry’ 13 October 2011 
available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/13/malawi-arrest-sudanese-president-al-bashir-or-bar-
his-entry, accessed on 21 August 2014 para 4. 
85
Voice of America ‘Sudan’s Bashir attends Djibouti’s president inauguration’ available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/22/chad-refuses-arrest-omar-al-bashir, accessed on 21 
November 2013 para 2. 
86
 Marlise Simons ‘Sudan’s President one step ahead of a suit and a warrant’ The New York Times 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/world/africa/sudans-president-one-step-ahead-of-a-
suit-and-a-warrant.html, 17 July 2013 accessed on 27 July 2014. 
87
 Bashir Watch ‘Omar Al-Bashir travels to Qatar’ available at http://bashirwatch.org/omar-al-bashir-
travels-qatar/ , accessed on 21 July 2014 para 1. 
88
 CNN wire staff ‘Sudan’s wanted President visits Egypt available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/16/world/africa/egypt-sudan/ , accessed on 21 July 2014 para 4. 
89
Malcolm Moore ‘Sudan’s al-Bashir given red carpet treatment by China’ The Telegraph available at  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8605319/Sudans-al-Bashir-given-red-carpet-
treatment-by-China.html ,accessed on 22 July 2014 para 4. 
90
 Ethiopian Review Sudan’s ‘President Al Bashir taunts ICC while visiting Ethiopia’ available at 
http://www.ethiopianreview.com/index/13636 , accessed on 21 July 2014 para 2. 
91
 BBC News Africa ‘Court worry at Omar Al Bashir’s Kenya trip’ 28 August 2010 available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11117662accesed, on 21 August 2014 para 2. 
26 
 
principle may be altered by the SC which may, by means of a resolution adopted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, creates an obligation to cooperate with the Court on those 
UN Member States which are not parties to the Statute. ... [T]he obligation to cooperate 
stems directly from the UN Charter. 
92 
 Chad, Malawi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria are state parties to the Rome 
Statute of the Court. They have obligation under article 86
93
 of the Rome Statute to 
cooperate with the Court. It has been argued that article 25 of the Charter does away 
with all the immunities that arise from customary international law and 




      Likewise, as members of the United Nations, Sudan, Libya China, Qatar, 
Ethiopia and Egypt have obligations arising from the Charter, therefore they should 
have cooperated with the Court pursuant to the provisions of Security Council 







 the Democratic Republic of Congo,
98
  Djibouti and Kenya 
before Al-Bashir visited these countries. These states failed to cooperate with the 




 failure to 
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cooperate and sent the same to the Security Council. The Court required Libya to 
surrender Al-Islam for investigation and prosecution of crimes against humanity.
101
 
      The Security Council referrals of the situations in both Sudan and Libya to the 
Court demonstrate the Court’s heavy reliance on state and non-state parties for 
cooperation failure of which it cannot exercise jurisdiction over the most serious 
international crimes. This non-cooperation undermines the Court’s work and makes 
it nearly impossible to achieve justice for victims and the public at large in the 
affected countries. Furthermore, it causes the budget of the Court to shoot up as in 
the cases where the witnesses and or victims in these cases are in protection, they 
still need maintenance, financial and otherwise from the Court as they await the 
surrender or arrest of the accused persons to the Court. Consequently, the Court has 
not prosecuted either Al-Bashir or Al-Islam for the alleged crimes against humanity. 
3.5 Enforcement of the Court’s decisions 
The Court has two ways of its enforcing decisions when states fail to cooperate with 
it in arresting and surrendering indicted persons to the Court for prosecution. First, 
the Court makes a finding on the failure of a state to cooperate and sends the finding 
either to the Assembly of Parties or to the Security Council. However, the 
enforcement mechanisms available to the Assembly of Parties are unclear. Article 
112(2) enables the Assembly of Parties to deal with all forms of non-cooperation 
which include: condemning the wrongful act, demanding compliance or referring the 
matter to the Security Council. 
102
 When states fail to cooperate in cases of referrals, 
the Court must make a finding of non-cooperation and send it to the Security 
Council as stated in article 87(7) of the Rome Statute.
103
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      Conversely, the Court does not have the enforcement powers against non-state 
parties to the Rome Statute. When the Security Council refers a situation involving a 
non-state party to the Court, the latter has an obligation to fully cooperate with the 
Court. However, when the non-state party fails to cooperate with the Court, the 
Security Council should apply its enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the 
Charter to enforce compliance.
104
 
     Since the Court does not have an enforcement mechanism, it relies solely on 
cooperation of states for effective investigation and prosecution of serious 
international crimes within its jurisdiction. The failure by states to cooperate with the 
Court frustrates its work as it is unable to proceed with its judicial proceedings, 
thereby delaying justice to affected people.
105
 
       After the Security Council refers a situation to the Court, the former has an 
obligation to enforce compliance with state and non-state parties’ obligations in the 
event of non-cooperation.
106
 The Security Council can invoke its powers pursuant to 
Chapter VII of the Charter to compel states to cooperate with the Charter as a way of 
restoring peace and security.  
3.5.1 What can the Security Council do to back up its referrals? 
The Security Council has a range of measures it can implement to do away with 
insecurity, it can employ hard or soft measures to achieve its mandate of maintaining 
peace and security. The soft tools encompass the use of mediation measures while 
hard tools means invoking Chapter VII powers under the Charter, referring situations 
to the Court or passing resolutions to start ad hoc tribunals and the use of force.
107
 
For instance, in the situation in Darfur, the United Nations Secretary General Special 
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Envoy for Darfur adopted peace settlement mechanisms which aimed to trigger 
peace negotiations and improve the humanitarian situation in Darfur.
108
  
      As aforementioned, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council has 
the function of determining breaches of peace, threats to peace and acts of aggression 
and decide or take measures under articles 41 or 42 of the Charter in the maintenance 
of peace and security.
109
 When the Security Council refers a situation to the Court, 
the latter has an obligation to ensure that states cooperate with the Court. 
Subsequently, when states fail to cooperate with the Court, Security Council can 
invoke its Chapter VII powers to ensure compliance. These powers are found under 
articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. Article 41 notes that: 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to 
be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United 
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.  
 
The Security Council has a range of options to exercise as enforcement mechanism 
when it encounters non-cooperation from states: it can apply article 42
110
 measures 
which involve force before it employs non-force measures under article 41, if it 
foresees that article 41 measures may be inadequate.
111
 
      The Security Council employed sanctions under article 41 of the Charter with 
regard to both the referrals in Sudan and Libya. The Security Council ordered the 
government of Sudan to disarm Janjaweed militias and prosecute them for the human 
rights violations committed. It proceeded to threaten the use of article 41 of the 
Charter measures in case of non-compliance.
112
 The Sudanese government did not 
comply with Security Council demands.  Subsequently, pursuant to Security Council 
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resolution 1556 (2004), the Sudan Sanctions Committee of the Security Council 
adopted sanctions against the Janjaweed leaders
113
. These included: travel bans, asset 
freeze and an arms embargo.
114
In the referral of the situation in Libya, the Security 
Council adopted a travel ban, arms embargo on Libya and freezing of assets on 
Muammar Gaddafi, his family members and some military officers.
115
  
      It is important to note that, the Security Council adopted these sanctions on 
Sudan and Libya before it referred the situations to the Court. It has not adopted any 
enforcement mechanism after the referral of the situations in both Darfur and Libya. 
3.6 The inaction of the Security Council 
The Security Council has not adopted any enforcement mechanisms after the referral 
of the situations in Darfur and Libya to state parties and non-state parties to facilitate 
cooperation with the Court. The situation in Darfur has been very challenging to the 
Court as Al-Bashir has made a mockery of the latter and the Security Council by 
travelling to territories of state and non-state parties including to China, which is a 
permanent member of the Security Council. 
The Security Council, the very body that referred the Sudan situation to the ICC has not 
stood firmly behind the arrest warrant against Bashir, it could have increased the cost of 
doing business with Bashir by imposing sanctions on fugitive Sudanese officials and 
governments that flout the arrest warrant. The Security Council may deserve credit for 




 The Prosecutor of the Court, in her report to the Security Council, urged the latter 
and state parties to take action with regard to the arrest of Al-Bashir, stating as 
follows:  
‘The time has come for this Council and States parties to seriously devise strategies for 
arresting those alleged to be responsible for these crimes.  It was a serious indictment on 
both the Council and those parties that President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and others had been 
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able to travel without fear of arrest.  The Council’s silence, even when notified of failures by 
States to comply with their obligations, only added insult to Darfur’s victims.’
117
 
The Prosecutor commended the Libyan government and non-state parties on the 
cooperation it had previously demonstrated but emphasised the need for the 
government of Libya to fulfil its obligations of surrendering Al-Islam to the Court.
118
 
       Evidently, the Security Council has failed to provide support to the Court 
through investigations and prosecutions after the referral of the situations of in 
Darfur and Libya. Consequently, Al Bashir has travelled extensively. The failure by 
the Security Council in providing enforcement mechanisms on its referrals to the 
Court has been an impediment to the achievement of international criminal justice 
and has lowered the credibility of the Court.
119
 
      Even though the Prosecutor has sent periodic reports to the Security Council, the 
latter has not supported the investigations and prosecutions or addressed the 
difficulties faced by the Court after non-cooperation from state and non-state parties. 
This does not promote the relationship between the Court and the Security Council 
contrary to intention of the drafters of the Rome Statute, the Rome Statute and the 
Relationship Agreement. It also frustrations the work of the Court. 
     Due to the failure of the Security Council to compel states to cooperate with the 
Court, its referrals weakened the enforcement mechanism of the Court and propelled 




    The failure of the Security Council to support the Court contravenes the 
relationship between the two international organisations as envisaged by the 
International Law Commission, Ad Hoc Committee and the Preparatory Committee. 
It also fails to fulfil the obligations of the Security Council under the Relationship 
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Agreement which requires the Court and the Security Council to have a close 
relationship for mutual attainment of their objectives.  
Conclusion  
The referral of the situation in Darfur and Libya was an opportunity to prosecute 
those suspected of having the highest individual criminal responsibility, to seek 
redress and justice for the victims in the affected areas and to promote the 
advancement of international criminal justice. The failure of the Security Council to 
provide enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter has lowered the 
credibility of both the Court and the Security Council as the perpetrators of the 
egregious human rights are still at large and the situation in Darfur continues to be a 
threat to international peace and security.  
      On the other hand, Libya has not yet surrendered Al-Islam to the Court at the 
time of writing this dissertation, therefore the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction him 
for the alleged crimes.   
      For successful referral of situations to the Court, the Security Council requires 
cooperation from states, but when states fail to collaborate with the Court, the 
Security Council has an obligation to compel states to cooperate with the Court. In 
doing, so the Security Council will kill two birds with one stone, as it will fulfil the 
obligations set out in the Relationship Agreement and the provisions of the Rome 
Statute and maintain international peace and security. Therefore, the Court can 
prosecute Al-Bashir and Al-Islam only if state parties comply with their obligations 
arising from the Rome Statute and the Charter. 
     As seen in the situations in Darfur and Libya, the Court relies heavily on states 
and the Security Council to enforce its decisions, failure to which renders the Court 
unable to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court should devise enforcement mechanisms 
to support its decisions. This should include the suspension of recalcitrant states who 
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THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1422(2002) AND 
1487(2003) 
4.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter Three of this thesis, the relationship between the Court and 
the Security Council is demonstrated through the exercise of referrals and deferrals. 
While the Security Council referral of situations to the Court can be viewed as the 
maintenance of peace through the achievement of justice, deferral could be perceived 
as postponing the wheels of justice to attain peace and security.
122
 
     Chapters One and Two of this thesis commenced the discussion on deferrals by 
showing how the  majority of delegates were opposed to the Security Council’s 
proposed exercise of deferrals due to the fear of politicised prosecutions. However, 
Singapore and Canada proposed for the Security Council to exercise deferrals 
pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter and to defer only for a limited period of time.   
      This chapter argues that in passing deferral resolutions 1422(2002) and 
1487(2003) the Security Council acted contrary to the provisions of the Rome 
Statute and the Charter. These deferral resolutions defy the Rome Statute provisions 
which lay out the conditions to be fulfilled before exercising deferrals and the 
irrelevance of official capacity. In addition, these resolutions did not comply with 
Chapter VII powers of the Charter.  
      This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part briefly discusses the 
Security Council’s powers of deferrals. The second part examines the Security 
Council’s deferral resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003).Thereafter, it evaluates 
the validity of the aforementioned resolutions. Then, it highlights the effect of the 
deferral resolutions and the possible remedies against the Security Council deferral 
resolutions. The chapter concludes by stating that the Security Council deferral 
resolutions put the relationship between the Court and the Security Council at a 
crossroad contrary to the intention of the founders of the Rome Statute. 
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4.2 The Security Council’s power of deferral 
The Rome Statute has not defined what a deferral means; generally, it means ‘[t]he 
act of delaying or postponing something.’
123
 With regard to the Rome Statute, 
deferral refers to the act of the Security Council delaying or postponing 
investigations or prosecutions of the Court for a period of 12 months.
124
 
      In allowing the Security Council to defer investigations or prosecutions of the 
Court, the latter recognises the role that the Security Council plays in the 
maintenance of peace and security under the Charter.  
      Thus article 16 of the Rome Statute lays out the conditions to be adhered to 
before the Security Council defers Court’s judicial proceedings.  
4.2.1 Conditions to be fulfilled by the Security Council 
before the exercise of deferrals. 
The Security Council has to comply with certain prerequisites set forth in article 16 
of the Rome Statute and in Chapter VII of the Charter of United Nations before it 
exercises a deferral. First, the power to defer investigations and prosecutions has to 
comply with the provisions set out in Chapter VII of the Charter which lays out the 
action that the Security Council should take in response to threats to peace, breach of 
the peace and acts of aggression. Article 39 of the Charter notes: ‘The Security 
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall 
be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.’ Therefore, before the Security Council exercises 
deferrals it has to establish the existence of a threat to peace, breach of the peace or 
an act of aggression.  
      Second, article 16 of the Rome Statute provides that the deferral can only last for 
12 months.
125
  This means that the suspension should not be for an indefinite period 
but be temporary. However, this period may be extended for 12 more months subject 
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to the fulfilment of prior conditions which are there must exist a threat to peace, 
breach of the peace or an act of aggression and the deferral resolution must be 
adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter.  
      Third, the deferral request can only be adopted through a Security Council 
resolution. The voting process is achieved when a deferral resolution gains a 
majority vote by nine members of the Security Council without the exercise of a veto 
by any of the five permanent members.
126
 
      Lastly, the Security Council can only defer the Court’s judicial proceedings once 
the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation or prosecution. The first paragraph of 
article 16 of the Rome Statute states: ‘[n]o investigation or prosecution may be 
commenced or proceeded with under this Statute.’ This means that the Security 
Council can postpone the Court’s judicial proceedings only when the Prosecutor is 
conducting an investigation or prosecutions. 
     The Security Council must conform to the provisions of the Rome Statute as the 
constitutive document which establishes the Court. These conditions will be 
discussed further in this chapter when evaluating whether the Security Council 
resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) complied with these conditions. 
 4.3 The Security Council resolutions 1422(2002), 
1487(2003) and 1497(2004)  
At the time of writing this thesis, the Security Council had passed two deferral 
resolutions and attempted to renew the said deferral resolutions for the third time. On 
14 July 2002 the Security Council adopted resolution 1422 (2002) to avoid the veto 
of its peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
127
 Paragraph 1 of the 
resolution reads:  
Requests, consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the ICC, if a 
case arises involving current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State not a 
Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or 
authorized operation, shall for a twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or 
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 Many states did not support the Security Council deferral request 1422(2002). 
Canada, South Africa, Brazil and New Zealand, opposed the deferral resolution 
arguing that the resolution granted immunity to peacekeepers contrary to the 
provisions of the Rome Statute.
129
 Similarly, Australia, Switzerland, Fiji, 
Liechtenstein, Syria, Burundi, Malawi and the United Arab Emirates argued that the 




      The Secretary General to the Security Council wrote a letter to Colin Powell, the 
then Secretary General of State for the United States of America, stating that the 
adoption of the Security Council resolution would provide a ‘blanket resolution’ to 
peacekeepers from non-state parties to the Court, contrary to the intention of the 
drafters of the Rome Statute of the Court.
131
 This meant that the resolution would 
completely shield the peace keepers from the jurisdiction of the Court, should they 
commit human rights violations, of the Court contrary to the provisions of the Rome 
Statute.  
      Although, many states and non-governmental organisations opposed resolution 
1422(2002), this resolution was renewed through resolution 1487(2003).
132
 
Resolution 1487(2003) sought to defer United Nations peacekeeping missions from 
the prosecution of the Court. Unsurprisingly, this renewal was met with vehement 
opposition from states and human rights organisations. 
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     The Human Rights Watch opposed the renewal of resolution 1422(2002) arguing 
that the resolution was adopted in the absence of any investigations or prosecutions 
which may have been a threat to international peace and security. Additionally, it 
argued that the resolution attempted to provide future immunity for the United 
Nations peacekeeping missions contrary to the provisions of the Rome Statute. 
133
 
      The Coalition Implementation for the International Criminal Court expressed the 
view that the resolution was passed contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
Charter thus the Security Council it contravened the provisions of the Charter.
134
  
      The United States of America attempted to renew resolution 1487(2003) through 
resolution 1497(2004), but it dropped the demand amidst allegations of its 
peacekeeping forces torturing detained prisoners in Iraq.
135
  
     The question which springs to mind is, whether these Security Council 
resolutions were adopted in accordance with the provisions of the Rome Statute and 
the Charter. In passing deferral resolutions 1422(2002), 1487(2003) the Security 
Council  contravened the article 34 and Chapter VII powers of the Charter it also 
acted contrary to articles 16 and 27 of the Rome Statute.  
     Pursuant to Chapter VII powers under the Charter, the Security Council must 
ensure that there is a threat to peace, breach of peace or an act of aggression before 
deferring Court’s investigations or prosecutions. The Security Council resolutions 
1422(2002) and 1487(2003) did not fit within the criteria laid out in article 39 of the 
Charter as discussed below. This is discussed at length in the subsequent subsection. 
 4.3.1 Validity of resolutions under the Charter  
Operative paragraph two of  both Security Council resolutions 1422(2002) and 
1487(2003) provide for an automatic renewal of the deferral resolution: ‘[E]xpresses 
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the intention to renew the request in paragraph 1 under the same conditions each 1 
July for further 12-month periods for as long as may be necessary.’
136
  
      This renewal raises the question of whether the Security Council can defer future 
investigations and situations without the existence of an imminent threat to peace. 
The Security Council cannot be able to defer future investigations or situations 
because it requires the existence of a threat to peace or a breach to peace before it 
halts Court’s judicial proceedings.  
      The Charter requires the Security Council to conduct investigations pursuant to 
article 34 of the Charter before determining whether a threat to peace exists.
137
 The 
automatic renewal of the deferral defies the provisions of the Charter because no 
investigation was conducted to determine whether a threat to peace existed. Further, 
the provisions of article 16 of the Rome Statute require a deferral to be determined 
on a case by case basis. Subsequently, the determination of a future possible threat to 
peace amends the provisions of article 16 of the Rome Statute contrary to the 
provisions of the Charter and the Rome Statute.
138
 The determination of whether a 
threat to peace exists and the decision to invoke a Chapter VII measure, can only be 
made when concrete terms which have the potential of destabilising peace and 
security are present.
139
The Charter does not define what a ‘threat to peace’ or a 
‘breach of peace’ means; however, the Security Council resolution has the discretion 
to define and adopt measures to restore international peace and stability.
140
  
      The threat to peace can be defined in an either negative or positive light. The 
negative definition perceives a threat to peace as ‘an absence in international armed 
conflict between states;’ this school also recognises that an internal conflict can 
destabilise international peace and security. 
141
 Conversely, the positive definition 
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encompasses the need to have good comity in the economic, social, political and 
environmental facets as a way of preserving peace among states.
142
 The negative 
definition holds more water, as it encompasses both internal and international 
conflicts which has the possibility of destabilising international peace and security. 
Nonetheless, the practice of the Security Council has shown that the definition of 
‘threat to peace’ is not cast in stone thus, it is dynamic as it captures the situation 
considering the circumstances at play.
143
 
      While the ‘breach of peace’ refers to the existence of armed conflict between 
states, it is unclear whether a civil war should be included as part of the definition.
144
 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that civil war in a state which is non-international 
in nature has the potential of destabilising international peace and security. 
      The Security Council passed deferral resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) in 
the absence of a threat to peace or a breach to the peace, these  resolutions do not 
make any reference to an internal or international conflict, neither do they refer to 
poor relations between states which may threaten peace and security. However, the 
only threat evident in these resolutions is the need to maintain United Nations 
peacekeeping operations.
145
 The maintenance of peacekeeping operations does not 
amount to a threat to peace or a breach of peace. In this regard, in passing these 
resolutions the Security Council acted contrary to the provisions of Chapter VII of 
the Charter as it passed resolutions in the absence of a threat to peace or a breach to 
the peace.        
4.3.2 The validity of the Security Council’s resolutions 
under the Rome Statute 
As mentioned earlier, article 16 of the Rome Statute sets out the conditions which 
the Security Council resolutions must adhere to before deferring Court’s 
investigations or prosecutions. In a nutshell, a valid deferral should be adopted 
through a Security Council resolution, pursuant to Chapter VII powers of the Charter 
and it lasts for only 12 months, although this may be renewed if a threat to peace, 
breach of the peace or acts of aggression exist. In passing Security Council 
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resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003), the Security Council defied the conditions 
set out in the Rome Statute. 
     Operative paragraph 2 of the resolution expresses the intention to renew the 
deferral resolution as many times as it may be necessary.
146  
This paragraph has the 
effect of automatically renewing the resolution without conforming to article 16 of 
the Rome Statute which reads that: ‘… [T]he request may be renewed by the Council 
under the same conditions’
147
 This means that the resolution should be renewed 
through a subsequent resolution, after determining that the existence of a threat to 
peace, breach to the peace or an act of aggression still exists. This means that the 
deferral resolution can only be adopted through an affirmative vote by nine members 
of the Security Council in the absence a veto. As a result, operative paragraph 2 
defied the provisions in the Rome Statute because the renewal was done in the 
absence of a threat to peace, breach of the peace and an act of aggression, also the 
intention to renew was not adopted through a resolution.  
     The renewal of a deferral resolution should be done on a case-by-case basis after 
the lapse of 12 months, accordingly, an automatic renewal defies the provisions of 
article 16 of the Rome Statute which provides for the procedure to renew a Security 
Council resolutions. This has been equated to providing ‘blanket immunity’ over 
peacekeepers for an indefinite duration. This automatic renewal attempts to amend 
the provisions of the Rome Statute contrary to international law. 
148
 
      As mentioned in Chapter Two of this dissertation, the authors of the Rome 
Statute envisaged for deferrals to be used sparingly for the purpose of temporarily 
halting judicial proceedings whenever they interfere with international peace and 
security. The Security Council resolutions passed these resolutions as a future 
preventive measure to halt future Court judicial proceedings against peacekeepers 
from non-state parties without any threat to peace, breach of the peace or an act of 
aggression. Therefore, the Security Council deferrals were contrary to the intention 
of the drafters of the Rome Statute.  
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     The first paragraph of article 16 of the Rome Statute states: ‘[n]o investigation or 
prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute … .’ The 
question that springs to mind is when does a prosecution or investigation occur? The 
Prosecutor has the power to initiate an investigation in his or her own accord 
pursuant to article 15 (1) and (2) of the Rome Statute.
149
 The term ‘initiate’ does not 
mean that the Prosecutor should ‘start’ with an investigation but it means that the 
Prosecutor has the discretion to begin with necessary preliminary steps of evaluating 
necessary material that form the basis of an actual investigation.
150
  Accordingly, the 
Prosecutor commences with the said investigation only after an authorisation from 
the Pre-Trial Chamber. Article 15(4) of the Rome Statute reads; 
If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request and the supporting material 
considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with the investigation, and the case 
appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorize the commencement of 
the investigation … . 
 Therefore, the Prosecutor can only proceed with full investigation after the Pre-Trial 
Chamber authorises him or her to do so. Consequently, the Security Council should 
only defer an investigation or prosecution after the Pre-Trial Chamber decides that 
the Prosecutor should proceed with the actual investigation in a given matter. 
Deferring an investigation which has not been authorised by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
amounts to interference in the independence of the office of the Prosecutor. In 
passing deferral resolutions in the absence of an investigation or a prosecution, the 
Security Council resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) failed to comply with the 
provisions of article 15 of the Rome Statute.  
     Similarly, it has been observed that suspects can only be identified at the 
prosecution stage. Therefore, in passing deferral resolutions before the investigation 
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      Exempting peacekeepers from the jurisdiction of the Court provides immunity 
over them contrary to the object and purpose of the Court of fighting impunity.
152
 I 
dare to state that the Security Council resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) is 
contributing to the same impunity the Court aims to fight! This contravenes article 
27 (1) of the Rome Statute which states that: ‘This Statute shall apply equally to all 
persons without distinction based on official capacity … .’ This subsection means 
that the Court has the jurisdiction to determine individual criminal responsibility 
over perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. In providing 
blanket immunity over United Nations peacekeeping forces the Security Council 
resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003)  acted in contravention of the provisions of 
article 21 of the Rome Statute which can be seen as an attempt by the Security 
Council to alter the provisions of the Rome Statute. In doing this, the Security 




4.4 Effect of these resolutions 
In passing the deferral resolutions, the Security Council resolutions attempted to 
amend the provisions of the Rome Statute which is in itself an interference with the 
work of the Court and contrary to international law. 
        The Rome Statute can be amended only by state parties pursuant to articles 121 
and 122 of the Rome Statute.
154
  The proposed amendments which are subject to 
considerations by the Assembly of Parties.
155
Article 39 of the Vienna Convention of 
the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty can generally be amended through an 
agreement by the state parties to the treaty.  
     The Security Council resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003)  attempt to alter 
article 16 of the Rome Statute contrary to the provisions of the Rome Statute and 
what the authors of the Rome Statute envisaged how the Security Council would 
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defer the judicial proceedings of the Court.
156
 The Court and the Security Council are 
two independent international organisations established through separate distinct 
treaties, thus in principle and under international law neither institution can ratify the 
other institutions treaty neither can they alter the provisions of each other’s founding 
documents.
157
 However, as seen in these two resolutions, the Security Council is 
acting beyond its powers and seems to give the message that it is above international 
law with no entity having any power to stop such interference. 
4.5 Possible remedies against the Security Council 
resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) ultra vires deferral 
resolutions.  
Article 1 of the Rome Statute reads: ‘…The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court 
shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.’ This is interpreted to mean that 
the Court should only carry out its tasks and functions as stipulated in the Rome 
Statute.
158
 In addition, article 21 of the Rome Statute notes: 
1. The Court shall apply: 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and 
rules of international law, including the established principles of the international 
law of armed conflict; 
(c) Failing that, general principles derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that 
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles 
are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally 
recognized norms and standards. 
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions. 
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with 
internationally recognized human rights…. 
This article displays the supremacy of the Rome Statute as it governs the running of 
the Court; it also recognises other sources of law that may be used to fill existing 
gaps in the Rome Statute, Elements of Crimes or the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.
159
Subsequently, in the light of the above provisions, the Court should 
establish whether the Security Council resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) 
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deferrals requests complied with the hierarchy of the applicable laws and make a 
determination on the same.
160
 So far, it has not done this. 
     The authors of the Rome Statute envisaged that deferrals to be used sparingly, 
when the pursuit of justice would interfere with the attainment of peace. But the 
exercise and conduct of the Security Council through resolutions 1422(2002) and 
1487(2003) does not reflect what the drafters envisaged.  I am of the opinion that the 
Court should in future ignore deferral requests from the Security Council resolutions 
on this basis. 
      The Security Council resolutions has a wide discretion to take suitable action in 
maintaining international peace and security pursuant to article 39 of the Charter. 
Being an international organisation it is subject to constitutional limitations set out in 
its constitutive body and it has to act within the confines of the Charter as it is not 
above the law.
161
    
      As a subject of international law, the United Nations is bound to conform to the 
rules of international law. Generally, member states to the United Nations have 
obligations arising from the Security Council resolutions to comply with its 
decisions. Article 25 states: ‘The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter.’  
     Nonetheless, these obligations are binding on member states only if the Security 
Council resolutions adopted the resolutions in good faith in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the Charter.
162
 Evidently, the Security Council resolutions 
1422(2002) and 1487(2003)  deferrals were not adopted in good faith as they did not 
conform to the provisions of the Rome Statute neither did they uphold or respect 
human rights. Further, the Security Council is further not a state, so the requests of 
the Security Council resolutions should in principle not be obligatory.   
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    The Court has the power to review Security Council resolutions passes a deferral 
which does not conform to the provisions of the Rome Statute and the principles of 
international law.
163
  When acting pursuant to Chapter VII powers under the Charter, 
the Security Council has an obligation to respect universal human rights instruments 
like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations 
Declaration on Human Rights, the Universal Bill of Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Political Rights and international humanitarian 
law. The deferral resolutions did not respect human rights law because it grants 
impunity to violators of human rights and it does not recognise the rights of victims 
in the affected areas. Therefore, member states and the Court in particular should 
question the validity of the said resolutions and if need be refuse to comply with 
deferral requests that are contrary to the aforementioned international law 
Conclusion 
In passing resolution 1422(2002) and renewing it through 1487(2002) the Security 
Council did not conform to the provisions of article 16 of the Rome Statute which 
lays out the conditions to be exercised before a deferral is passed. The deferral 
requests were passed in theoretical terms in the absence of a threat to peace, breach 
of peace or an act of aggression. Moreover, these deferral requests had an automatic 
renewal providing for a renewal after the lapse of 12 months on condition that 
conditions under article 39 of the Charter are present. Lastly, in providing for an 
automatic renewal; the Security Council resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) 
attempted to alter the provisions of the Rome Statute. Therefore, the Security 
Council acted in an ultra vires manner. 
      In granting blanket immunity to peace keepers who are non-state parties to the 
Rome Statute, the Security Council defies the general principle of equality which 
encourages different laws to be used among peacekeepers, depending on whether 
they have ratified the Rome Statute or not. 
      When assessing the need to defer investigations or prosecutions the Security 
Council should respect its primary objectives and those of the Court to ensure that 
the legitimacy and credibility of both of the offices are upheld. The Security Council 
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resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) put the relationship between the Court and 





















CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This thesis has shown that the crafters of the Rome Statute envisaged a close 
interaction between the Court and the Security Council, demonstrated through the 
latter’s exercise of referrals and deferrals of situations to the Court. However, the 
Security Council’s exercise of referrals and deferrals has been inconsistent with the 
Relationship Agreement, the Charter, the provisions of the Rome Statute and the 
intention of the drafters. As a result, this has negatively affected the relationship 
between the Court and Security Council. 
     This chapter is divided into two parts; the first section makes a conclusion of the 
issues that arose in the Security Council’s exercise of referrals and deferrals while 
the second part, recommends on how the Security Council may defer and refer in a 
way that sustains the relationship between the Security Council and the Court. 
5.2 Conclusion 
Cooperation and enforcement are two aspects that are required for a successful 
referral.  The Security Council’s referrals of the situations in Darfur and Libya to the 
Court has shown that the latter lacks a proper enforcement mechanism. Although the 
Security Council has an enforcement role to play when it refers situations to the 
Court, the former has not performed this role pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome 
Statute. This is evident when the Security Council failed to impose sanctions on 
recalcitrant states which failed to cooperate with the Court in arresting Al-Bashir and 
the Security Council’s inaction to respond to the lack of Libya’s failure to cooperate 
with the Court in surrendering Al-Islam to the Court. At the time of writing this 
dissertation, the Court has been unable to exercise jurisdiction over Al-Bashir nine 
years after the Security Council referral. Similarly, the Court has been unable to 
prosecute Al-Islam three years after the Security Council referral of the situation in 
Libya to the Court. This has lowered the credibility and legitimacy of the Court.  
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      In passing deferral resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487 (2003), the Security Council 
did not conform to the intention of the authors of the Rome Statute. This is evident 
when the Security Council passed deferral resolutions in the absence of a threat to 
peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression. Moreover, the Security Council 
did not act in accordance with the conditions laid out in both the Charter and the 
Rome Statute before exercising of these deferrals.  
      Through the exercise of referrals and deferrals, the Security Council has failed to 
promote a close relationship with the Court contrary to the intention of the authors of 
the Rome Statute, the Relationship Agreement, the Charter and the Rome Statute 
itself. 
      In passing the deferral resolutions, the Security Council weakened the 
relationship between the Court and the Security Council contrary to what was 
envisaged by the crafters of the Rome Statute and the Relationship Agreement. 
Consequently, both of the independent international organisations fail to fulfil their 
mutual objective which lowers the credibility of both the Court and the Security 
Council. 
5.3 The way forward 
There is a need to strengthen the relationship between the Court and the Security 
Council  to ensure that both entities fulfil their mutual objectives of prosecuting 
serious international crimes and maintaining international peace and security 
pursuant to the provisions if the Rome Statute and the Charter respectively. 
      When referring situations, the Security Council should stress in the referral 
resolutions the importance of all states to cooperate with the Court. This will impose 
obligations on all states to collaborate with the Court for successful referrals. Also, 
the Security Council should be ready to help the Court to enforce cooperation 
requests by imposing sanctions on states that fail to fulfil these obligations. 
      The Court and the Security Council have to cooperate effectively in order to 
fulfil their roles of fighting the culture of impunity and maintaining peace and 
security. Nonetheless, the failure of the Security Council to cooperate with the Court 
in enforcing decisions after a referral or failing to conform to the conditions of 
deferral lowers the credibility and legitimacy of the Court.  
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      The Security Council should employ soft and hard measures pursuant to 40 or 41 
of the Charter to compel recalcitrant states to cooperate with the Court as a way of 
maintaining peace and security as it simultaneously enforces the Court’s decisions. 
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The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) provides for a 
close relationship between the International Criminal Court (Court) and the United 
Nations Security Council (Security Council). This relationship is demonstrated through 
Security Council exercise of referrals and deferrals. This dissertation discusses first, the 
Security Council referrals of the situations in Darfur, Sudan and Libya. Second, the 
Security Council passing of resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003), which deferred the 
Court from commencing any investigations or prosecuting of any crimes that could 
have arisen as a result of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. 
     This dissertation argues that  the Security Council has exercised referrals and 
deferrals contrary to the Rome Statute, the Charter of the United Nations (the Charter), 
and the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the Court and the Security Council 
(Relationship Agreement) as envisaged by the drafters of the Rome Statute.  
     It concludes by stating  that, the relationship between the Court and the Security 
Council is at a crossroad because the latter has failed to exercise referrals and deferrals 
in the manner provided for in the Rome Statute and as envisioned during the drafting of 







































OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
1.0 Introduction  
The authors of the Rome Statute envisioned a close relationship between the Court 
and the Security Council. This relationship is realised through the Negotiated 
Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United 
Nations (Relationship Agreement).The Relationship Agreement not only sets out the 
terms on which the Court and Security Council should relate but also lays 
obligations on both entities to respect each other’s mandates and to cooperate in 
order to achieve mutual obligations.
1
 These mutual obligations are prosecuting 
serious international crimes which concern the international community and 
maintaining international peace and security.  
     The Court was established by the Rome Statute to determine individual criminal 
responsibility and punish perpetrators of egregious human rights violations. Article 1 
of the Rome Statute states: ‘A court is hereby established .It shall be a permanent 
institution and shall have power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most 
serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute … .’ Pursuant to 
article 5 of the Rome Statute, ‘the Court has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and aggression.’
2
  
 On the other hand, the Security Council plays the role of maintaining 
international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. Article 24 (1) of 
the Charter reads that:  
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer 
on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security 




                                                          
1
 Article 3 of the Relationship Agreement reads: ‘The United Nations and the Court agree that, with a 
view to facilitating the effective discharge of their respective responsibilities, they shall cooperate 
closely …and consult each other on matters of mutual interest pursuant to the provisions of the 
present Agreement and in conformity with the respective provisions of the Charter and the Statute.’ 
2
 Presently, the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression after the Rome 
Statute is amended and the amendment is ratified by at least a third of the state parties. 
3
 United Nations ‘Charter of the United Nations’ available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml#article24, accessed on 21 July 2014. 
2 
 
     It is important to note that, while the Court has the role of prosecuting serious 
international crimes which shock the international community, the Security Council 
maintains international peace and security pursuant to Chapter VII powers of the 
Charter. Consequently, their primary roles overlap because the crimes that fall within 
the jurisdiction of the Court have the ability to threaten international peace and 
security.
4
 It is worth noting that, the prosecution of perpetrators who commit 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or acts of aggression deters potential 
criminals from committing serious international crimes which may destabilise 
international peace and security. 
5
 In this regard, the Security Council and the Court 
require mutual collaboration for effective discharge of their roles.  
     The Rome Statute acknowledges the role that the Security Council plays in 
maintaining international peace and security through empowering it to exercise 
referrals and deferrals . 
     This chapter commences the discussion on the relationship between the Court and 
the Security Council in the context of referrals and deferrals. It does this by 
examining the provisions of the International Law Commission’s Draft Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Draft Statute of the Court), the Ad Hoc Committee of 
the Court and the reports of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court (Preparatory Committee). It evaluates the delegates’ 
views on the relationship of the Court and Security Council at the Rome Conference 
as well as the provisions of the Rome Statute that regulate the said relationship. 
     This chapter lays a basis for discussions in chapters Three and Four which 
focuses on how the Security Council exercised referrals and deferrals and evaluates 
whether this exercise complied with how the drafters of the Rome Statute envisaged 
them and the provisions of the Rome Statute itself. 
 
                                                          
4
 Paragraph 3 of the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court 
and the United Nations. 
5
 L Condorelli and S Villalpando ‘Relationship of the Court with the United Nations’ in Antonio 




     To understand how the relationship between the Court and the Security Council is 
structured, it is necessary to evaluate the drafting history of the relationship between 
the Court and the Security Council. 
1.1 The road to the establishment of the Court 
The United Nations General Assembly (General Assembly) established the 
International Law Commission whose aim was to research on the viability of 
establishing an international organ to prosecute genocide.
6
 The International Law 
Commission negotiated the Draft Statute of the Court, which laid the basis for future 
discussions on the proposed Court. Additionally, the International Law Commission 
proposed the establishment of an International Criminal Court and of an Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Ad Hoc 
Committee) whose mandate was to review the substantive decisions of the Draft 
Statute of the Court. 
7
 Following the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, the General 
Assembly established the Preparatory Committee to consolidate the drafts. Finally, 
the General Assembly held a United Nations’ Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of the International Criminal Court  (Rome Conference), which was 
characterised by extensive discussions on the drafts of the establishment of the Court 
by states, and lead to the adoption of the Rome Statute.
8
 
(a) International Law Commission, Ad Hoc Committee and Preparatory 
Committee 
The International Law Commission envisaged a close relationship between the Court 
and the Security Council.  Article 2 of the Draft Statute of the Court states that: 
‘[t]he President with the approval of the state parties to this Statute (“State parties”) 
may conclude an agreement establishing an appropriate relationship between the 
Court and the United Nations.’9 
                                                          
6
 M Bassiouni ‘The journey to a permanent International Criminal Court’ in M Bassiouni (ed) 
International Criminal Court: Compilation of United Nations Documents and Draft Statute before the 
Diplomatic Conference (1998) page xvii. 
7
Coalition for the International Criminal Court ‘History of the ICC’ available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=icchistory accessed on 20 July 2014 para 2. 
8
 M Bassiouni ‘The journey to a permanent International Criminal Court’ in M Bassiouni (ed) 
International Criminal Court: Compilation of United Nations Documents and Draft Court Statute 
before the Diplomatic Conference (1998) page xvii. 
9
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        The Preparatory Committee negotiated for a close relationship between the 
Court and the Security Council. Article 2 of the Preparatory Committee reiterated the 
provisions of the International Law Commission’s Draft Statute of the Court, which 
sought a close relationship between the Court and the United Nations which was to 
be enforced through an agreement.
10
 
    Similarly, the Ad Hoc Committee considered the relationship as ‘an essential 
condition of the universality and moral authority of the new institution and, as well 
as of its financial and administrative viability.’
11
 
    Consequently, the Ad Hoc Committee viewed the relationship as the source of 
credibility and legitimacy for the Court and also as a way of facilitating the work of 
the Court. Thus, the Relationship Agreement was viewed as a way of promoting 
cooperation between the two institutions.  
(b) The Rome Conference  
The relationship between the Court and the Security Council was a contentious topic 
during the negotiation of the Rome Statute. At the initial stages of the negotiation, 
many delegates viewed the relationship between the Court and the Security Council 
as a threat and an impediment against the achievement of either the Court or the 
Security Council objectives. 
      A vast majority of delegates at the Rome Conference heavily debated upon the 
Security Council’s proposed power of referrals and deferrals. The debate ranged 
between two opposing factions; one side opposed the relationship between the two 
on the basis that the Court was an independent judicial body which had to be 
insulated from political interference with regard to its functions. Conversely, the 
supporters of the Security Council argued that the jurisdiction of the Court would 




        As the negotiations proceeded, the majority of the delegates supported a 
relationship between the Court and the Security Council but subject to conditions. 
                                                          
10
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Canada, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Lesotho, Belgium, 
Brazil and Denmark opted for a close relationship between the Court and the 
Security Council only if the latter respected the Court as an independent legal 
institution.  A Canadian representative stated: ‘The Court would need to have a 
constructive relationship with the United Nations, while preserving its independence 
and impartiality. The Security Council could play a useful role in referring matters to 
the Court.’
 13  
        Additionally, China supported the need for a close relationship between the 
Court and the Security Council, as long as the provisions of the Rome Statute were 
not contrary with the provisions of the Charter.
14
 On the other hand, Australia 
supported a relationship between the two entities only if the Court acknowledged the 
Security Council’s primary role in maintaining peace and security. The Australian 
representative stated: ‘There must also be a workable relationship between the Court 
and the Security Council, recognizing the Council's primacy in matters relating to 
international peace and security.’
 15 
During the Rome Conference, the Rome Statute 
was adopted after ratification by 160 states.
16
  It emphasised the importance for close 
interactions between the Court and the Security Council. 
(c) The relationship between the Rome Statute of the Court and the Security   
Council 
 Paragraph 8 of the preamble of the Rome Statute states as follows: ‘Determined to 
these ends and for the sake of present and future generations, to establish an 
independent permanent International Criminal Court in relationship with the United 
Nations system, with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes … .’  
                                                          
13
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     In addition, article 2 of the Rome Statute provides that: ‘The Court shall be 
brought into relationship with the United Nations through an agreement to be 
approved by the Assembly of State Parties to this Statute and therefore concluded by 
the President of the Court on its behalf.’  
      The need for a close relationship between the Court and the Security Council was 
important for a number of reasons. First, in punishing perpetrators who commit 
serious international crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
the Court contributes towards maintaining international peace and security. 
17
 
Secondly, in referring a situation to the Court, the Security Council extends the 
jurisdiction of the Court over non-state parties to the Rome Statute.
18
 Thirdly, the 
Court relies on the Security Council for enforcement of its decisions.
19
 The Security 
Council promotes the credibility and legitimacy of the Court when it enforces its 
decisions under article 86 of the Rome Statute. This dissertation will discuss at 
length the referrals and deferrals under articles 13(b) and 16 of the Rome Statute of 
the Court in Chapters Three and Four. 
      The Rome Statute, therefore, lays out the foundation of the relationship between 
the Court and the Security Council through; paragraph 8 of the preamble and article 
2 of the Rome Statute. Additionally, articles 13(b) and 16 of the Rome Statute 
further acknowledge the relationship between the two institutions while laying out 
the conditions and the nature of the relationship between the Court and the Security 
Council. 
     After the adoption of the Rome Statute, the President of the Assembly of Parties 
of the Court and the Secretary General of the Security Council signed the 
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(d) The Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal 
Court and the United Nations 
Presently, the Relationship Agreement provides for a close relationship between the 
Court and the United Nations. The purpose of the Relationship Agreement is to bring 
the two entities into a relationship pursuant to the Rome Statute and the Charter.
21
 
The Relationship Agreement obliges the Court and the Security Council to cooperate 
closely to ensure the attainment of their objectives. The effect of the Relationship 
Agreement is that it ties the Security Council to the Court therefore, both 
independent organisations have the obligation to cooperate with each other to ensure 
the effective discharge of their functions pursuant to the provisions of the 
Relationship Agreement, the Charter and the Rome Statute. 
22
 
1.2 Objectives of the study 
The objectives of this study are to examine the interaction between the Court and the 
Security Council which is demonstrated through referrals and deferrals, then to 
evaluate whether the Security Council has exercised this relationship in accordance 
with the provisions of the Rome Statute as envisaged during the drafting of the 
Rome Statute. 
1.3 Research questions 
This study seeks to answer: 
(a) Whether the Security Council exercised referrals and deferrals in accordance 
with the provisions of the Rome Statute, the Charter and as envisaged by the 
drafters of the Rome Statute. 
(b) How the Security Council’s exercise of the power of referrals and deferrals 
has affected the relationship between the latter and the Court. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
This research is conducted from primary and secondary resources. The primary 
sources will include the Rome Statute, the Charter, the Relationship Agreement, the 
International Law Commission’s Draft Statute of the Court and the reports of the 
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entered into by the United Nations and the International Criminal Court … defines the terms on which 
the United Nations and the Court shall be brought into relationship.’ 
22
 The Relationship Agreement Op cit (no) 1. 
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Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. It 
also includes cases which arose from the situations in Darfur and Libya, while the 
secondary sources entail textbooks on international criminal law and the Security 
Council, journals will be drawn from the Court and United Nations websites. 
 1.5 Chapter outline 
Chapter One introduces the relationship between the Court and the Security Council 
by examining how the crafters of the Rome Statute envisaged that relationship, and 
how legislation provides for the relationship at present. 
      Chapter Two provides an overview of how the Security Council’s exercise of 
referrals and deferrals was envisaged during the making of the Rome Statute.  
      Chapter Three examines the Security Council power of referrals under article 
13(b) of the Rome Statute. It examines how the Security Council exercised its power 
of referral in the situations in Darfur and Libya. It deals with the issues that arose 
from these referrals, such as the failure of states to cooperate with the Court for 
effective prosecution of President Omar Al-Bashir and Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi for 
crimes against humanity. Moreover, it looks at the failure of the Security Council in 
both situations to back up the referrals. Finally, the chapter examines the 
enforcement mechanisms available to the Court and whether the Security Council 
has enforced the Court’s decisions. 
      Chapter Four, evaluates the deferral of investigations by the Security Council to 
the Court under article 16 of the Rome Statute. Generally, this chapter focuses on 
Security Council deferral resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487 (2003) which grants 
immunity to United Nations peacekeepers from non-state parties, thus excluding 
them from the jurisdiction of the Court. First, it begins by examining the Security 
Council deferral powers and the conditions to be fulfilled before the exercise of a 
deferral. It examines whether the Security Council resolutions on deferral were 
consistent with the provisions of the Rome Statute.      
      Chapter Five concludes by stating that the Security Council has exercised 
referrals and deferrals contrary to the provisions of the Relationship Agreement, the 
Charter, the Rome Statute and as envisaged by the crafters of the Rome Statute. 
Consequently, it argues that the relationship between the Court and the Security 
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Council is at a crossroad and proceeds to recommend for the two international 
organisations to improve their relationship. 
 





REFERRALS AND DEFERALS AS ENVISAGED BY THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW COMMISSION AND THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE 
 
 2.0 Introduction  
As mentioned in Chapter One, the drafters of the Rome Statute envisioned a close 
relationship between the Court and the Security Council. This interaction was 
essential to facilitate mutual achievement of each of the independent organisations’ 
objectives. 
      This chapter focuses on the provisions of the International Law Commission’s 
Draft Statute of the Court and the reports of the Preparatory Committee on referrals 
and deferrals. It seeks to provide a background to how the drafters of the Rome 
Statute envisioned the Security Council’s exercise of referrals and deferrals. It also 
evaluates the views of the delegates at the Rome Conference on the proposed powers 
of the Security Council to refer situations and defer prosecutions and investigations. 
     The chapter commences by laying out the provisions of referrals and deferrals as 
provided for by the International Law Commission and the Preparatory Committee. 
It argues that the crafters of the Rome Statute envisaged for the Security Council to 
refer situations within the jurisdiction of the Court to the latter and halt 
investigations and prosecutions as a way of maintaining international peace and 
security. However, the exercise of referrals and deferrals was subject to conditions 
laid out in the Draft Statute of the Court and the reports of Preparatory Committee. 
For instance, when exercising referrals, the Security Council has to adopt a 
resolution pursuant to the provisions of the Charter. Further, it has to refer a 
‘situation’ as opposed to a ‘matter’.  
      On the other hand, the Security Council can only exercise deferrals sparingly 
when the pursuit of justice interferes with the attainment of peace. Just like referrals, 
deferrals must be adopted through a formal Security Council resolution. For a 
deferral to be valid, there must be a threat to peace, a breach of peace or an act of 
aggression at the time of its adoption. Lastly, the Security Council can halt the 
Court’s investigations or proceedings for only a year, but this is renewable, 
11 
 
depending on whether the prior conditions on which the deferral was first adopted 
still exist. 
2.1 Referrals as envisaged by the International Law 
Commission and the Preparatory Committee 
(a) The  International Law Commission 
Initially, a vast majority of states at the Rome Conference for the establishment of 
the Court were against the Security Council referral of situations for prosecution to 
the Court, unsurprisingly, many states objected strongly against the Security 
Council’s power to defer Court’s investigations and prosecutions.  The delegates 
perceived referrals as an interference of the work of an independent judicial body.
23
 
      However, the Draft Statute of the Court recognised the importance of a 
relationship between the Court and the Security Council. It recognised the essence of 
referring ‘matters’ to the Court article 23(1) of the Draft Statute of the Court read 
that: ‘Notwithstanding article 21, the Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this 
Statute with respect to crimes referred to in article 20 as a consequence of the 
referral of a matter to the Court by the Security Council acting under chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations.’        
       The Draft Statute of the Court therefore envisioned a close interaction between 
the two entities which was demonstrated through the referral of ‘matters’ by the 
Security Council to the Court. However, the Court had to seek permission from the 
Security Council before it exercised jurisdiction on matters or situations within its 
jurisdiction over which the Security Council was acting upon.
24
The only cure to the 
foreseen power imbalance between the Court and the Security Council was to 
acknowledge the role played the Security Council in maintaining peace and security 
and thus allow the latter to exercise referrals in a way that would not affect the 
independence of the Court.
25
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         As the negotiations proceeded, delegates supported the Security Council 
referral of ‘situations’ as opposed to ‘matters’ to the Court in order to obviate the 
need to create more ad hoc tribunals for prosecution of egregious human rights 
violations. Sweden stated as follows: ‘The Security Council, under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, should indeed be able to refer to the Court 
situations in which crimes under the Court's jurisdiction appeared to have been 




        It is evident from this discussion that the International Law Commission 
envisaged a close interaction between the two international organisations through the 
referral of matters and the deferral of the Court’s judicial proceedings. The 
discussion on whether the Security Council was to refer ‘situations’ as opposed to 
‘matters’ will be discussed in the subsequent subsection. 
(b)    The Preparatory Committee’s discussion one the referral of ‘matters’ or 
‘situations’ by Security Council to the Court  
The Preparatory Committee was not certain on whether the Security Council should 
refer matters or situations to the Court. Pursuant to article 10(1) of the Preparatory 
Committee:  
[N]otwithstanding article 6, [7] [and [9], the court has jurisdiction in accordance with this 
statute with respect to crimes [referred to][specified] in articles [as a consequence of the 
referral of ][on the basis of a [formal]decision to refer a [matter] [situation] in which one or 
more crimes appear to have been committed  to [the Prosecutor of] the Court by the Security 
Council[acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations] in accordance with 
the terms of such referral.]
27  
    The debate on whether the Security Council should refer ‘situations’ or ‘matters’ 
to the Court arose at this stage, as mentioned earlier, the draft statute of the Court 
allowed the Security Council to refer ‘matters’. Many delegates opposed for the 
Security Council to refer ‘matters’ to the Court as the term was considered to be 
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limited in scope and would subsequently affect the independence of the Court to 
prosecute, thus the term ‘situation’ was preferred as it was general in nature and 
would not interfere with  the independence of the Court.
28
  
The Draft Statute of the Court, proposed for the Security Council to refer ‘matters’ 













 Bosnia and Herzegovina
35
 and other 
delegates preferred for the Security Council to refer ‘situations’ to the Court as 
opposed to ‘matters’. It was agreed that the Security Council could only refer 
situations to the Court in order to respect the office of the Prosecutor of the Court 
and hence promote the independence of the Court.
36
 
      However, other states opposed the exercise of referral by the Security Council to 
the Court. India expressed the lack of support for the Security Council referrals. The 
Indian representative argued that referring situations to the Court was unnecessary 
because the Court could exercise jurisdiction through the initiation by the Prosecutor 
and by state party referrals.  India stated as follows; ‘[T]he Security Council had set 
up ad hoc tribunals because no appropriate judicial mechanism had existed to try 
such crimes at the time, but with the establishment of the Court, States parties would 
have the right to refer cases to it. The Council did not need to refer cases ... .’
37
 
       From the reports of the Preparatory Committee, it is evident that the spirit of the 
Rome Statute was to create a close interaction between the Security Council and the 
Court through the referral of situations which would maintain international peace 
and security as it preserved the independence of the Court.  
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2.2 Deferrals as envisaged by the International Law 
Commission and the Preparatory Committee 
(a) Deferrals under the International Law Commission 
The Draft Statute of the Court formed a basis for future negotiations of the Security 
Council power of deferrals in the Ad Hoc Committee and the Preparatory 
Committee. Article 23 (3) of the Draft Statute of the Court provided as follows: ‘No 
prosecution may be commenced under this Statute arising from a situation which is 
being dealt with by the Security Council as a threat to or breach of the peace or an 




     Although the Draft Statute of the Court acknowledged the role of the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, it also proposed a vertical relationship 
between the Court and the Security Council. Evidently, article 23(3) of the Draft 
Statute for the Court imposed certain obligations on the Court before the latter 
exercised jurisdiction which was that, the Court had to ascertain whether the Security 
Council was dealing with a situation which threatened international peace and 
security and then refrain from exercising jurisdiction in such a given situation.  
     Delegates opposed this provision because it meant that the Court had to seek the 
Security Council’s permission before it exercised jurisdiction upon a situation which 
the Security Council was dealing with. The Court’s request was subject to a veto by 
any of the permanent members of the Security Council.
39
  
     Seeking permission from the Security Council before exercising jurisdiction on a 
situation would obstruct the Court from conducting judicial proceedings because, as 
already mentioned, the request was subject to a veto and the process of requesting 
would considerably delay the Court in fulfilling its objectives. Further, it would have 
made the Court to be dependent on the Security Council, this would affect the 
independence of the Court. 
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(b) Deferrals  under the Preparatory Committee  
During the negotiation of the Security Council’s power of deferrals, majority of the 
delegates were of the view that deferring the Court’s investigations and prosecutions 
was unnecessary because it amounted to a political interference in the work of an 
independent legal institution.  
     Many states including, Nigeria, Malawi, Philippines amongst others, argued that 
allowing the Security Council to defer the Court’s investigations or prosecutions 
would interfere with the independent functioning of the Court. 
40
 Other states 
opposed the Security Council’s exercise of deferrals as there was fear of the 




      India objected strongly to the involvement of the Security Council in the judicial 
proceedings of the Court, therefore it did not support referrals and deferrals of the 
Security Council to the Court. The Indian representative stated as follows: 
‘The power to block proceedings was even harder to accept .On the one hand, it was argued 
that the Court was to try crimes of the gravest magnitude, yet on the other, it was argued that 
the maintenance of international peace and security might require that those who committed 
such crimes should be permitted to escape justice, if the Council so decided.’
42
  
Singapore made a proposal which found middle ground between states who were 
against the Security Council’s exercise of deferrals and those who strongly believed 
that the Security Council should be allowed to halt the investigations or prosecutions 
of the Court. The Singapore compromise made it harder for the Security Council to 
misuse the power of deferrals.
43
  The proposal allowed the Security Council to halt 
investigations or prosecutions of the Court only after passing a formal resolution 
which was subject to a veto by any of the permanent members. The Singapore 
compromise read as follows: 
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 ‘No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute 
 where the Security Council has, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
 Nations, given a direction to that effect.’
 44
 
On the other hand, Canada agreed with the Singaporean proposal and added a time 
limitation before the exercise of deferrals. Canada proposed that: 
‘No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this statute for 
a period of twelve months where the Security Council has been acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, notified the Court to that effect. Notification that the 
Security Council is continuing to act may be renewed at twelve months intervals.’
45
 
 A deferral was envisaged to be exercised in limited occasions when the attainment 
of justice would interfere with the maintenance of peace and security.
46
 The 
Canadian proposal enabled the Court to proceed with legal proceedings after a year, 
if the Security Council did not request a renewal.  
       The time limit avoided the probable seizing of the situations by the Security 
Council over an undefined period of time which would have had the effect of 
delaying the Court from exercising its judicial activities.         
      A huge majority of states in the Rome Conference supported the Canadian and 
Singaporean proposals as the formal request by the Security Council to the Court 
acknowledged the independence of both of the entities. Further the limitation of time 
enabled the Court to proceed with its judicial activities after the lapse of twelve 
months in the absence of a formal request of an extension by the Security Council. 
     The Canadian proposal was widely supported by the delegates who agreed that it 
was necessary for the Security Council to temporarily suspend legal proceedings if 
they affected the maintenance of international peace and security.
47
    
Conclusion 
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At the initial stages of the negotiations of the Rome Statute delegates were opposed 
to the involvement of the Security Council in the work of the Court. They perceived 
the involvement of the Security Council as an interference of a political organ in the 
work of an independent judicial body. However, as the negotiations of the Rome 
Statute proceeded, delegates agreed for the Security Council to refer situations and 
defer investigations and prosecutions subject to certain conditions.  
     Both referrals and deferrals were to be adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter 
through a formal Security Council resolution. The Security Council could only refer 
situations as opposed to matters to the Prosecutor of the Court. Finally, with regard 
to deferrals, the Security Council could only defer an investigation or prosecution for 
twelve months which was subject to a renewal through a Security Council resolution. 
      From the above discussion, it is evident that the founders of the Rome Statute 
were apprehensive about the interference of the Security Council in the work of the 
Court. However, mechanisms were put in place to ensure that the Security Council 
did not misuse the powers of referrals and deferrals. The subsequent chapters discuss 
whether the Security Council has complied with the said mechanism in the exercise 







THE SECURITY COUNCIL EXERCISE OF REFERRALS IN 
DARFUR AND LIBYA 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have set out at length how the crafters of the Rome Statute 
envisaged a close interaction between the Court and the Security Council as a way of 
ensuring successful prosecution of serious crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction and 
maintaining international peace and security. 
     This chapter focuses on the Security Council referral of the situations in Libya 
and Darfur to the Court and the issues arising from them. It discusses firstly, the 
failure of state parties and non-state parties to fulfil their arrest and surrender 
obligations arising from the Rome Statute and the Charter respectively; secondly, the 
failure of the Security Council to cooperate with the Court after the latter sent the 
Security Council a finding pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute. The finding 
informed the Security Council of two things, first the non-cooperation of state parties 
and secondly, that non-state parties had to comply with obligations emanating from 
the Security Council resolutions and the provisions of the Rome Statute. 
      It argues that for successful referrals, the Court requires cooperation from state 
parties, non-state parties and the Security Council. The failure of these entities to 
cooperate has made both the Darfur and Libyan referrals unsuccessful up to date.      
This chapter is divided into five parts. The first part briefly highlights how the 
Security Council can exercise jurisdiction, it then discusses the history of the onflicts 
in Darfur and Libya; the chapter proceeds to examine the state’s obligations arising 
from the Security Council referrals. It studies the need for states to cooperate with 
the Court and the enforcement mechanisms available to the Court after the Security 
Council refers situations to the latter. Also, it examines whether the Security 
Council’s has enforced the said mechanisms after referring the situations to the 
Court. Finally, the chapter concludes by stating that the inaction of the Security 
Council to respond to the states non-cooperation, strains the relationship between the 
two international organisations contrary to what the authors of the Rome Statute 
envisaged, the provisions of the Rome Statute and the Relationship Agreement. 
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Consequently, in the nine years after the Security Council referral of the situation in 
Darfur, President Omar Al-Bashir (Al-Bashir) has not been surrendered to the Court. 
Similarly, in the Libyan case, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Al-Islam) has not been 
surrendered to the Court, in the five years after the Security Council referred the 
situation in Libya to the Court.   
 3.2 The Security Council exercise of referrals  
The Prosecutor of the Court can exercise jurisdiction only in the following instances: 
first, through a state party referral, second, when the Security Council refers a 
situation to the Court acting under article 13(b) of the Rome Statute and third, when 
he or she acts in their own accord to initiate investigations. 
      Pursuant to article 13(b)
48
 of the Rome Statute, the Security Council has the 
power to refer situations in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court has been committed.  
      When the Security Council refers a situation to the Court, it has to comply with 
the conditions arising from the Rome Statute. First, the Security Council can only 
refer ‘situations’ in which one or more crimes have been committed according to the 
Rome Statute of the Court. As previously mentioned in Chapter Two of this thesis, 
the crafters of the Rome Statute preferred the term ‘situation’ to ‘matter,’ because the 
former would uphold the independence of the Court. Second, the Security Council 
must act under Chapter VII of the Charter when referring situations to the Court. 
Subsequently, the referral of a situation to the Court should be exercised after the 
Security Council has established the existence of a breach of peace or threat to 
peace.  
      The effects of Security Council referrals are that, firstly, it enhances international 
criminal justice through extending the jurisdiction of the Court over non-state 
parties. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Court extends over all states irrespective of 
whether they are parties to the Rome Statute or not.
49
 Secondly, the Security 
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 C Heyder ‘The UN Security Council’s referral of the crimes in Darfur to the International Criminal 
Court in light of U.S position to the Court: Implications for the International Criminal Court’s 
functions and status ’(2006) J.INT’L LAW 650. 
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Council’s referrals to the Court increases the legitimacy of the Court as it obviates 
with the need to create ad hoc tribunals to investigate and prosecute the situations in 
Darfur and Libya.
50
 Thirdly, Security Council’s referrals can be viewed as a tool for 
maintaining international peace and security
51
 thus, the Darfur and Libya referrals 
can be viewed as measures of restoring international peace and security without the 
use of force as stipulated under articles 39 to 41 of the Charter.
52
  
     So far and at the time of writing this thesis, the Security Council has referred only 





     With regard to the situation in Darfur, Sudan the Prosecutor applied for a warrant 
of arrest against Al-Bashir. The Pre-Trial Chamber issued a warrant of arrest against 
him for crimes against humanity and war crimes.
55
 The Pre Trial-Chamber issued a 
second warrant of arrest against Al-Bashir for committing genocide.
 56
 Presently, the 
war in Darfur between the Sudanese government and the rebel forces still persist. 
57
 
Subsequently, nine years after the Security Council referral of the situation in Darfur 
to the Court, and five years after the Court issued a warrant of arrest against Al-
Bashir, the suspect has not been prosecuted to the Court. 
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      In the Libyan situation, the Pre-Trial Chamber I issued warrants of arrest against 
Al-Islam, Muammar Gaddafi
58
 and Abdullah Al-Senussi.
59
 Al-Islam was charged 
with murder and persecution as crime against humanity
60
  while Abdullah Al-
Senussi was charged with murder and crimes against humanity. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber I decided that complementarity rendered the Court’s proceedings against 
Abdullah Al- Senussi inadmissible because Libya was conducting proceedings 
against him for the same charges.
61
On 21 May 2014, the Appeals Chamber ruled that 
the case against AI- Islam was admissible before the Court and reiterated Libya’s 
obligations to surrender him.
62
Therefore, Libya is yet to surrender Al-Islam to the 
Court. 
3.3 Background to the conflicts  
3.3.1 Darfur 
The conflict in Darfur arose between the Sudanese government and rebel groups. 
The conflict resulted in many deaths, displacement of people and wanton destruction 
of property.
63
The United Nations Human Rights Experts called for the Security 
Council to take effective measures to end egregious human rights violations in 




      The Security Council requested the Secretary General to establish an 
International Commission of Inquiry to investigate the human rights violations and 
to determine if genocide had occurred. The Commission identified the perpetrators 
and proposed for the Security Council to refer the situation in Darfur to the 
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Prosecutor of the Court.
65





On 18 February 2011, the Libyans protested against the Muammar Gaddafi’s 
dictatorship.
67
 Gaddafi responded by using excessive force against the Libyan people 




      The Security Council, invoking its Chapter VII powers under the Charter, passed 
sanctions on Gaddafi and his family and referred the situation to the Court.
 69
 The 
Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Libya, a travel ban, freezing of the 
assets of Gaddafi, his family members and some military officers.
 
 
3.4 State obligations  
3.4.1 Non-state party cooperation 
International law does not impose any obligations to third states who have not 
ratified a treaty. Customary international law recognises that states can be bound to 
the terms of a treaty only if they expressly consent to it as provided in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.
70
 
       Theoretically, as non-state parties to the Rome Statute, Sudan and Libya have no 
obligations arising from the Rome Statute.  
      Conversely, there are two ways in which non-state parties are obliged to 
cooperate with the Court: firstly, when the non-state party enters into an ad hoc 
arrangement with the Court under articles 12(3)
71
 and 87(5) (a) and (b) of the Rome 
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 Secondly, non-state parties have an obligation to cooperate with the Court 
emanating from the Security Council resolutions as members of the United Nations. 
In referring the situations in Darfur and Libya, the referrals obliged both non-state 
parties to cooperate with the Court because they are members of the United Nations.  
      Paragraph 2 of the Security Council 1593(2005) resolution that referred the 
situation in Darfur reads: 
 ‘Decides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall 
cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor 
pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute 
have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other 
international organizations to cooperate fully;’ 
73 
Similarly, the Security Council resolution in the situation in Libya reiterated the 
same provisions
74
, thereby making it compulsory for the two countries to comply 
with the Security Council directions. 
      Cooperation obliges states to act in good faith with a view to fulfilling 
international obligations.
75
Both Sudan and Libya have obligations to cooperate with 
the Court and these obligations stem from their membership to the United Nations. 




      As high contracting parties to the Geneva Conventions, Sudan and Libya are 
obliged to act in accordance with the provisions of the Charter in cases of egregious 
                                                                                                                                                                    
with respect to the crime in question .The  accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without 
delay or exception in accordance with Part 9.’ 
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 The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court are similar 
to those that state parties to the Geneva Conventions agreed to respect.
78
  
     Therefore, the Security Council decision requiring non-state parties to cooperate 
with the Court blurs the distinction between state and non-state party obligations 
because all states are obligated to cooperate with the Court.
79
  
 3.4.2 International cooperation with the Court 
In identifying issues related to the prosecution by international criminal tribunals. 
Antonio Cassese likens the International Criminal Court of Yugoslavia to ‘a giant 
without arms and legs — it needs artificial limbs to walk and work.’
 80
 Similarly, the 
Court requires cooperation from the Security Council, state parties, non-state parties 
and international organisations in order to effectively fulfil its functions, otherwise 
the Court’s decisions are likened to the proverbial harmless toothless watchdog. The 
Court requires the Security Council to enforce its decisions when states fail to 
cooperate with it with respect to referrals.  
      Lack of cooperation from state and non-state parties hinders the Court from 
prosecuting serious crimes. The failure of the Security Council to enforce its 
decisions makes it more difficult for the Court to try accused persons or even avail 
them before the Court because it requires and relies on the cooperation of the state 
parties and other entities in locating indicted persons, arresting, detaining and 
surrendering of the accused persons to the Court for trial.   
      State parties to the Court are required to provide full cooperation at all times 
when so requested by the Court during investigations and prosecutions unless the 
information so requested may affect the states national security.
81
 
                                                          
77
 Article 89 of Protocol I  Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of victims 
of international armed conflicts states that; ‘In situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of 
this Protocol the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, in cooperation with 
the United Nations and in conformity with the United Nations Charter.’  
78
 G Nesi ‘The obligation to cooperate with the International Criminal Court and state parties not 
party to the Statute’ in Mauro Politi et al (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; 
A Challenge to Impunity (2001) page 28.   
79
 L Condorelli and A Ciampi ‘Comments on the Security Council referral of the situation in Darfur to 
the ICC’ 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005) page 594. 
80
 A Cassese ‘On the current trend towards criminal prosecution and punishment of breaches of 
international humanitarian law’ 9 EJIL (1998). 
81
 P Machochoko ‘Judicial Cooperation and judicial assistance’ in Roy S Lee The International 
Criminal Court, the Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results (1999) page 32. 
25 
 
     The obligation of state parties to cooperate with the Court stems from article 86 
of the Rome Statute which states, ‘State Parties shall … cooperate fully with the 
Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.’ 
 3.4.2.1 The travelling tyrant 
After the issuance of the arrest warrant on Al-Bashir, the Registrar of the Court made 
cooperation requests and submitted them to all state parties to arrest and surrender 
him if he visited their territories.
82
 Nonetheless, Al-Bashir travelled to territories of 



















 None of the countries 
complied with the provisions of the Security Council resolution 1593(2003) or with 
the cooperation requests to execute outstanding arrest warrants of Al-Bashir. 
       As mentioned earlier, in 3.4 of this chapter, both state parties and non-state 
parties to the Court have an obligation to cooperate with it. These obligations arise 
from the Rome Statute with regard to state parties and from the Charter with regard 
to non-state parties. The Pre-Trial Chamber II stated as follows in that regard: 
 ...[O]nly States Parties to the Statute are under an obligation to cooperate with the Court.  ... 
[N]on-States Parties may decide to cooperate with the Court on an ad hoc basis... . This 
                                                          
82
 International Criminal Court ‘Report of the registry on the decision on the prosecution's urgent 
notification of travel in the case of The Prosecutor v. Omar Al-Bashir ICC-02/05-01/09’ available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1803812.pdf , accessed on 27 July 2014 para 1. 
83
Xan Rice ‘Chad refuses to arrest Omar Al-Bashir over genocide charges’ The Guardian 22 July 
2010 available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/22/chad-refuses-arrest-omar-al-bashir, 
accessed on 21 July 2014 para 3. 
84
Human Rights Watch ‘Malawi; arrest Sudanese President or bar his entry’ 13 October 2011 
available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/13/malawi-arrest-sudanese-president-al-bashir-or-bar-
his-entry, accessed on 21 August 2014 para 4. 
85
Voice of America ‘Sudan’s Bashir attends Djibouti’s president inauguration’ available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/22/chad-refuses-arrest-omar-al-bashir, accessed on 21 
November 2013 para 2. 
86
 Marlise Simons ‘Sudan’s President one step ahead of a suit and a warrant’ The New York Times 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/world/africa/sudans-president-one-step-ahead-of-a-
suit-and-a-warrant.html, 17 July 2013 accessed on 27 July 2014. 
87
 Bashir Watch ‘Omar Al-Bashir travels to Qatar’ available at http://bashirwatch.org/omar-al-bashir-
travels-qatar/ , accessed on 21 July 2014 para 1. 
88
 CNN wire staff ‘Sudan’s wanted President visits Egypt available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/16/world/africa/egypt-sudan/ , accessed on 21 July 2014 para 4. 
89
Malcolm Moore ‘Sudan’s al-Bashir given red carpet treatment by China’ The Telegraph available at  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8605319/Sudans-al-Bashir-given-red-carpet-
treatment-by-China.html ,accessed on 22 July 2014 para 4. 
90
 Ethiopian Review Sudan’s ‘President Al Bashir taunts ICC while visiting Ethiopia’ available at 
http://www.ethiopianreview.com/index/13636 , accessed on 21 July 2014 para 2. 
91
 BBC News Africa ‘Court worry at Omar Al Bashir’s Kenya trip’ 28 August 2010 available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11117662accesed, on 21 August 2014 para 2. 
26 
 
principle may be altered by the SC which may, by means of a resolution adopted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, creates an obligation to cooperate with the Court on those 
UN Member States which are not parties to the Statute. ... [T]he obligation to cooperate 
stems directly from the UN Charter. 
92 
 Chad, Malawi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria are state parties to the Rome 
Statute of the Court. They have obligation under article 86
93
 of the Rome Statute to 
cooperate with the Court. It has been argued that article 25 of the Charter does away 
with all the immunities that arise from customary international law and 




      Likewise, as members of the United Nations, Sudan, Libya China, Qatar, 
Ethiopia and Egypt have obligations arising from the Charter, therefore they should 
have cooperated with the Court pursuant to the provisions of Security Council 







 the Democratic Republic of Congo,
98
  Djibouti and Kenya 
before Al-Bashir visited these countries. These states failed to cooperate with the 




 failure to 
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cooperate and sent the same to the Security Council. The Court required Libya to 
surrender Al-Islam for investigation and prosecution of crimes against humanity.
101
 
      The Security Council referrals of the situations in both Sudan and Libya to the 
Court demonstrate the Court’s heavy reliance on state and non-state parties for 
cooperation failure of which it cannot exercise jurisdiction over the most serious 
international crimes. This non-cooperation undermines the Court’s work and makes 
it nearly impossible to achieve justice for victims and the public at large in the 
affected countries. Furthermore, it causes the budget of the Court to shoot up as in 
the cases where the witnesses and or victims in these cases are in protection, they 
still need maintenance, financial and otherwise from the Court as they await the 
surrender or arrest of the accused persons to the Court. Consequently, the Court has 
not prosecuted either Al-Bashir or Al-Islam for the alleged crimes against humanity. 
3.5 Enforcement of the Court’s decisions 
The Court has two ways of its enforcing decisions when states fail to cooperate with 
it in arresting and surrendering indicted persons to the Court for prosecution. First, 
the Court makes a finding on the failure of a state to cooperate and sends the finding 
either to the Assembly of Parties or to the Security Council. However, the 
enforcement mechanisms available to the Assembly of Parties are unclear. Article 
112(2) enables the Assembly of Parties to deal with all forms of non-cooperation 
which include: condemning the wrongful act, demanding compliance or referring the 
matter to the Security Council. 
102
 When states fail to cooperate in cases of referrals, 
the Court must make a finding of non-cooperation and send it to the Security 
Council as stated in article 87(7) of the Rome Statute.
103
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      Conversely, the Court does not have the enforcement powers against non-state 
parties to the Rome Statute. When the Security Council refers a situation involving a 
non-state party to the Court, the latter has an obligation to fully cooperate with the 
Court. However, when the non-state party fails to cooperate with the Court, the 
Security Council should apply its enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the 
Charter to enforce compliance.
104
 
     Since the Court does not have an enforcement mechanism, it relies solely on 
cooperation of states for effective investigation and prosecution of serious 
international crimes within its jurisdiction. The failure by states to cooperate with the 
Court frustrates its work as it is unable to proceed with its judicial proceedings, 
thereby delaying justice to affected people.
105
 
       After the Security Council refers a situation to the Court, the former has an 
obligation to enforce compliance with state and non-state parties’ obligations in the 
event of non-cooperation.
106
 The Security Council can invoke its powers pursuant to 
Chapter VII of the Charter to compel states to cooperate with the Charter as a way of 
restoring peace and security.  
3.5.1 What can the Security Council do to back up its referrals? 
The Security Council has a range of measures it can implement to do away with 
insecurity, it can employ hard or soft measures to achieve its mandate of maintaining 
peace and security. The soft tools encompass the use of mediation measures while 
hard tools means invoking Chapter VII powers under the Charter, referring situations 
to the Court or passing resolutions to start ad hoc tribunals and the use of force.
107
 
For instance, in the situation in Darfur, the United Nations Secretary General Special 
                                                                                                                                                                    
this Statute, the Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of 
Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council. 
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Envoy for Darfur adopted peace settlement mechanisms which aimed to trigger 
peace negotiations and improve the humanitarian situation in Darfur.
108
  
      As aforementioned, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council has 
the function of determining breaches of peace, threats to peace and acts of aggression 
and decide or take measures under articles 41 or 42 of the Charter in the maintenance 
of peace and security.
109
 When the Security Council refers a situation to the Court, 
the latter has an obligation to ensure that states cooperate with the Court. 
Subsequently, when states fail to cooperate with the Court, Security Council can 
invoke its Chapter VII powers to ensure compliance. These powers are found under 
articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. Article 41 notes that: 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to 
be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United 
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.  
 
The Security Council has a range of options to exercise as enforcement mechanism 
when it encounters non-cooperation from states: it can apply article 42
110
 measures 
which involve force before it employs non-force measures under article 41, if it 
foresees that article 41 measures may be inadequate.
111
 
      The Security Council employed sanctions under article 41 of the Charter with 
regard to both the referrals in Sudan and Libya. The Security Council ordered the 
government of Sudan to disarm Janjaweed militias and prosecute them for the human 
rights violations committed. It proceeded to threaten the use of article 41 of the 
Charter measures in case of non-compliance.
112
 The Sudanese government did not 
comply with Security Council demands.  Subsequently, pursuant to Security Council 
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resolution 1556 (2004), the Sudan Sanctions Committee of the Security Council 
adopted sanctions against the Janjaweed leaders
113
. These included: travel bans, asset 
freeze and an arms embargo.
114
In the referral of the situation in Libya, the Security 
Council adopted a travel ban, arms embargo on Libya and freezing of assets on 
Muammar Gaddafi, his family members and some military officers.
115
  
      It is important to note that, the Security Council adopted these sanctions on 
Sudan and Libya before it referred the situations to the Court. It has not adopted any 
enforcement mechanism after the referral of the situations in both Darfur and Libya. 
3.6 The inaction of the Security Council 
The Security Council has not adopted any enforcement mechanisms after the referral 
of the situations in Darfur and Libya to state parties and non-state parties to facilitate 
cooperation with the Court. The situation in Darfur has been very challenging to the 
Court as Al-Bashir has made a mockery of the latter and the Security Council by 
travelling to territories of state and non-state parties including to China, which is a 
permanent member of the Security Council. 
The Security Council, the very body that referred the Sudan situation to the ICC has not 
stood firmly behind the arrest warrant against Bashir, it could have increased the cost of 
doing business with Bashir by imposing sanctions on fugitive Sudanese officials and 
governments that flout the arrest warrant. The Security Council may deserve credit for 




 The Prosecutor of the Court, in her report to the Security Council, urged the latter 
and state parties to take action with regard to the arrest of Al-Bashir, stating as 
follows:  
‘The time has come for this Council and States parties to seriously devise strategies for 
arresting those alleged to be responsible for these crimes.  It was a serious indictment on 
both the Council and those parties that President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and others had been 
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able to travel without fear of arrest.  The Council’s silence, even when notified of failures by 
States to comply with their obligations, only added insult to Darfur’s victims.’
117
 
The Prosecutor commended the Libyan government and non-state parties on the 
cooperation it had previously demonstrated but emphasised the need for the 
government of Libya to fulfil its obligations of surrendering Al-Islam to the Court.
118
 
       Evidently, the Security Council has failed to provide support to the Court 
through investigations and prosecutions after the referral of the situations of in 
Darfur and Libya. Consequently, Al Bashir has travelled extensively. The failure by 
the Security Council in providing enforcement mechanisms on its referrals to the 
Court has been an impediment to the achievement of international criminal justice 
and has lowered the credibility of the Court.
119
 
      Even though the Prosecutor has sent periodic reports to the Security Council, the 
latter has not supported the investigations and prosecutions or addressed the 
difficulties faced by the Court after non-cooperation from state and non-state parties. 
This does not promote the relationship between the Court and the Security Council 
contrary to intention of the drafters of the Rome Statute, the Rome Statute and the 
Relationship Agreement. It also frustrations the work of the Court. 
     Due to the failure of the Security Council to compel states to cooperate with the 
Court, its referrals weakened the enforcement mechanism of the Court and propelled 




    The failure of the Security Council to support the Court contravenes the 
relationship between the two international organisations as envisaged by the 
International Law Commission, Ad Hoc Committee and the Preparatory Committee. 
It also fails to fulfil the obligations of the Security Council under the Relationship 
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Agreement which requires the Court and the Security Council to have a close 
relationship for mutual attainment of their objectives.  
Conclusion  
The referral of the situation in Darfur and Libya was an opportunity to prosecute 
those suspected of having the highest individual criminal responsibility, to seek 
redress and justice for the victims in the affected areas and to promote the 
advancement of international criminal justice. The failure of the Security Council to 
provide enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter has lowered the 
credibility of both the Court and the Security Council as the perpetrators of the 
egregious human rights are still at large and the situation in Darfur continues to be a 
threat to international peace and security.  
      On the other hand, Libya has not yet surrendered Al-Islam to the Court at the 
time of writing this dissertation, therefore the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction him 
for the alleged crimes.   
      For successful referral of situations to the Court, the Security Council requires 
cooperation from states, but when states fail to collaborate with the Court, the 
Security Council has an obligation to compel states to cooperate with the Court. In 
doing, so the Security Council will kill two birds with one stone, as it will fulfil the 
obligations set out in the Relationship Agreement and the provisions of the Rome 
Statute and maintain international peace and security. Therefore, the Court can 
prosecute Al-Bashir and Al-Islam only if state parties comply with their obligations 
arising from the Rome Statute and the Charter. 
     As seen in the situations in Darfur and Libya, the Court relies heavily on states 
and the Security Council to enforce its decisions, failure to which renders the Court 
unable to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court should devise enforcement mechanisms 
to support its decisions. This should include the suspension of recalcitrant states who 
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THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1422(2002) AND 
1487(2003) 
4.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter Three of this thesis, the relationship between the Court and 
the Security Council is demonstrated through the exercise of referrals and deferrals. 
While the Security Council referral of situations to the Court can be viewed as the 
maintenance of peace through the achievement of justice, deferral could be perceived 
as postponing the wheels of justice to attain peace and security.
122
 
     Chapters One and Two of this thesis commenced the discussion on deferrals by 
showing how the  majority of delegates were opposed to the Security Council’s 
proposed exercise of deferrals due to the fear of politicised prosecutions. However, 
Singapore and Canada proposed for the Security Council to exercise deferrals 
pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter and to defer only for a limited period of time.   
      This chapter argues that in passing deferral resolutions 1422(2002) and 
1487(2003) the Security Council acted contrary to the provisions of the Rome 
Statute and the Charter. These deferral resolutions defy the Rome Statute provisions 
which lay out the conditions to be fulfilled before exercising deferrals and the 
irrelevance of official capacity. In addition, these resolutions did not comply with 
Chapter VII powers of the Charter.  
      This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part briefly discusses the 
Security Council’s powers of deferrals. The second part examines the Security 
Council’s deferral resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003).Thereafter, it evaluates 
the validity of the aforementioned resolutions. Then, it highlights the effect of the 
deferral resolutions and the possible remedies against the Security Council deferral 
resolutions. The chapter concludes by stating that the Security Council deferral 
resolutions put the relationship between the Court and the Security Council at a 
crossroad contrary to the intention of the founders of the Rome Statute. 
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4.2 The Security Council’s power of deferral 
The Rome Statute has not defined what a deferral means; generally, it means ‘[t]he 
act of delaying or postponing something.’
123
 With regard to the Rome Statute, 
deferral refers to the act of the Security Council delaying or postponing 
investigations or prosecutions of the Court for a period of 12 months.
124
 
      In allowing the Security Council to defer investigations or prosecutions of the 
Court, the latter recognises the role that the Security Council plays in the 
maintenance of peace and security under the Charter.  
      Thus article 16 of the Rome Statute lays out the conditions to be adhered to 
before the Security Council defers Court’s judicial proceedings.  
4.2.1 Conditions to be fulfilled by the Security Council 
before the exercise of deferrals. 
The Security Council has to comply with certain prerequisites set forth in article 16 
of the Rome Statute and in Chapter VII of the Charter of United Nations before it 
exercises a deferral. First, the power to defer investigations and prosecutions has to 
comply with the provisions set out in Chapter VII of the Charter which lays out the 
action that the Security Council should take in response to threats to peace, breach of 
the peace and acts of aggression. Article 39 of the Charter notes: ‘The Security 
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall 
be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.’ Therefore, before the Security Council exercises 
deferrals it has to establish the existence of a threat to peace, breach of the peace or 
an act of aggression.  
      Second, article 16 of the Rome Statute provides that the deferral can only last for 
12 months.
125
  This means that the suspension should not be for an indefinite period 
but be temporary. However, this period may be extended for 12 more months subject 
                                                          
123
 Mirriam-Webster Dictionary available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/deferral 
accessed on 30 August 2014. 
124
 ‘No investigation or prosecution  may be commenced or  proceeded with under this Statute for a 
period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the 
Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request  may be renewed by 





to the fulfilment of prior conditions which are there must exist a threat to peace, 
breach of the peace or an act of aggression and the deferral resolution must be 
adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter.  
      Third, the deferral request can only be adopted through a Security Council 
resolution. The voting process is achieved when a deferral resolution gains a 
majority vote by nine members of the Security Council without the exercise of a veto 
by any of the five permanent members.
126
 
      Lastly, the Security Council can only defer the Court’s judicial proceedings once 
the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation or prosecution. The first paragraph of 
article 16 of the Rome Statute states: ‘[n]o investigation or prosecution may be 
commenced or proceeded with under this Statute.’ This means that the Security 
Council can postpone the Court’s judicial proceedings only when the Prosecutor is 
conducting an investigation or prosecutions. 
     The Security Council must conform to the provisions of the Rome Statute as the 
constitutive document which establishes the Court. These conditions will be 
discussed further in this chapter when evaluating whether the Security Council 
resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) complied with these conditions. 
 4.3 The Security Council resolutions 1422(2002), 
1487(2003) and 1497(2004)  
At the time of writing this thesis, the Security Council had passed two deferral 
resolutions and attempted to renew the said deferral resolutions for the third time. On 
14 July 2002 the Security Council adopted resolution 1422 (2002) to avoid the veto 
of its peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
127
 Paragraph 1 of the 
resolution reads:  
Requests, consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the ICC, if a 
case arises involving current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State not a 
Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or 
authorized operation, shall for a twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or 
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 Many states did not support the Security Council deferral request 1422(2002). 
Canada, South Africa, Brazil and New Zealand, opposed the deferral resolution 
arguing that the resolution granted immunity to peacekeepers contrary to the 
provisions of the Rome Statute.
129
 Similarly, Australia, Switzerland, Fiji, 
Liechtenstein, Syria, Burundi, Malawi and the United Arab Emirates argued that the 




      The Secretary General to the Security Council wrote a letter to Colin Powell, the 
then Secretary General of State for the United States of America, stating that the 
adoption of the Security Council resolution would provide a ‘blanket resolution’ to 
peacekeepers from non-state parties to the Court, contrary to the intention of the 
drafters of the Rome Statute of the Court.
131
 This meant that the resolution would 
completely shield the peace keepers from the jurisdiction of the Court, should they 
commit human rights violations, of the Court contrary to the provisions of the Rome 
Statute.  
      Although, many states and non-governmental organisations opposed resolution 
1422(2002), this resolution was renewed through resolution 1487(2003).
132
 
Resolution 1487(2003) sought to defer United Nations peacekeeping missions from 
the prosecution of the Court. Unsurprisingly, this renewal was met with vehement 
opposition from states and human rights organisations. 
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     The Human Rights Watch opposed the renewal of resolution 1422(2002) arguing 
that the resolution was adopted in the absence of any investigations or prosecutions 
which may have been a threat to international peace and security. Additionally, it 
argued that the resolution attempted to provide future immunity for the United 
Nations peacekeeping missions contrary to the provisions of the Rome Statute. 
133
 
      The Coalition Implementation for the International Criminal Court expressed the 
view that the resolution was passed contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
Charter thus the Security Council it contravened the provisions of the Charter.
134
  
      The United States of America attempted to renew resolution 1487(2003) through 
resolution 1497(2004), but it dropped the demand amidst allegations of its 
peacekeeping forces torturing detained prisoners in Iraq.
135
  
     The question which springs to mind is, whether these Security Council 
resolutions were adopted in accordance with the provisions of the Rome Statute and 
the Charter. In passing deferral resolutions 1422(2002), 1487(2003) the Security 
Council  contravened the article 34 and Chapter VII powers of the Charter it also 
acted contrary to articles 16 and 27 of the Rome Statute.  
     Pursuant to Chapter VII powers under the Charter, the Security Council must 
ensure that there is a threat to peace, breach of peace or an act of aggression before 
deferring Court’s investigations or prosecutions. The Security Council resolutions 
1422(2002) and 1487(2003) did not fit within the criteria laid out in article 39 of the 
Charter as discussed below. This is discussed at length in the subsequent subsection. 
 4.3.1 Validity of resolutions under the Charter  
Operative paragraph two of  both Security Council resolutions 1422(2002) and 
1487(2003) provide for an automatic renewal of the deferral resolution: ‘[E]xpresses 
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the intention to renew the request in paragraph 1 under the same conditions each 1 
July for further 12-month periods for as long as may be necessary.’
136
  
      This renewal raises the question of whether the Security Council can defer future 
investigations and situations without the existence of an imminent threat to peace. 
The Security Council cannot be able to defer future investigations or situations 
because it requires the existence of a threat to peace or a breach to peace before it 
halts Court’s judicial proceedings.  
      The Charter requires the Security Council to conduct investigations pursuant to 
article 34 of the Charter before determining whether a threat to peace exists.
137
 The 
automatic renewal of the deferral defies the provisions of the Charter because no 
investigation was conducted to determine whether a threat to peace existed. Further, 
the provisions of article 16 of the Rome Statute require a deferral to be determined 
on a case by case basis. Subsequently, the determination of a future possible threat to 
peace amends the provisions of article 16 of the Rome Statute contrary to the 
provisions of the Charter and the Rome Statute.
138
 The determination of whether a 
threat to peace exists and the decision to invoke a Chapter VII measure, can only be 
made when concrete terms which have the potential of destabilising peace and 
security are present.
139
The Charter does not define what a ‘threat to peace’ or a 
‘breach of peace’ means; however, the Security Council resolution has the discretion 
to define and adopt measures to restore international peace and stability.
140
  
      The threat to peace can be defined in an either negative or positive light. The 
negative definition perceives a threat to peace as ‘an absence in international armed 
conflict between states;’ this school also recognises that an internal conflict can 
destabilise international peace and security. 
141
 Conversely, the positive definition 
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encompasses the need to have good comity in the economic, social, political and 
environmental facets as a way of preserving peace among states.
142
 The negative 
definition holds more water, as it encompasses both internal and international 
conflicts which has the possibility of destabilising international peace and security. 
Nonetheless, the practice of the Security Council has shown that the definition of 
‘threat to peace’ is not cast in stone thus, it is dynamic as it captures the situation 
considering the circumstances at play.
143
 
      While the ‘breach of peace’ refers to the existence of armed conflict between 
states, it is unclear whether a civil war should be included as part of the definition.
144
 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that civil war in a state which is non-international 
in nature has the potential of destabilising international peace and security. 
      The Security Council passed deferral resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) in 
the absence of a threat to peace or a breach to the peace, these  resolutions do not 
make any reference to an internal or international conflict, neither do they refer to 
poor relations between states which may threaten peace and security. However, the 
only threat evident in these resolutions is the need to maintain United Nations 
peacekeeping operations.
145
 The maintenance of peacekeeping operations does not 
amount to a threat to peace or a breach of peace. In this regard, in passing these 
resolutions the Security Council acted contrary to the provisions of Chapter VII of 
the Charter as it passed resolutions in the absence of a threat to peace or a breach to 
the peace.        
4.3.2 The validity of the Security Council’s resolutions 
under the Rome Statute 
As mentioned earlier, article 16 of the Rome Statute sets out the conditions which 
the Security Council resolutions must adhere to before deferring Court’s 
investigations or prosecutions. In a nutshell, a valid deferral should be adopted 
through a Security Council resolution, pursuant to Chapter VII powers of the Charter 
and it lasts for only 12 months, although this may be renewed if a threat to peace, 
breach of the peace or acts of aggression exist. In passing Security Council 
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resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003), the Security Council defied the conditions 
set out in the Rome Statute. 
     Operative paragraph 2 of the resolution expresses the intention to renew the 
deferral resolution as many times as it may be necessary.
146  
This paragraph has the 
effect of automatically renewing the resolution without conforming to article 16 of 
the Rome Statute which reads that: ‘… [T]he request may be renewed by the Council 
under the same conditions’
147
 This means that the resolution should be renewed 
through a subsequent resolution, after determining that the existence of a threat to 
peace, breach to the peace or an act of aggression still exists. This means that the 
deferral resolution can only be adopted through an affirmative vote by nine members 
of the Security Council in the absence a veto. As a result, operative paragraph 2 
defied the provisions in the Rome Statute because the renewal was done in the 
absence of a threat to peace, breach of the peace and an act of aggression, also the 
intention to renew was not adopted through a resolution.  
     The renewal of a deferral resolution should be done on a case-by-case basis after 
the lapse of 12 months, accordingly, an automatic renewal defies the provisions of 
article 16 of the Rome Statute which provides for the procedure to renew a Security 
Council resolutions. This has been equated to providing ‘blanket immunity’ over 
peacekeepers for an indefinite duration. This automatic renewal attempts to amend 
the provisions of the Rome Statute contrary to international law. 
148
 
      As mentioned in Chapter Two of this dissertation, the authors of the Rome 
Statute envisaged for deferrals to be used sparingly for the purpose of temporarily 
halting judicial proceedings whenever they interfere with international peace and 
security. The Security Council resolutions passed these resolutions as a future 
preventive measure to halt future Court judicial proceedings against peacekeepers 
from non-state parties without any threat to peace, breach of the peace or an act of 
aggression. Therefore, the Security Council deferrals were contrary to the intention 
of the drafters of the Rome Statute.  
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     The first paragraph of article 16 of the Rome Statute states: ‘[n]o investigation or 
prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute … .’ The 
question that springs to mind is when does a prosecution or investigation occur? The 
Prosecutor has the power to initiate an investigation in his or her own accord 
pursuant to article 15 (1) and (2) of the Rome Statute.
149
 The term ‘initiate’ does not 
mean that the Prosecutor should ‘start’ with an investigation but it means that the 
Prosecutor has the discretion to begin with necessary preliminary steps of evaluating 
necessary material that form the basis of an actual investigation.
150
  Accordingly, the 
Prosecutor commences with the said investigation only after an authorisation from 
the Pre-Trial Chamber. Article 15(4) of the Rome Statute reads; 
If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request and the supporting material 
considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with the investigation, and the case 
appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorize the commencement of 
the investigation … . 
 Therefore, the Prosecutor can only proceed with full investigation after the Pre-Trial 
Chamber authorises him or her to do so. Consequently, the Security Council should 
only defer an investigation or prosecution after the Pre-Trial Chamber decides that 
the Prosecutor should proceed with the actual investigation in a given matter. 
Deferring an investigation which has not been authorised by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
amounts to interference in the independence of the office of the Prosecutor. In 
passing deferral resolutions in the absence of an investigation or a prosecution, the 
Security Council resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) failed to comply with the 
provisions of article 15 of the Rome Statute.  
     Similarly, it has been observed that suspects can only be identified at the 
prosecution stage. Therefore, in passing deferral resolutions before the investigation 
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      Exempting peacekeepers from the jurisdiction of the Court provides immunity 
over them contrary to the object and purpose of the Court of fighting impunity.
152
 I 
dare to state that the Security Council resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) is 
contributing to the same impunity the Court aims to fight! This contravenes article 
27 (1) of the Rome Statute which states that: ‘This Statute shall apply equally to all 
persons without distinction based on official capacity … .’ This subsection means 
that the Court has the jurisdiction to determine individual criminal responsibility 
over perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. In providing 
blanket immunity over United Nations peacekeeping forces the Security Council 
resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003)  acted in contravention of the provisions of 
article 21 of the Rome Statute which can be seen as an attempt by the Security 
Council to alter the provisions of the Rome Statute. In doing this, the Security 




4.4 Effect of these resolutions 
In passing the deferral resolutions, the Security Council resolutions attempted to 
amend the provisions of the Rome Statute which is in itself an interference with the 
work of the Court and contrary to international law. 
        The Rome Statute can be amended only by state parties pursuant to articles 121 
and 122 of the Rome Statute.
154
  The proposed amendments which are subject to 
considerations by the Assembly of Parties.
155
Article 39 of the Vienna Convention of 
the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty can generally be amended through an 
agreement by the state parties to the treaty.  
     The Security Council resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003)  attempt to alter 
article 16 of the Rome Statute contrary to the provisions of the Rome Statute and 
what the authors of the Rome Statute envisaged how the Security Council would 
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defer the judicial proceedings of the Court.
156
 The Court and the Security Council are 
two independent international organisations established through separate distinct 
treaties, thus in principle and under international law neither institution can ratify the 
other institutions treaty neither can they alter the provisions of each other’s founding 
documents.
157
 However, as seen in these two resolutions, the Security Council is 
acting beyond its powers and seems to give the message that it is above international 
law with no entity having any power to stop such interference. 
4.5 Possible remedies against the Security Council 
resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) ultra vires deferral 
resolutions.  
Article 1 of the Rome Statute reads: ‘…The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court 
shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.’ This is interpreted to mean that 
the Court should only carry out its tasks and functions as stipulated in the Rome 
Statute.
158
 In addition, article 21 of the Rome Statute notes: 
1. The Court shall apply: 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and 
rules of international law, including the established principles of the international 
law of armed conflict; 
(c) Failing that, general principles derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that 
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles 
are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally 
recognized norms and standards. 
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions. 
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with 
internationally recognized human rights…. 
This article displays the supremacy of the Rome Statute as it governs the running of 
the Court; it also recognises other sources of law that may be used to fill existing 
gaps in the Rome Statute, Elements of Crimes or the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.
159
Subsequently, in the light of the above provisions, the Court should 
establish whether the Security Council resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) 
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deferrals requests complied with the hierarchy of the applicable laws and make a 
determination on the same.
160
 So far, it has not done this. 
     The authors of the Rome Statute envisaged that deferrals to be used sparingly, 
when the pursuit of justice would interfere with the attainment of peace. But the 
exercise and conduct of the Security Council through resolutions 1422(2002) and 
1487(2003) does not reflect what the drafters envisaged.  I am of the opinion that the 
Court should in future ignore deferral requests from the Security Council resolutions 
on this basis. 
      The Security Council resolutions has a wide discretion to take suitable action in 
maintaining international peace and security pursuant to article 39 of the Charter. 
Being an international organisation it is subject to constitutional limitations set out in 
its constitutive body and it has to act within the confines of the Charter as it is not 
above the law.
161
    
      As a subject of international law, the United Nations is bound to conform to the 
rules of international law. Generally, member states to the United Nations have 
obligations arising from the Security Council resolutions to comply with its 
decisions. Article 25 states: ‘The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter.’  
     Nonetheless, these obligations are binding on member states only if the Security 
Council resolutions adopted the resolutions in good faith in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the Charter.
162
 Evidently, the Security Council resolutions 
1422(2002) and 1487(2003)  deferrals were not adopted in good faith as they did not 
conform to the provisions of the Rome Statute neither did they uphold or respect 
human rights. Further, the Security Council is further not a state, so the requests of 
the Security Council resolutions should in principle not be obligatory.   
                                                          
160
 Amnesty International ‘International Criminal court The unlawful attempt by the Security Council 
to give US citizens permanent impunity  from international justice’ available at  
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR40/006/2003/en/af118f82-d6f8-11dd-b0cc-
1f0860013475/ior400062003en.html, accessed on 9 August 2014 para 15. 
161
  The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic a/k/a ‘DULE’ ‘Decision on the defence motion for the 
Interlocutory appeal  on jurisdiction’ available at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm,  accessed on 27 August 2014 para 28  
162




    The Court has the power to review Security Council resolutions passes a deferral 
which does not conform to the provisions of the Rome Statute and the principles of 
international law.
163
  When acting pursuant to Chapter VII powers under the Charter, 
the Security Council has an obligation to respect universal human rights instruments 
like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations 
Declaration on Human Rights, the Universal Bill of Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Political Rights and international humanitarian 
law. The deferral resolutions did not respect human rights law because it grants 
impunity to violators of human rights and it does not recognise the rights of victims 
in the affected areas. Therefore, member states and the Court in particular should 
question the validity of the said resolutions and if need be refuse to comply with 
deferral requests that are contrary to the aforementioned international law 
Conclusion 
In passing resolution 1422(2002) and renewing it through 1487(2002) the Security 
Council did not conform to the provisions of article 16 of the Rome Statute which 
lays out the conditions to be exercised before a deferral is passed. The deferral 
requests were passed in theoretical terms in the absence of a threat to peace, breach 
of peace or an act of aggression. Moreover, these deferral requests had an automatic 
renewal providing for a renewal after the lapse of 12 months on condition that 
conditions under article 39 of the Charter are present. Lastly, in providing for an 
automatic renewal; the Security Council resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) 
attempted to alter the provisions of the Rome Statute. Therefore, the Security 
Council acted in an ultra vires manner. 
      In granting blanket immunity to peace keepers who are non-state parties to the 
Rome Statute, the Security Council defies the general principle of equality which 
encourages different laws to be used among peacekeepers, depending on whether 
they have ratified the Rome Statute or not. 
      When assessing the need to defer investigations or prosecutions the Security 
Council should respect its primary objectives and those of the Court to ensure that 
the legitimacy and credibility of both of the offices are upheld. The Security Council 
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resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) put the relationship between the Court and 





















CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This thesis has shown that the crafters of the Rome Statute envisaged a close 
interaction between the Court and the Security Council, demonstrated through the 
latter’s exercise of referrals and deferrals of situations to the Court. However, the 
Security Council’s exercise of referrals and deferrals has been inconsistent with the 
Relationship Agreement, the Charter, the provisions of the Rome Statute and the 
intention of the drafters. As a result, this has negatively affected the relationship 
between the Court and Security Council. 
     This chapter is divided into two parts; the first section makes a conclusion of the 
issues that arose in the Security Council’s exercise of referrals and deferrals while 
the second part, recommends on how the Security Council may defer and refer in a 
way that sustains the relationship between the Security Council and the Court. 
5.2 Conclusion 
Cooperation and enforcement are two aspects that are required for a successful 
referral.  The Security Council’s referrals of the situations in Darfur and Libya to the 
Court has shown that the latter lacks a proper enforcement mechanism. Although the 
Security Council has an enforcement role to play when it refers situations to the 
Court, the former has not performed this role pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome 
Statute. This is evident when the Security Council failed to impose sanctions on 
recalcitrant states which failed to cooperate with the Court in arresting Al-Bashir and 
the Security Council’s inaction to respond to the lack of Libya’s failure to cooperate 
with the Court in surrendering Al-Islam to the Court. At the time of writing this 
dissertation, the Court has been unable to exercise jurisdiction over Al-Bashir nine 
years after the Security Council referral. Similarly, the Court has been unable to 
prosecute Al-Islam three years after the Security Council referral of the situation in 
Libya to the Court. This has lowered the credibility and legitimacy of the Court.  
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      In passing deferral resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487 (2003), the Security Council 
did not conform to the intention of the authors of the Rome Statute. This is evident 
when the Security Council passed deferral resolutions in the absence of a threat to 
peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression. Moreover, the Security Council 
did not act in accordance with the conditions laid out in both the Charter and the 
Rome Statute before exercising of these deferrals.  
      Through the exercise of referrals and deferrals, the Security Council has failed to 
promote a close relationship with the Court contrary to the intention of the authors of 
the Rome Statute, the Relationship Agreement, the Charter and the Rome Statute 
itself. 
      In passing the deferral resolutions, the Security Council weakened the 
relationship between the Court and the Security Council contrary to what was 
envisaged by the crafters of the Rome Statute and the Relationship Agreement. 
Consequently, both of the independent international organisations fail to fulfil their 
mutual objective which lowers the credibility of both the Court and the Security 
Council. 
5.3 The way forward 
There is a need to strengthen the relationship between the Court and the Security 
Council  to ensure that both entities fulfil their mutual objectives of prosecuting 
serious international crimes and maintaining international peace and security 
pursuant to the provisions if the Rome Statute and the Charter respectively. 
      When referring situations, the Security Council should stress in the referral 
resolutions the importance of all states to cooperate with the Court. This will impose 
obligations on all states to collaborate with the Court for successful referrals. Also, 
the Security Council should be ready to help the Court to enforce cooperation 
requests by imposing sanctions on states that fail to fulfil these obligations. 
      The Court and the Security Council have to cooperate effectively in order to 
fulfil their roles of fighting the culture of impunity and maintaining peace and 
security. Nonetheless, the failure of the Security Council to cooperate with the Court 
in enforcing decisions after a referral or failing to conform to the conditions of 
deferral lowers the credibility and legitimacy of the Court.  
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      The Security Council should employ soft and hard measures pursuant to 40 or 41 
of the Charter to compel recalcitrant states to cooperate with the Court as a way of 
maintaining peace and security as it simultaneously enforces the Court’s decisions. 
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The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) provides for a 
close relationship between the International Criminal Court (Court) and the United 
Nations Security Council (Security Council). This relationship is demonstrated through 
Security Council exercise of referrals and deferrals. This dissertation discusses first, the 
Security Council referrals of the situations in Darfur, Sudan and Libya. Second, the 
Security Council passing of resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003), which deferred the 
Court from commencing any investigations or prosecuting of any crimes that could 
have arisen as a result of the United Nations peacekeeping operations. 
     This dissertation argues that  the Security Council has exercised referrals and 
deferrals contrary to the Rome Statute, the Charter of the United Nations (the Charter), 
and the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the Court and the Security Council 
(Relationship Agreement) as envisaged by the drafters of the Rome Statute.  
     It concludes by stating  that, the relationship between the Court and the Security 
Council is at a crossroad because the latter has failed to exercise referrals and deferrals 
in the manner provided for in the Rome Statute and as envisioned during the drafting of 







































OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
1.0 Introduction  
The authors of the Rome Statute envisioned a close relationship between the Court 
and the Security Council. This relationship is realised through the Negotiated 
Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United 
Nations (Relationship Agreement).The Relationship Agreement not only sets out the 
terms on which the Court and Security Council should relate but also lays 
obligations on both entities to respect each other’s mandates and to cooperate in 
order to achieve mutual obligations.
1
 These mutual obligations are prosecuting 
serious international crimes which concern the international community and 
maintaining international peace and security.  
     The Court was established by the Rome Statute to determine individual criminal 
responsibility and punish perpetrators of egregious human rights violations. Article 1 
of the Rome Statute states: ‘A court is hereby established .It shall be a permanent 
institution and shall have power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most 
serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute … .’ Pursuant to 
article 5 of the Rome Statute, ‘the Court has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and aggression.’
2
  
 On the other hand, the Security Council plays the role of maintaining 
international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. Article 24 (1) of 
the Charter reads that:  
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer 
on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security 




                                                          
1
 Article 3 of the Relationship Agreement reads: ‘The United Nations and the Court agree that, with a 
view to facilitating the effective discharge of their respective responsibilities, they shall cooperate 
closely …and consult each other on matters of mutual interest pursuant to the provisions of the 
present Agreement and in conformity with the respective provisions of the Charter and the Statute.’ 
2
 Presently, the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression after the Rome 
Statute is amended and the amendment is ratified by at least a third of the state parties. 
3
 United Nations ‘Charter of the United Nations’ available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter5.shtml#article24, accessed on 21 July 2014. 
2 
 
     It is important to note that, while the Court has the role of prosecuting serious 
international crimes which shock the international community, the Security Council 
maintains international peace and security pursuant to Chapter VII powers of the 
Charter. Consequently, their primary roles overlap because the crimes that fall within 
the jurisdiction of the Court have the ability to threaten international peace and 
security.
4
 It is worth noting that, the prosecution of perpetrators who commit 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes or acts of aggression deters potential 
criminals from committing serious international crimes which may destabilise 
international peace and security. 
5
 In this regard, the Security Council and the Court 
require mutual collaboration for effective discharge of their roles.  
     The Rome Statute acknowledges the role that the Security Council plays in 
maintaining international peace and security through empowering it to exercise 
referrals and deferrals . 
     This chapter commences the discussion on the relationship between the Court and 
the Security Council in the context of referrals and deferrals. It does this by 
examining the provisions of the International Law Commission’s Draft Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (Draft Statute of the Court), the Ad Hoc Committee of 
the Court and the reports of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court (Preparatory Committee). It evaluates the delegates’ 
views on the relationship of the Court and Security Council at the Rome Conference 
as well as the provisions of the Rome Statute that regulate the said relationship. 
     This chapter lays a basis for discussions in chapters Three and Four which 
focuses on how the Security Council exercised referrals and deferrals and evaluates 
whether this exercise complied with how the drafters of the Rome Statute envisaged 
them and the provisions of the Rome Statute itself. 
 
                                                          
4
 Paragraph 3 of the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court 
and the United Nations. 
5
 L Condorelli and S Villalpando ‘Relationship of the Court with the United Nations’ in Antonio 




     To understand how the relationship between the Court and the Security Council is 
structured, it is necessary to evaluate the drafting history of the relationship between 
the Court and the Security Council. 
1.1 The road to the establishment of the Court 
The United Nations General Assembly (General Assembly) established the 
International Law Commission whose aim was to research on the viability of 
establishing an international organ to prosecute genocide.
6
 The International Law 
Commission negotiated the Draft Statute of the Court, which laid the basis for future 
discussions on the proposed Court. Additionally, the International Law Commission 
proposed the establishment of an International Criminal Court and of an Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Ad Hoc 
Committee) whose mandate was to review the substantive decisions of the Draft 
Statute of the Court. 
7
 Following the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, the General 
Assembly established the Preparatory Committee to consolidate the drafts. Finally, 
the General Assembly held a United Nations’ Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of the International Criminal Court  (Rome Conference), which was 
characterised by extensive discussions on the drafts of the establishment of the Court 
by states, and lead to the adoption of the Rome Statute.
8
 
(a) International Law Commission, Ad Hoc Committee and Preparatory 
Committee 
The International Law Commission envisaged a close relationship between the Court 
and the Security Council.  Article 2 of the Draft Statute of the Court states that: 
‘[t]he President with the approval of the state parties to this Statute (“State parties”) 
may conclude an agreement establishing an appropriate relationship between the 
Court and the United Nations.’9 
                                                          
6
 M Bassiouni ‘The journey to a permanent International Criminal Court’ in M Bassiouni (ed) 
International Criminal Court: Compilation of United Nations Documents and Draft Statute before the 
Diplomatic Conference (1998) page xvii. 
7
Coalition for the International Criminal Court ‘History of the ICC’ available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=icchistory accessed on 20 July 2014 para 2. 
8
 M Bassiouni ‘The journey to a permanent International Criminal Court’ in M Bassiouni (ed) 
International Criminal Court: Compilation of United Nations Documents and Draft Court Statute 
before the Diplomatic Conference (1998) page xvii. 
9
 United Nations ‘1994 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court’ 2005 available at 
http://legal.un.org/InternationalLawCommission/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_4_1994
.pdf, accessed on 20 July 2014 page 15. 
4 
 
        The Preparatory Committee negotiated for a close relationship between the 
Court and the Security Council. Article 2 of the Preparatory Committee reiterated the 
provisions of the International Law Commission’s Draft Statute of the Court, which 
sought a close relationship between the Court and the United Nations which was to 
be enforced through an agreement.
10
 
    Similarly, the Ad Hoc Committee considered the relationship as ‘an essential 
condition of the universality and moral authority of the new institution and, as well 
as of its financial and administrative viability.’
11
 
    Consequently, the Ad Hoc Committee viewed the relationship as the source of 
credibility and legitimacy for the Court and also as a way of facilitating the work of 
the Court. Thus, the Relationship Agreement was viewed as a way of promoting 
cooperation between the two institutions.  
(b) The Rome Conference  
The relationship between the Court and the Security Council was a contentious topic 
during the negotiation of the Rome Statute. At the initial stages of the negotiation, 
many delegates viewed the relationship between the Court and the Security Council 
as a threat and an impediment against the achievement of either the Court or the 
Security Council objectives. 
      A vast majority of delegates at the Rome Conference heavily debated upon the 
Security Council’s proposed power of referrals and deferrals. The debate ranged 
between two opposing factions; one side opposed the relationship between the two 
on the basis that the Court was an independent judicial body which had to be 
insulated from political interference with regard to its functions. Conversely, the 
supporters of the Security Council argued that the jurisdiction of the Court would 




        As the negotiations proceeded, the majority of the delegates supported a 
relationship between the Court and the Security Council but subject to conditions. 
                                                          
10
 ‘The Court shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations by an agreement to be 
approved by the State Parties to this Statute and concluded by the President on behalf of the Court.’  
11
 M Bassiouni The Legislative History of the International Criminal Court: an Article by Article 
Evolution of the Statute from 1994- 1998 (2005) page 17. 
12
 H  Olasolo The Triggering Procedure of the International Criminal Court (2005) page 17. 
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Canada, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Lesotho, Belgium, 
Brazil and Denmark opted for a close relationship between the Court and the 
Security Council only if the latter respected the Court as an independent legal 
institution.  A Canadian representative stated: ‘The Court would need to have a 
constructive relationship with the United Nations, while preserving its independence 
and impartiality. The Security Council could play a useful role in referring matters to 
the Court.’
 13  
        Additionally, China supported the need for a close relationship between the 
Court and the Security Council, as long as the provisions of the Rome Statute were 
not contrary with the provisions of the Charter.
14
 On the other hand, Australia 
supported a relationship between the two entities only if the Court acknowledged the 
Security Council’s primary role in maintaining peace and security. The Australian 
representative stated: ‘There must also be a workable relationship between the Court 
and the Security Council, recognizing the Council's primacy in matters relating to 
international peace and security.’
 15 
During the Rome Conference, the Rome Statute 
was adopted after ratification by 160 states.
16
  It emphasised the importance for close 
interactions between the Court and the Security Council. 
(c) The relationship between the Rome Statute of the Court and the Security   
Council 
 Paragraph 8 of the preamble of the Rome Statute states as follows: ‘Determined to 
these ends and for the sake of present and future generations, to establish an 
independent permanent International Criminal Court in relationship with the United 
Nations system, with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes … .’  
                                                          
13
 United Nations ‘Diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court Rome .Summary records of the plenary meetings of the  Committee of the Whole.  
A/CONF.183/13’ available at 
http://legal.un.org/Court/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v1_e.pdf, accessed on 10 July 
2014, page 54. 
14
 United Nations ‘Diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court A/CONF.183/13’, page 100. 
15
 United Nations ‘Diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court. Summary records of the plenary meetings of the Committee of the Whole.  
A/CONF.183/13’ available at 
http://legal.un.org/Court/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf ,accessed on 12 July 
2014, page 43. 
16
 International Criminal Court ‘What is the Rome Statute?’ available at http://www.Court-
cpi.int/en_menus/Court/about%20the%20court/frequently%20asked%20questions/Pages/3.aspx, 
accessed on 10 July 2014, paragraph 1. 
6 
 
     In addition, article 2 of the Rome Statute provides that: ‘The Court shall be 
brought into relationship with the United Nations through an agreement to be 
approved by the Assembly of State Parties to this Statute and therefore concluded by 
the President of the Court on its behalf.’  
      The need for a close relationship between the Court and the Security Council was 
important for a number of reasons. First, in punishing perpetrators who commit 
serious international crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
the Court contributes towards maintaining international peace and security. 
17
 
Secondly, in referring a situation to the Court, the Security Council extends the 
jurisdiction of the Court over non-state parties to the Rome Statute.
18
 Thirdly, the 
Court relies on the Security Council for enforcement of its decisions.
19
 The Security 
Council promotes the credibility and legitimacy of the Court when it enforces its 
decisions under article 86 of the Rome Statute. This dissertation will discuss at 
length the referrals and deferrals under articles 13(b) and 16 of the Rome Statute of 
the Court in Chapters Three and Four. 
      The Rome Statute, therefore, lays out the foundation of the relationship between 
the Court and the Security Council through; paragraph 8 of the preamble and article 
2 of the Rome Statute. Additionally, articles 13(b) and 16 of the Rome Statute 
further acknowledge the relationship between the two institutions while laying out 
the conditions and the nature of the relationship between the Court and the Security 
Council. 
     After the adoption of the Rome Statute, the President of the Assembly of Parties 
of the Court and the Secretary General of the Security Council signed the 




                                                          
17
 L Condorelli and S Villalpando ‘Relationship of the Court with the United Nations’  in  Antonio 
Cassese et al The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; A Commentary  page 222. 
18
 Pursuant to article 12 of the Rome Statute, the Court can only exercise its jurisdiction over state 
parties or over non state parties when they declare to accept Court’s jurisdiction. 
19
 L Caflisch Promoting justice human rights and conflict resolution through International Law 
(2007) page 87. 
20
 Coalition for the International Criminal Court ‘A universal court with global support ,cooperation 
agreements and enforcement ,cooperation with the United Nations’ available at 
http://www.Courtnow.org/?mod=agreementsun ,accessed on 14 July 2014 para 3. 
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(d) The Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal 
Court and the United Nations 
Presently, the Relationship Agreement provides for a close relationship between the 
Court and the United Nations. The purpose of the Relationship Agreement is to bring 
the two entities into a relationship pursuant to the Rome Statute and the Charter.
21
 
The Relationship Agreement obliges the Court and the Security Council to cooperate 
closely to ensure the attainment of their objectives. The effect of the Relationship 
Agreement is that it ties the Security Council to the Court therefore, both 
independent organisations have the obligation to cooperate with each other to ensure 
the effective discharge of their functions pursuant to the provisions of the 
Relationship Agreement, the Charter and the Rome Statute. 
22
 
1.2 Objectives of the study 
The objectives of this study are to examine the interaction between the Court and the 
Security Council which is demonstrated through referrals and deferrals, then to 
evaluate whether the Security Council has exercised this relationship in accordance 
with the provisions of the Rome Statute as envisaged during the drafting of the 
Rome Statute. 
1.3 Research questions 
This study seeks to answer: 
(a) Whether the Security Council exercised referrals and deferrals in accordance 
with the provisions of the Rome Statute, the Charter and as envisaged by the 
drafters of the Rome Statute. 
(b) How the Security Council’s exercise of the power of referrals and deferrals 
has affected the relationship between the latter and the Court. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
This research is conducted from primary and secondary resources. The primary 
sources will include the Rome Statute, the Charter, the Relationship Agreement, the 
International Law Commission’s Draft Statute of the Court and the reports of the 
                                                          
21
 Article 1 of the Relationship Agreement which reads that: ‘The present Agreement, which is 
entered into by the United Nations and the International Criminal Court … defines the terms on which 
the United Nations and the Court shall be brought into relationship.’ 
22
 The Relationship Agreement Op cit (no) 1. 
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Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. It 
also includes cases which arose from the situations in Darfur and Libya, while the 
secondary sources entail textbooks on international criminal law and the Security 
Council, journals will be drawn from the Court and United Nations websites. 
 1.5 Chapter outline 
Chapter One introduces the relationship between the Court and the Security Council 
by examining how the crafters of the Rome Statute envisaged that relationship, and 
how legislation provides for the relationship at present. 
      Chapter Two provides an overview of how the Security Council’s exercise of 
referrals and deferrals was envisaged during the making of the Rome Statute.  
      Chapter Three examines the Security Council power of referrals under article 
13(b) of the Rome Statute. It examines how the Security Council exercised its power 
of referral in the situations in Darfur and Libya. It deals with the issues that arose 
from these referrals, such as the failure of states to cooperate with the Court for 
effective prosecution of President Omar Al-Bashir and Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi for 
crimes against humanity. Moreover, it looks at the failure of the Security Council in 
both situations to back up the referrals. Finally, the chapter examines the 
enforcement mechanisms available to the Court and whether the Security Council 
has enforced the Court’s decisions. 
      Chapter Four, evaluates the deferral of investigations by the Security Council to 
the Court under article 16 of the Rome Statute. Generally, this chapter focuses on 
Security Council deferral resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487 (2003) which grants 
immunity to United Nations peacekeepers from non-state parties, thus excluding 
them from the jurisdiction of the Court. First, it begins by examining the Security 
Council deferral powers and the conditions to be fulfilled before the exercise of a 
deferral. It examines whether the Security Council resolutions on deferral were 
consistent with the provisions of the Rome Statute.      
      Chapter Five concludes by stating that the Security Council has exercised 
referrals and deferrals contrary to the provisions of the Relationship Agreement, the 
Charter, the Rome Statute and as envisaged by the crafters of the Rome Statute. 
Consequently, it argues that the relationship between the Court and the Security 
9 
 
Council is at a crossroad and proceeds to recommend for the two international 
organisations to improve their relationship. 
 





REFERRALS AND DEFERALS AS ENVISAGED BY THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW COMMISSION AND THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE 
 
 2.0 Introduction  
As mentioned in Chapter One, the drafters of the Rome Statute envisioned a close 
relationship between the Court and the Security Council. This interaction was 
essential to facilitate mutual achievement of each of the independent organisations’ 
objectives. 
      This chapter focuses on the provisions of the International Law Commission’s 
Draft Statute of the Court and the reports of the Preparatory Committee on referrals 
and deferrals. It seeks to provide a background to how the drafters of the Rome 
Statute envisioned the Security Council’s exercise of referrals and deferrals. It also 
evaluates the views of the delegates at the Rome Conference on the proposed powers 
of the Security Council to refer situations and defer prosecutions and investigations. 
     The chapter commences by laying out the provisions of referrals and deferrals as 
provided for by the International Law Commission and the Preparatory Committee. 
It argues that the crafters of the Rome Statute envisaged for the Security Council to 
refer situations within the jurisdiction of the Court to the latter and halt 
investigations and prosecutions as a way of maintaining international peace and 
security. However, the exercise of referrals and deferrals was subject to conditions 
laid out in the Draft Statute of the Court and the reports of Preparatory Committee. 
For instance, when exercising referrals, the Security Council has to adopt a 
resolution pursuant to the provisions of the Charter. Further, it has to refer a 
‘situation’ as opposed to a ‘matter’.  
      On the other hand, the Security Council can only exercise deferrals sparingly 
when the pursuit of justice interferes with the attainment of peace. Just like referrals, 
deferrals must be adopted through a formal Security Council resolution. For a 
deferral to be valid, there must be a threat to peace, a breach of peace or an act of 
aggression at the time of its adoption. Lastly, the Security Council can halt the 
Court’s investigations or proceedings for only a year, but this is renewable, 
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depending on whether the prior conditions on which the deferral was first adopted 
still exist. 
2.1 Referrals as envisaged by the International Law 
Commission and the Preparatory Committee 
(a) The  International Law Commission 
Initially, a vast majority of states at the Rome Conference for the establishment of 
the Court were against the Security Council referral of situations for prosecution to 
the Court, unsurprisingly, many states objected strongly against the Security 
Council’s power to defer Court’s investigations and prosecutions.  The delegates 
perceived referrals as an interference of the work of an independent judicial body.
23
 
      However, the Draft Statute of the Court recognised the importance of a 
relationship between the Court and the Security Council. It recognised the essence of 
referring ‘matters’ to the Court article 23(1) of the Draft Statute of the Court read 
that: ‘Notwithstanding article 21, the Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this 
Statute with respect to crimes referred to in article 20 as a consequence of the 
referral of a matter to the Court by the Security Council acting under chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations.’        
       The Draft Statute of the Court therefore envisioned a close interaction between 
the two entities which was demonstrated through the referral of ‘matters’ by the 
Security Council to the Court. However, the Court had to seek permission from the 
Security Council before it exercised jurisdiction on matters or situations within its 
jurisdiction over which the Security Council was acting upon.
24
The only cure to the 
foreseen power imbalance between the Court and the Security Council was to 
acknowledge the role played the Security Council in maintaining peace and security 
and thus allow the latter to exercise referrals in a way that would not affect the 
independence of the Court.
25
 
                                                          
23
  N White and R Cryer ‘The Court and the Security Council; an uncomfortable relationship’ in Jose 
Doria et al (eds) The Legal Regime of the International Criminal Court. Essays in Honour of Igor 
Blishchenko page 464. 
24
 S Kim ‘Maintaining the independence of the International Criminal Court: The legal and procedural 
implications of article 16 deferral request’ (2011) 29 Agenda Internacional 175- 212. 
25
 K Ambos ‘Establishing an International Criminal Court and an International Criminal Code. 
Observations from an International Law Viewpoint’ (1996) 7 EIJIL 519-544. 
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         As the negotiations proceeded, delegates supported the Security Council 
referral of ‘situations’ as opposed to ‘matters’ to the Court in order to obviate the 
need to create more ad hoc tribunals for prosecution of egregious human rights 
violations. Sweden stated as follows: ‘The Security Council, under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, should indeed be able to refer to the Court 
situations in which crimes under the Court's jurisdiction appeared to have been 




        It is evident from this discussion that the International Law Commission 
envisaged a close interaction between the two international organisations through the 
referral of matters and the deferral of the Court’s judicial proceedings. The 
discussion on whether the Security Council was to refer ‘situations’ as opposed to 
‘matters’ will be discussed in the subsequent subsection. 
(b)    The Preparatory Committee’s discussion one the referral of ‘matters’ or 
‘situations’ by Security Council to the Court  
The Preparatory Committee was not certain on whether the Security Council should 
refer matters or situations to the Court. Pursuant to article 10(1) of the Preparatory 
Committee:  
[N]otwithstanding article 6, [7] [and [9], the court has jurisdiction in accordance with this 
statute with respect to crimes [referred to][specified] in articles [as a consequence of the 
referral of ][on the basis of a [formal]decision to refer a [matter] [situation] in which one or 
more crimes appear to have been committed  to [the Prosecutor of] the Court by the Security 
Council[acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations] in accordance with 
the terms of such referral.]
27  
    The debate on whether the Security Council should refer ‘situations’ or ‘matters’ 
to the Court arose at this stage, as mentioned earlier, the draft statute of the Court 
allowed the Security Council to refer ‘matters’. Many delegates opposed for the 
Security Council to refer ‘matters’ to the Court as the term was considered to be 
                                                          
26
 United Nations ‘Diplomatic conference of Plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court A/CONF.183/SR’ available at 
http://legal.un.org/Court/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v3_e.pdf ,   accessed on 12 July 
2014 page 100. 
27
 United Nations ‘Diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court. Report of the Preparatory Committee on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court A/CONF.183/2’ available at 
http://legal.un.org/Court/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf, accessed on 12 July 
2014 page 26. 
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limited in scope and would subsequently affect the independence of the Court to 
prosecute, thus the term ‘situation’ was preferred as it was general in nature and 
would not interfere with  the independence of the Court.
28
  
The Draft Statute of the Court, proposed for the Security Council to refer ‘matters’ 













 Bosnia and Herzegovina
35
 and other 
delegates preferred for the Security Council to refer ‘situations’ to the Court as 
opposed to ‘matters’. It was agreed that the Security Council could only refer 
situations to the Court in order to respect the office of the Prosecutor of the Court 
and hence promote the independence of the Court.
36
 
      However, other states opposed the exercise of referral by the Security Council to 
the Court. India expressed the lack of support for the Security Council referrals. The 
Indian representative argued that referring situations to the Court was unnecessary 
because the Court could exercise jurisdiction through the initiation by the Prosecutor 
and by state party referrals.  India stated as follows; ‘[T]he Security Council had set 
up ad hoc tribunals because no appropriate judicial mechanism had existed to try 
such crimes at the time, but with the establishment of the Court, States parties would 
have the right to refer cases to it. The Council did not need to refer cases ... .’
37
 
       From the reports of the Preparatory Committee, it is evident that the spirit of the 
Rome Statute was to create a close interaction between the Security Council and the 
Court through the referral of situations which would maintain international peace 
and security as it preserved the independence of the Court.  
                                                          
28
 S Williams W Schabas ‘Article 13 exercise of jurisdiction’ in William A Schabas (ed) A 
Commentary to the Rome Statute of an International Criminal Court page 108. 
29
 United Nations ‘Diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court. Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of 
the Whole A/CONF.183/C.1/SR 10’ available at accessed on page 202. 
30
 United Nations op cit (no27) at 206. 
31
  United Nations op cit (no27) at 208. 
32
  United Nations op cit (no27) at 212. 
33
  United Nations op cit (no27) at 215. 
34
 United Nations ‘Diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court .Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of 
the Whole A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.11’ available at 
http://legal.un.org/Court/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf , accessed on 12 July 
2014 page 307. 
35
United Nations op cit (no 27) at 316. 
36
 Doria op cit (no23) at 457.  
37
 Doria op cit (no23) at 464. 
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2.2 Deferrals as envisaged by the International Law 
Commission and the Preparatory Committee 
(a) Deferrals under the International Law Commission 
The Draft Statute of the Court formed a basis for future negotiations of the Security 
Council power of deferrals in the Ad Hoc Committee and the Preparatory 
Committee. Article 23 (3) of the Draft Statute of the Court provided as follows: ‘No 
prosecution may be commenced under this Statute arising from a situation which is 
being dealt with by the Security Council as a threat to or breach of the peace or an 




     Although the Draft Statute of the Court acknowledged the role of the Security 
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, it also proposed a vertical relationship 
between the Court and the Security Council. Evidently, article 23(3) of the Draft 
Statute for the Court imposed certain obligations on the Court before the latter 
exercised jurisdiction which was that, the Court had to ascertain whether the Security 
Council was dealing with a situation which threatened international peace and 
security and then refrain from exercising jurisdiction in such a given situation.  
     Delegates opposed this provision because it meant that the Court had to seek the 
Security Council’s permission before it exercised jurisdiction upon a situation which 
the Security Council was dealing with. The Court’s request was subject to a veto by 
any of the permanent members of the Security Council.
39
  
     Seeking permission from the Security Council before exercising jurisdiction on a 
situation would obstruct the Court from conducting judicial proceedings because, as 
already mentioned, the request was subject to a veto and the process of requesting 
would considerably delay the Court in fulfilling its objectives. Further, it would have 
made the Court to be dependent on the Security Council, this would affect the 
independence of the Court. 
                                                          
38
 United Nations ‘Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court’ available at 
http://legal.un.org/InternationalLawCommission/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_4_1994
.pdf , accessed on 22 July 2014. 
39
 United Nations ‘Diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court .Summary records of the plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of 
the Whole’ available at  




(b) Deferrals  under the Preparatory Committee  
During the negotiation of the Security Council’s power of deferrals, majority of the 
delegates were of the view that deferring the Court’s investigations and prosecutions 
was unnecessary because it amounted to a political interference in the work of an 
independent legal institution.  
     Many states including, Nigeria, Malawi, Philippines amongst others, argued that 
allowing the Security Council to defer the Court’s investigations or prosecutions 
would interfere with the independent functioning of the Court. 
40
 Other states 
opposed the Security Council’s exercise of deferrals as there was fear of the 




      India objected strongly to the involvement of the Security Council in the judicial 
proceedings of the Court, therefore it did not support referrals and deferrals of the 
Security Council to the Court. The Indian representative stated as follows: 
‘The power to block proceedings was even harder to accept .On the one hand, it was argued 
that the Court was to try crimes of the gravest magnitude, yet on the other, it was argued that 
the maintenance of international peace and security might require that those who committed 
such crimes should be permitted to escape justice, if the Council so decided.’
42
  
Singapore made a proposal which found middle ground between states who were 
against the Security Council’s exercise of deferrals and those who strongly believed 
that the Security Council should be allowed to halt the investigations or prosecutions 
of the Court. The Singapore compromise made it harder for the Security Council to 
misuse the power of deferrals.
43
  The proposal allowed the Security Council to halt 
investigations or prosecutions of the Court only after passing a formal resolution 
which was subject to a veto by any of the permanent members. The Singapore 
compromise read as follows: 
                                                          
40
 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights ‘Establishing an International Criminal Court major 
unresolved issues on the draft statute’ available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/2PrepCmtEstablishICCLCHR.pdf , accessed on 12 July 2014 page 
1.   
41
 P Kirsch, JT Holmes, M Johnson ‘International tribunals and courts’ in David Malone (ed) The UN 
Security Council from the Cold War to the 21 century (2004) page 290. 
42
 United Nations op cit (no39) page 183.   
43
 R Cryer Prosecuting International Crimes. Selectivity and the International Criminal Law regime 
(2005) page 226. 
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 ‘No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute 
 where the Security Council has, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
 Nations, given a direction to that effect.’
 44
 
On the other hand, Canada agreed with the Singaporean proposal and added a time 
limitation before the exercise of deferrals. Canada proposed that: 
‘No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this statute for 
a period of twelve months where the Security Council has been acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations, notified the Court to that effect. Notification that the 
Security Council is continuing to act may be renewed at twelve months intervals.’
45
 
 A deferral was envisaged to be exercised in limited occasions when the attainment 
of justice would interfere with the maintenance of peace and security.
46
 The 
Canadian proposal enabled the Court to proceed with legal proceedings after a year, 
if the Security Council did not request a renewal.  
       The time limit avoided the probable seizing of the situations by the Security 
Council over an undefined period of time which would have had the effect of 
delaying the Court from exercising its judicial activities.         
      A huge majority of states in the Rome Conference supported the Canadian and 
Singaporean proposals as the formal request by the Security Council to the Court 
acknowledged the independence of both of the entities. Further the limitation of time 
enabled the Court to proceed with its judicial activities after the lapse of twelve 
months in the absence of a formal request of an extension by the Security Council. 
     The Canadian proposal was widely supported by the delegates who agreed that it 
was necessary for the Security Council to temporarily suspend legal proceedings if 
they affected the maintenance of international peace and security.
47
    
Conclusion 
                                                          
44
United Nations ‘Non paper /WG.3/No 16’ 8 August 1997 available at http://www. 
iccnow.org/documents/SingaporeSecurityCouncil.pdf, accessed on 20 July 2014. 
45
 United Nations ‘Diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court. Summary records of the plenary meetings and the meetings of the Committee of the 
Whole A/CONF.183/ C.1/L 20’ available at 
http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf, accessed on 12 July 
2014 page 120.  
46
 R Pitty ‘Political constraints upon the International Criminal Court’ in Ustinia Dolgopol et al (eds) 
The Challenge of Conflict: International Law responds (2006) page 347. 
47
 United Nations ‘Diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court. Summary records of the plenary meetings A/CONF/183/SR.6.’available at 
http://legal.un.org/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf, accessed on 14 July 
2014 page 200. 
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At the initial stages of the negotiations of the Rome Statute delegates were opposed 
to the involvement of the Security Council in the work of the Court. They perceived 
the involvement of the Security Council as an interference of a political organ in the 
work of an independent judicial body. However, as the negotiations of the Rome 
Statute proceeded, delegates agreed for the Security Council to refer situations and 
defer investigations and prosecutions subject to certain conditions.  
     Both referrals and deferrals were to be adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter 
through a formal Security Council resolution. The Security Council could only refer 
situations as opposed to matters to the Prosecutor of the Court. Finally, with regard 
to deferrals, the Security Council could only defer an investigation or prosecution for 
twelve months which was subject to a renewal through a Security Council resolution. 
      From the above discussion, it is evident that the founders of the Rome Statute 
were apprehensive about the interference of the Security Council in the work of the 
Court. However, mechanisms were put in place to ensure that the Security Council 
did not misuse the powers of referrals and deferrals. The subsequent chapters discuss 
whether the Security Council has complied with the said mechanism in the exercise 







THE SECURITY COUNCIL EXERCISE OF REFERRALS IN 
DARFUR AND LIBYA 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters have set out at length how the crafters of the Rome Statute 
envisaged a close interaction between the Court and the Security Council as a way of 
ensuring successful prosecution of serious crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction and 
maintaining international peace and security. 
     This chapter focuses on the Security Council referral of the situations in Libya 
and Darfur to the Court and the issues arising from them. It discusses firstly, the 
failure of state parties and non-state parties to fulfil their arrest and surrender 
obligations arising from the Rome Statute and the Charter respectively; secondly, the 
failure of the Security Council to cooperate with the Court after the latter sent the 
Security Council a finding pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome Statute. The finding 
informed the Security Council of two things, first the non-cooperation of state parties 
and secondly, that non-state parties had to comply with obligations emanating from 
the Security Council resolutions and the provisions of the Rome Statute. 
      It argues that for successful referrals, the Court requires cooperation from state 
parties, non-state parties and the Security Council. The failure of these entities to 
cooperate has made both the Darfur and Libyan referrals unsuccessful up to date.      
This chapter is divided into five parts. The first part briefly highlights how the 
Security Council can exercise jurisdiction, it then discusses the history of the onflicts 
in Darfur and Libya; the chapter proceeds to examine the state’s obligations arising 
from the Security Council referrals. It studies the need for states to cooperate with 
the Court and the enforcement mechanisms available to the Court after the Security 
Council refers situations to the latter. Also, it examines whether the Security 
Council’s has enforced the said mechanisms after referring the situations to the 
Court. Finally, the chapter concludes by stating that the inaction of the Security 
Council to respond to the states non-cooperation, strains the relationship between the 
two international organisations contrary to what the authors of the Rome Statute 
envisaged, the provisions of the Rome Statute and the Relationship Agreement. 
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Consequently, in the nine years after the Security Council referral of the situation in 
Darfur, President Omar Al-Bashir (Al-Bashir) has not been surrendered to the Court. 
Similarly, in the Libyan case, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (Al-Islam) has not been 
surrendered to the Court, in the five years after the Security Council referred the 
situation in Libya to the Court.   
 3.2 The Security Council exercise of referrals  
The Prosecutor of the Court can exercise jurisdiction only in the following instances: 
first, through a state party referral, second, when the Security Council refers a 
situation to the Court acting under article 13(b) of the Rome Statute and third, when 
he or she acts in their own accord to initiate investigations. 
      Pursuant to article 13(b)
48
 of the Rome Statute, the Security Council has the 
power to refer situations in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court has been committed.  
      When the Security Council refers a situation to the Court, it has to comply with 
the conditions arising from the Rome Statute. First, the Security Council can only 
refer ‘situations’ in which one or more crimes have been committed according to the 
Rome Statute of the Court. As previously mentioned in Chapter Two of this thesis, 
the crafters of the Rome Statute preferred the term ‘situation’ to ‘matter,’ because the 
former would uphold the independence of the Court. Second, the Security Council 
must act under Chapter VII of the Charter when referring situations to the Court. 
Subsequently, the referral of a situation to the Court should be exercised after the 
Security Council has established the existence of a breach of peace or threat to 
peace.  
      The effects of Security Council referrals are that, firstly, it enhances international 
criminal justice through extending the jurisdiction of the Court over non-state 
parties. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Court extends over all states irrespective of 
whether they are parties to the Rome Statute or not.
49
 Secondly, the Security 
                                                          
48
 Accordingly, article 13(b) of provides: ‘The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a 
crime referred to in article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: (b) A situation in 
which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the 
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; or … .’ 
49
 C Heyder ‘The UN Security Council’s referral of the crimes in Darfur to the International Criminal 
Court in light of U.S position to the Court: Implications for the International Criminal Court’s 
functions and status ’(2006) J.INT’L LAW 650. 
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Council’s referrals to the Court increases the legitimacy of the Court as it obviates 
with the need to create ad hoc tribunals to investigate and prosecute the situations in 
Darfur and Libya.
50
 Thirdly, Security Council’s referrals can be viewed as a tool for 
maintaining international peace and security
51
 thus, the Darfur and Libya referrals 
can be viewed as measures of restoring international peace and security without the 
use of force as stipulated under articles 39 to 41 of the Charter.
52
  
     So far and at the time of writing this thesis, the Security Council has referred only 





     With regard to the situation in Darfur, Sudan the Prosecutor applied for a warrant 
of arrest against Al-Bashir. The Pre-Trial Chamber issued a warrant of arrest against 
him for crimes against humanity and war crimes.
55
 The Pre Trial-Chamber issued a 
second warrant of arrest against Al-Bashir for committing genocide.
 56
 Presently, the 
war in Darfur between the Sudanese government and the rebel forces still persist. 
57
 
Subsequently, nine years after the Security Council referral of the situation in Darfur 
to the Court, and five years after the Court issued a warrant of arrest against Al-
Bashir, the suspect has not been prosecuted to the Court. 
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  S Garsky ‘Strong, independent, and effective: The European Union’s promotions of the 
International Criminal Court’ in Astrid Boening et al (eds) Global Power Europe Volume 2 Policies, 
Actions and Influence of the EU’s External Relations (2013) page 12.  
51
 L Condorelli and S Villapando ‘Referral and deferral by the Security Council’ in Antonio Cassese 
et al (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A commentary (2002) page 630. 
52
 Article 39 of the Charter states that; ‘The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.’ The Security Council referrals to the Court can be viewed as a non-
use of force measure taken to maintain international peace and security. 
53
 United Nations Security Council ‘Resolution 1593(2005)’ available at http://www.icc-
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accessed on 21 August 2014 paragraph 1. 
54
 United Nations Security Council ‘Resolution 1970(2011)’ available at http://www.icc-
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August 2014 paragraph 1. 
55
 International Criminal Court ‘Pre Trial Chamber I Situation in Darfur Sudan, in the case of The 
Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Omar Al Bashir)’ available at http://www.icc-




Human Rights Watch ‘Sudan: renewed attacks on civilians in Darfur. Activists detained, protester 
killed’ available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/21/sudan-renewed-attacks-civilians-darfur , 
accessed on 25 August 2014. 
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      In the Libyan situation, the Pre-Trial Chamber I issued warrants of arrest against 
Al-Islam, Muammar Gaddafi
58
 and Abdullah Al-Senussi.
59
 Al-Islam was charged 
with murder and persecution as crime against humanity
60
  while Abdullah Al-
Senussi was charged with murder and crimes against humanity. The Pre-Trial 
Chamber I decided that complementarity rendered the Court’s proceedings against 
Abdullah Al- Senussi inadmissible because Libya was conducting proceedings 
against him for the same charges.
61
On 21 May 2014, the Appeals Chamber ruled that 
the case against AI- Islam was admissible before the Court and reiterated Libya’s 
obligations to surrender him.
62
Therefore, Libya is yet to surrender Al-Islam to the 
Court. 
3.3 Background to the conflicts  
3.3.1 Darfur 
The conflict in Darfur arose between the Sudanese government and rebel groups. 
The conflict resulted in many deaths, displacement of people and wanton destruction 
of property.
63
The United Nations Human Rights Experts called for the Security 
Council to take effective measures to end egregious human rights violations in 




      The Security Council requested the Secretary General to establish an 
International Commission of Inquiry to investigate the human rights violations and 
to determine if genocide had occurred. The Commission identified the perpetrators 
and proposed for the Security Council to refer the situation in Darfur to the 
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cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1099332.pdf , accessed on 21 July 2014   page 3. 
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Prosecutor of the Court.
65





On 18 February 2011, the Libyans protested against the Muammar Gaddafi’s 
dictatorship.
67
 Gaddafi responded by using excessive force against the Libyan people 




      The Security Council, invoking its Chapter VII powers under the Charter, passed 
sanctions on Gaddafi and his family and referred the situation to the Court.
 69
 The 
Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Libya, a travel ban, freezing of the 
assets of Gaddafi, his family members and some military officers.
 
 
3.4 State obligations  
3.4.1 Non-state party cooperation 
International law does not impose any obligations to third states who have not 
ratified a treaty. Customary international law recognises that states can be bound to 
the terms of a treaty only if they expressly consent to it as provided in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.
70
 
       Theoretically, as non-state parties to the Rome Statute, Sudan and Libya have no 
obligations arising from the Rome Statute.  
      Conversely, there are two ways in which non-state parties are obliged to 
cooperate with the Court: firstly, when the non-state party enters into an ad hoc 
arrangement with the Court under articles 12(3)
71
 and 87(5) (a) and (b) of the Rome 
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 Secondly, non-state parties have an obligation to cooperate with the Court 
emanating from the Security Council resolutions as members of the United Nations. 
In referring the situations in Darfur and Libya, the referrals obliged both non-state 
parties to cooperate with the Court because they are members of the United Nations.  
      Paragraph 2 of the Security Council 1593(2005) resolution that referred the 
situation in Darfur reads: 
 ‘Decides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall 
cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor 
pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute 
have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other 
international organizations to cooperate fully;’ 
73 
Similarly, the Security Council resolution in the situation in Libya reiterated the 
same provisions
74
, thereby making it compulsory for the two countries to comply 
with the Security Council directions. 
      Cooperation obliges states to act in good faith with a view to fulfilling 
international obligations.
75
Both Sudan and Libya have obligations to cooperate with 
the Court and these obligations stem from their membership to the United Nations. 




      As high contracting parties to the Geneva Conventions, Sudan and Libya are 
obliged to act in accordance with the provisions of the Charter in cases of egregious 
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delay or exception in accordance with Part 9.’ 
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 The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court are similar 
to those that state parties to the Geneva Conventions agreed to respect.
78
  
     Therefore, the Security Council decision requiring non-state parties to cooperate 
with the Court blurs the distinction between state and non-state party obligations 
because all states are obligated to cooperate with the Court.
79
  
 3.4.2 International cooperation with the Court 
In identifying issues related to the prosecution by international criminal tribunals. 
Antonio Cassese likens the International Criminal Court of Yugoslavia to ‘a giant 
without arms and legs — it needs artificial limbs to walk and work.’
 80
 Similarly, the 
Court requires cooperation from the Security Council, state parties, non-state parties 
and international organisations in order to effectively fulfil its functions, otherwise 
the Court’s decisions are likened to the proverbial harmless toothless watchdog. The 
Court requires the Security Council to enforce its decisions when states fail to 
cooperate with it with respect to referrals.  
      Lack of cooperation from state and non-state parties hinders the Court from 
prosecuting serious crimes. The failure of the Security Council to enforce its 
decisions makes it more difficult for the Court to try accused persons or even avail 
them before the Court because it requires and relies on the cooperation of the state 
parties and other entities in locating indicted persons, arresting, detaining and 
surrendering of the accused persons to the Court for trial.   
      State parties to the Court are required to provide full cooperation at all times 
when so requested by the Court during investigations and prosecutions unless the 
information so requested may affect the states national security.
81
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     The obligation of state parties to cooperate with the Court stems from article 86 
of the Rome Statute which states, ‘State Parties shall … cooperate fully with the 
Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.’ 
 3.4.2.1 The travelling tyrant 
After the issuance of the arrest warrant on Al-Bashir, the Registrar of the Court made 
cooperation requests and submitted them to all state parties to arrest and surrender 
him if he visited their territories.
82
 Nonetheless, Al-Bashir travelled to territories of 



















 None of the countries 
complied with the provisions of the Security Council resolution 1593(2003) or with 
the cooperation requests to execute outstanding arrest warrants of Al-Bashir. 
       As mentioned earlier, in 3.4 of this chapter, both state parties and non-state 
parties to the Court have an obligation to cooperate with it. These obligations arise 
from the Rome Statute with regard to state parties and from the Charter with regard 
to non-state parties. The Pre-Trial Chamber II stated as follows in that regard: 
 ...[O]nly States Parties to the Statute are under an obligation to cooperate with the Court.  ... 
[N]on-States Parties may decide to cooperate with the Court on an ad hoc basis... . This 
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principle may be altered by the SC which may, by means of a resolution adopted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, creates an obligation to cooperate with the Court on those 
UN Member States which are not parties to the Statute. ... [T]he obligation to cooperate 
stems directly from the UN Charter. 
92 
 Chad, Malawi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria are state parties to the Rome 
Statute of the Court. They have obligation under article 86
93
 of the Rome Statute to 
cooperate with the Court. It has been argued that article 25 of the Charter does away 
with all the immunities that arise from customary international law and 




      Likewise, as members of the United Nations, Sudan, Libya China, Qatar, 
Ethiopia and Egypt have obligations arising from the Charter, therefore they should 
have cooperated with the Court pursuant to the provisions of Security Council 







 the Democratic Republic of Congo,
98
  Djibouti and Kenya 
before Al-Bashir visited these countries. These states failed to cooperate with the 




 failure to 
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cooperate and sent the same to the Security Council. The Court required Libya to 
surrender Al-Islam for investigation and prosecution of crimes against humanity.
101
 
      The Security Council referrals of the situations in both Sudan and Libya to the 
Court demonstrate the Court’s heavy reliance on state and non-state parties for 
cooperation failure of which it cannot exercise jurisdiction over the most serious 
international crimes. This non-cooperation undermines the Court’s work and makes 
it nearly impossible to achieve justice for victims and the public at large in the 
affected countries. Furthermore, it causes the budget of the Court to shoot up as in 
the cases where the witnesses and or victims in these cases are in protection, they 
still need maintenance, financial and otherwise from the Court as they await the 
surrender or arrest of the accused persons to the Court. Consequently, the Court has 
not prosecuted either Al-Bashir or Al-Islam for the alleged crimes against humanity. 
3.5 Enforcement of the Court’s decisions 
The Court has two ways of its enforcing decisions when states fail to cooperate with 
it in arresting and surrendering indicted persons to the Court for prosecution. First, 
the Court makes a finding on the failure of a state to cooperate and sends the finding 
either to the Assembly of Parties or to the Security Council. However, the 
enforcement mechanisms available to the Assembly of Parties are unclear. Article 
112(2) enables the Assembly of Parties to deal with all forms of non-cooperation 
which include: condemning the wrongful act, demanding compliance or referring the 
matter to the Security Council. 
102
 When states fail to cooperate in cases of referrals, 
the Court must make a finding of non-cooperation and send it to the Security 
Council as stated in article 87(7) of the Rome Statute.
103
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      Conversely, the Court does not have the enforcement powers against non-state 
parties to the Rome Statute. When the Security Council refers a situation involving a 
non-state party to the Court, the latter has an obligation to fully cooperate with the 
Court. However, when the non-state party fails to cooperate with the Court, the 
Security Council should apply its enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the 
Charter to enforce compliance.
104
 
     Since the Court does not have an enforcement mechanism, it relies solely on 
cooperation of states for effective investigation and prosecution of serious 
international crimes within its jurisdiction. The failure by states to cooperate with the 
Court frustrates its work as it is unable to proceed with its judicial proceedings, 
thereby delaying justice to affected people.
105
 
       After the Security Council refers a situation to the Court, the former has an 
obligation to enforce compliance with state and non-state parties’ obligations in the 
event of non-cooperation.
106
 The Security Council can invoke its powers pursuant to 
Chapter VII of the Charter to compel states to cooperate with the Charter as a way of 
restoring peace and security.  
3.5.1 What can the Security Council do to back up its referrals? 
The Security Council has a range of measures it can implement to do away with 
insecurity, it can employ hard or soft measures to achieve its mandate of maintaining 
peace and security. The soft tools encompass the use of mediation measures while 
hard tools means invoking Chapter VII powers under the Charter, referring situations 
to the Court or passing resolutions to start ad hoc tribunals and the use of force.
107
 
For instance, in the situation in Darfur, the United Nations Secretary General Special 
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Envoy for Darfur adopted peace settlement mechanisms which aimed to trigger 
peace negotiations and improve the humanitarian situation in Darfur.
108
  
      As aforementioned, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council has 
the function of determining breaches of peace, threats to peace and acts of aggression 
and decide or take measures under articles 41 or 42 of the Charter in the maintenance 
of peace and security.
109
 When the Security Council refers a situation to the Court, 
the latter has an obligation to ensure that states cooperate with the Court. 
Subsequently, when states fail to cooperate with the Court, Security Council can 
invoke its Chapter VII powers to ensure compliance. These powers are found under 
articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. Article 41 notes that: 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to 
be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United 
Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.  
 
The Security Council has a range of options to exercise as enforcement mechanism 
when it encounters non-cooperation from states: it can apply article 42
110
 measures 
which involve force before it employs non-force measures under article 41, if it 
foresees that article 41 measures may be inadequate.
111
 
      The Security Council employed sanctions under article 41 of the Charter with 
regard to both the referrals in Sudan and Libya. The Security Council ordered the 
government of Sudan to disarm Janjaweed militias and prosecute them for the human 
rights violations committed. It proceeded to threaten the use of article 41 of the 
Charter measures in case of non-compliance.
112
 The Sudanese government did not 
comply with Security Council demands.  Subsequently, pursuant to Security Council 
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resolution 1556 (2004), the Sudan Sanctions Committee of the Security Council 
adopted sanctions against the Janjaweed leaders
113
. These included: travel bans, asset 
freeze and an arms embargo.
114
In the referral of the situation in Libya, the Security 
Council adopted a travel ban, arms embargo on Libya and freezing of assets on 
Muammar Gaddafi, his family members and some military officers.
115
  
      It is important to note that, the Security Council adopted these sanctions on 
Sudan and Libya before it referred the situations to the Court. It has not adopted any 
enforcement mechanism after the referral of the situations in both Darfur and Libya. 
3.6 The inaction of the Security Council 
The Security Council has not adopted any enforcement mechanisms after the referral 
of the situations in Darfur and Libya to state parties and non-state parties to facilitate 
cooperation with the Court. The situation in Darfur has been very challenging to the 
Court as Al-Bashir has made a mockery of the latter and the Security Council by 
travelling to territories of state and non-state parties including to China, which is a 
permanent member of the Security Council. 
The Security Council, the very body that referred the Sudan situation to the ICC has not 
stood firmly behind the arrest warrant against Bashir, it could have increased the cost of 
doing business with Bashir by imposing sanctions on fugitive Sudanese officials and 
governments that flout the arrest warrant. The Security Council may deserve credit for 




 The Prosecutor of the Court, in her report to the Security Council, urged the latter 
and state parties to take action with regard to the arrest of Al-Bashir, stating as 
follows:  
‘The time has come for this Council and States parties to seriously devise strategies for 
arresting those alleged to be responsible for these crimes.  It was a serious indictment on 
both the Council and those parties that President Omar Hassan al-Bashir and others had been 
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able to travel without fear of arrest.  The Council’s silence, even when notified of failures by 
States to comply with their obligations, only added insult to Darfur’s victims.’
117
 
The Prosecutor commended the Libyan government and non-state parties on the 
cooperation it had previously demonstrated but emphasised the need for the 
government of Libya to fulfil its obligations of surrendering Al-Islam to the Court.
118
 
       Evidently, the Security Council has failed to provide support to the Court 
through investigations and prosecutions after the referral of the situations of in 
Darfur and Libya. Consequently, Al Bashir has travelled extensively. The failure by 
the Security Council in providing enforcement mechanisms on its referrals to the 
Court has been an impediment to the achievement of international criminal justice 
and has lowered the credibility of the Court.
119
 
      Even though the Prosecutor has sent periodic reports to the Security Council, the 
latter has not supported the investigations and prosecutions or addressed the 
difficulties faced by the Court after non-cooperation from state and non-state parties. 
This does not promote the relationship between the Court and the Security Council 
contrary to intention of the drafters of the Rome Statute, the Rome Statute and the 
Relationship Agreement. It also frustrations the work of the Court. 
     Due to the failure of the Security Council to compel states to cooperate with the 
Court, its referrals weakened the enforcement mechanism of the Court and propelled 




    The failure of the Security Council to support the Court contravenes the 
relationship between the two international organisations as envisaged by the 
International Law Commission, Ad Hoc Committee and the Preparatory Committee. 
It also fails to fulfil the obligations of the Security Council under the Relationship 
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Agreement which requires the Court and the Security Council to have a close 
relationship for mutual attainment of their objectives.  
Conclusion  
The referral of the situation in Darfur and Libya was an opportunity to prosecute 
those suspected of having the highest individual criminal responsibility, to seek 
redress and justice for the victims in the affected areas and to promote the 
advancement of international criminal justice. The failure of the Security Council to 
provide enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter has lowered the 
credibility of both the Court and the Security Council as the perpetrators of the 
egregious human rights are still at large and the situation in Darfur continues to be a 
threat to international peace and security.  
      On the other hand, Libya has not yet surrendered Al-Islam to the Court at the 
time of writing this dissertation, therefore the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction him 
for the alleged crimes.   
      For successful referral of situations to the Court, the Security Council requires 
cooperation from states, but when states fail to collaborate with the Court, the 
Security Council has an obligation to compel states to cooperate with the Court. In 
doing, so the Security Council will kill two birds with one stone, as it will fulfil the 
obligations set out in the Relationship Agreement and the provisions of the Rome 
Statute and maintain international peace and security. Therefore, the Court can 
prosecute Al-Bashir and Al-Islam only if state parties comply with their obligations 
arising from the Rome Statute and the Charter. 
     As seen in the situations in Darfur and Libya, the Court relies heavily on states 
and the Security Council to enforce its decisions, failure to which renders the Court 
unable to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court should devise enforcement mechanisms 
to support its decisions. This should include the suspension of recalcitrant states who 
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THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1422(2002) AND 
1487(2003) 
4.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter Three of this thesis, the relationship between the Court and 
the Security Council is demonstrated through the exercise of referrals and deferrals. 
While the Security Council referral of situations to the Court can be viewed as the 
maintenance of peace through the achievement of justice, deferral could be perceived 
as postponing the wheels of justice to attain peace and security.
122
 
     Chapters One and Two of this thesis commenced the discussion on deferrals by 
showing how the  majority of delegates were opposed to the Security Council’s 
proposed exercise of deferrals due to the fear of politicised prosecutions. However, 
Singapore and Canada proposed for the Security Council to exercise deferrals 
pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter and to defer only for a limited period of time.   
      This chapter argues that in passing deferral resolutions 1422(2002) and 
1487(2003) the Security Council acted contrary to the provisions of the Rome 
Statute and the Charter. These deferral resolutions defy the Rome Statute provisions 
which lay out the conditions to be fulfilled before exercising deferrals and the 
irrelevance of official capacity. In addition, these resolutions did not comply with 
Chapter VII powers of the Charter.  
      This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part briefly discusses the 
Security Council’s powers of deferrals. The second part examines the Security 
Council’s deferral resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003).Thereafter, it evaluates 
the validity of the aforementioned resolutions. Then, it highlights the effect of the 
deferral resolutions and the possible remedies against the Security Council deferral 
resolutions. The chapter concludes by stating that the Security Council deferral 
resolutions put the relationship between the Court and the Security Council at a 
crossroad contrary to the intention of the founders of the Rome Statute. 
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4.2 The Security Council’s power of deferral 
The Rome Statute has not defined what a deferral means; generally, it means ‘[t]he 
act of delaying or postponing something.’
123
 With regard to the Rome Statute, 
deferral refers to the act of the Security Council delaying or postponing 
investigations or prosecutions of the Court for a period of 12 months.
124
 
      In allowing the Security Council to defer investigations or prosecutions of the 
Court, the latter recognises the role that the Security Council plays in the 
maintenance of peace and security under the Charter.  
      Thus article 16 of the Rome Statute lays out the conditions to be adhered to 
before the Security Council defers Court’s judicial proceedings.  
4.2.1 Conditions to be fulfilled by the Security Council 
before the exercise of deferrals. 
The Security Council has to comply with certain prerequisites set forth in article 16 
of the Rome Statute and in Chapter VII of the Charter of United Nations before it 
exercises a deferral. First, the power to defer investigations and prosecutions has to 
comply with the provisions set out in Chapter VII of the Charter which lays out the 
action that the Security Council should take in response to threats to peace, breach of 
the peace and acts of aggression. Article 39 of the Charter notes: ‘The Security 
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall 
be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.’ Therefore, before the Security Council exercises 
deferrals it has to establish the existence of a threat to peace, breach of the peace or 
an act of aggression.  
      Second, article 16 of the Rome Statute provides that the deferral can only last for 
12 months.
125
  This means that the suspension should not be for an indefinite period 
but be temporary. However, this period may be extended for 12 more months subject 
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to the fulfilment of prior conditions which are there must exist a threat to peace, 
breach of the peace or an act of aggression and the deferral resolution must be 
adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter.  
      Third, the deferral request can only be adopted through a Security Council 
resolution. The voting process is achieved when a deferral resolution gains a 
majority vote by nine members of the Security Council without the exercise of a veto 
by any of the five permanent members.
126
 
      Lastly, the Security Council can only defer the Court’s judicial proceedings once 
the Prosecutor has initiated an investigation or prosecution. The first paragraph of 
article 16 of the Rome Statute states: ‘[n]o investigation or prosecution may be 
commenced or proceeded with under this Statute.’ This means that the Security 
Council can postpone the Court’s judicial proceedings only when the Prosecutor is 
conducting an investigation or prosecutions. 
     The Security Council must conform to the provisions of the Rome Statute as the 
constitutive document which establishes the Court. These conditions will be 
discussed further in this chapter when evaluating whether the Security Council 
resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) complied with these conditions. 
 4.3 The Security Council resolutions 1422(2002), 
1487(2003) and 1497(2004)  
At the time of writing this thesis, the Security Council had passed two deferral 
resolutions and attempted to renew the said deferral resolutions for the third time. On 
14 July 2002 the Security Council adopted resolution 1422 (2002) to avoid the veto 
of its peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
127
 Paragraph 1 of the 
resolution reads:  
Requests, consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the ICC, if a 
case arises involving current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State not a 
Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or 
authorized operation, shall for a twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or 
                                                          
126
 Article 25(2) of the Charter provides that; ‘Decisions of the Security Council on procedural 
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.’ 
127
 UN News Centre UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina extended for 3 days; US vetoes longer 
term available at 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=4077&Cr=Bosnia&Cr1=#.Upodo9JVOrw , 
accessed on 3 August 2014 para 1. 
36 
 




 Many states did not support the Security Council deferral request 1422(2002). 
Canada, South Africa, Brazil and New Zealand, opposed the deferral resolution 
arguing that the resolution granted immunity to peacekeepers contrary to the 
provisions of the Rome Statute.
129
 Similarly, Australia, Switzerland, Fiji, 
Liechtenstein, Syria, Burundi, Malawi and the United Arab Emirates argued that the 




      The Secretary General to the Security Council wrote a letter to Colin Powell, the 
then Secretary General of State for the United States of America, stating that the 
adoption of the Security Council resolution would provide a ‘blanket resolution’ to 
peacekeepers from non-state parties to the Court, contrary to the intention of the 
drafters of the Rome Statute of the Court.
131
 This meant that the resolution would 
completely shield the peace keepers from the jurisdiction of the Court, should they 
commit human rights violations, of the Court contrary to the provisions of the Rome 
Statute.  
      Although, many states and non-governmental organisations opposed resolution 
1422(2002), this resolution was renewed through resolution 1487(2003).
132
 
Resolution 1487(2003) sought to defer United Nations peacekeeping missions from 
the prosecution of the Court. Unsurprisingly, this renewal was met with vehement 
opposition from states and human rights organisations. 
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     The Human Rights Watch opposed the renewal of resolution 1422(2002) arguing 
that the resolution was adopted in the absence of any investigations or prosecutions 
which may have been a threat to international peace and security. Additionally, it 
argued that the resolution attempted to provide future immunity for the United 
Nations peacekeeping missions contrary to the provisions of the Rome Statute. 
133
 
      The Coalition Implementation for the International Criminal Court expressed the 
view that the resolution was passed contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
Charter thus the Security Council it contravened the provisions of the Charter.
134
  
      The United States of America attempted to renew resolution 1487(2003) through 
resolution 1497(2004), but it dropped the demand amidst allegations of its 
peacekeeping forces torturing detained prisoners in Iraq.
135
  
     The question which springs to mind is, whether these Security Council 
resolutions were adopted in accordance with the provisions of the Rome Statute and 
the Charter. In passing deferral resolutions 1422(2002), 1487(2003) the Security 
Council  contravened the article 34 and Chapter VII powers of the Charter it also 
acted contrary to articles 16 and 27 of the Rome Statute.  
     Pursuant to Chapter VII powers under the Charter, the Security Council must 
ensure that there is a threat to peace, breach of peace or an act of aggression before 
deferring Court’s investigations or prosecutions. The Security Council resolutions 
1422(2002) and 1487(2003) did not fit within the criteria laid out in article 39 of the 
Charter as discussed below. This is discussed at length in the subsequent subsection. 
 4.3.1 Validity of resolutions under the Charter  
Operative paragraph two of  both Security Council resolutions 1422(2002) and 
1487(2003) provide for an automatic renewal of the deferral resolution: ‘[E]xpresses 
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the intention to renew the request in paragraph 1 under the same conditions each 1 
July for further 12-month periods for as long as may be necessary.’
136
  
      This renewal raises the question of whether the Security Council can defer future 
investigations and situations without the existence of an imminent threat to peace. 
The Security Council cannot be able to defer future investigations or situations 
because it requires the existence of a threat to peace or a breach to peace before it 
halts Court’s judicial proceedings.  
      The Charter requires the Security Council to conduct investigations pursuant to 
article 34 of the Charter before determining whether a threat to peace exists.
137
 The 
automatic renewal of the deferral defies the provisions of the Charter because no 
investigation was conducted to determine whether a threat to peace existed. Further, 
the provisions of article 16 of the Rome Statute require a deferral to be determined 
on a case by case basis. Subsequently, the determination of a future possible threat to 
peace amends the provisions of article 16 of the Rome Statute contrary to the 
provisions of the Charter and the Rome Statute.
138
 The determination of whether a 
threat to peace exists and the decision to invoke a Chapter VII measure, can only be 
made when concrete terms which have the potential of destabilising peace and 
security are present.
139
The Charter does not define what a ‘threat to peace’ or a 
‘breach of peace’ means; however, the Security Council resolution has the discretion 
to define and adopt measures to restore international peace and stability.
140
  
      The threat to peace can be defined in an either negative or positive light. The 
negative definition perceives a threat to peace as ‘an absence in international armed 
conflict between states;’ this school also recognises that an internal conflict can 
destabilise international peace and security. 
141
 Conversely, the positive definition 
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encompasses the need to have good comity in the economic, social, political and 
environmental facets as a way of preserving peace among states.
142
 The negative 
definition holds more water, as it encompasses both internal and international 
conflicts which has the possibility of destabilising international peace and security. 
Nonetheless, the practice of the Security Council has shown that the definition of 
‘threat to peace’ is not cast in stone thus, it is dynamic as it captures the situation 
considering the circumstances at play.
143
 
      While the ‘breach of peace’ refers to the existence of armed conflict between 
states, it is unclear whether a civil war should be included as part of the definition.
144
 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that civil war in a state which is non-international 
in nature has the potential of destabilising international peace and security. 
      The Security Council passed deferral resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) in 
the absence of a threat to peace or a breach to the peace, these  resolutions do not 
make any reference to an internal or international conflict, neither do they refer to 
poor relations between states which may threaten peace and security. However, the 
only threat evident in these resolutions is the need to maintain United Nations 
peacekeeping operations.
145
 The maintenance of peacekeeping operations does not 
amount to a threat to peace or a breach of peace. In this regard, in passing these 
resolutions the Security Council acted contrary to the provisions of Chapter VII of 
the Charter as it passed resolutions in the absence of a threat to peace or a breach to 
the peace.        
4.3.2 The validity of the Security Council’s resolutions 
under the Rome Statute 
As mentioned earlier, article 16 of the Rome Statute sets out the conditions which 
the Security Council resolutions must adhere to before deferring Court’s 
investigations or prosecutions. In a nutshell, a valid deferral should be adopted 
through a Security Council resolution, pursuant to Chapter VII powers of the Charter 
and it lasts for only 12 months, although this may be renewed if a threat to peace, 
breach of the peace or acts of aggression exist. In passing Security Council 
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resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003), the Security Council defied the conditions 
set out in the Rome Statute. 
     Operative paragraph 2 of the resolution expresses the intention to renew the 
deferral resolution as many times as it may be necessary.
146  
This paragraph has the 
effect of automatically renewing the resolution without conforming to article 16 of 
the Rome Statute which reads that: ‘… [T]he request may be renewed by the Council 
under the same conditions’
147
 This means that the resolution should be renewed 
through a subsequent resolution, after determining that the existence of a threat to 
peace, breach to the peace or an act of aggression still exists. This means that the 
deferral resolution can only be adopted through an affirmative vote by nine members 
of the Security Council in the absence a veto. As a result, operative paragraph 2 
defied the provisions in the Rome Statute because the renewal was done in the 
absence of a threat to peace, breach of the peace and an act of aggression, also the 
intention to renew was not adopted through a resolution.  
     The renewal of a deferral resolution should be done on a case-by-case basis after 
the lapse of 12 months, accordingly, an automatic renewal defies the provisions of 
article 16 of the Rome Statute which provides for the procedure to renew a Security 
Council resolutions. This has been equated to providing ‘blanket immunity’ over 
peacekeepers for an indefinite duration. This automatic renewal attempts to amend 
the provisions of the Rome Statute contrary to international law. 
148
 
      As mentioned in Chapter Two of this dissertation, the authors of the Rome 
Statute envisaged for deferrals to be used sparingly for the purpose of temporarily 
halting judicial proceedings whenever they interfere with international peace and 
security. The Security Council resolutions passed these resolutions as a future 
preventive measure to halt future Court judicial proceedings against peacekeepers 
from non-state parties without any threat to peace, breach of the peace or an act of 
aggression. Therefore, the Security Council deferrals were contrary to the intention 
of the drafters of the Rome Statute.  
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     The first paragraph of article 16 of the Rome Statute states: ‘[n]o investigation or 
prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute … .’ The 
question that springs to mind is when does a prosecution or investigation occur? The 
Prosecutor has the power to initiate an investigation in his or her own accord 
pursuant to article 15 (1) and (2) of the Rome Statute.
149
 The term ‘initiate’ does not 
mean that the Prosecutor should ‘start’ with an investigation but it means that the 
Prosecutor has the discretion to begin with necessary preliminary steps of evaluating 
necessary material that form the basis of an actual investigation.
150
  Accordingly, the 
Prosecutor commences with the said investigation only after an authorisation from 
the Pre-Trial Chamber. Article 15(4) of the Rome Statute reads; 
If the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request and the supporting material 
considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with the investigation, and the case 
appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorize the commencement of 
the investigation … . 
 Therefore, the Prosecutor can only proceed with full investigation after the Pre-Trial 
Chamber authorises him or her to do so. Consequently, the Security Council should 
only defer an investigation or prosecution after the Pre-Trial Chamber decides that 
the Prosecutor should proceed with the actual investigation in a given matter. 
Deferring an investigation which has not been authorised by the Pre-Trial Chamber 
amounts to interference in the independence of the office of the Prosecutor. In 
passing deferral resolutions in the absence of an investigation or a prosecution, the 
Security Council resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) failed to comply with the 
provisions of article 15 of the Rome Statute.  
     Similarly, it has been observed that suspects can only be identified at the 
prosecution stage. Therefore, in passing deferral resolutions before the investigation 
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      Exempting peacekeepers from the jurisdiction of the Court provides immunity 
over them contrary to the object and purpose of the Court of fighting impunity.
152
 I 
dare to state that the Security Council resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) is 
contributing to the same impunity the Court aims to fight! This contravenes article 
27 (1) of the Rome Statute which states that: ‘This Statute shall apply equally to all 
persons without distinction based on official capacity … .’ This subsection means 
that the Court has the jurisdiction to determine individual criminal responsibility 
over perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. In providing 
blanket immunity over United Nations peacekeeping forces the Security Council 
resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003)  acted in contravention of the provisions of 
article 21 of the Rome Statute which can be seen as an attempt by the Security 
Council to alter the provisions of the Rome Statute. In doing this, the Security 




4.4 Effect of these resolutions 
In passing the deferral resolutions, the Security Council resolutions attempted to 
amend the provisions of the Rome Statute which is in itself an interference with the 
work of the Court and contrary to international law. 
        The Rome Statute can be amended only by state parties pursuant to articles 121 
and 122 of the Rome Statute.
154
  The proposed amendments which are subject to 
considerations by the Assembly of Parties.
155
Article 39 of the Vienna Convention of 
the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty can generally be amended through an 
agreement by the state parties to the treaty.  
     The Security Council resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003)  attempt to alter 
article 16 of the Rome Statute contrary to the provisions of the Rome Statute and 
what the authors of the Rome Statute envisaged how the Security Council would 
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defer the judicial proceedings of the Court.
156
 The Court and the Security Council are 
two independent international organisations established through separate distinct 
treaties, thus in principle and under international law neither institution can ratify the 
other institutions treaty neither can they alter the provisions of each other’s founding 
documents.
157
 However, as seen in these two resolutions, the Security Council is 
acting beyond its powers and seems to give the message that it is above international 
law with no entity having any power to stop such interference. 
4.5 Possible remedies against the Security Council 
resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) ultra vires deferral 
resolutions.  
Article 1 of the Rome Statute reads: ‘…The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court 
shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.’ This is interpreted to mean that 
the Court should only carry out its tasks and functions as stipulated in the Rome 
Statute.
158
 In addition, article 21 of the Rome Statute notes: 
1. The Court shall apply: 
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence; 
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and 
rules of international law, including the established principles of the international 
law of armed conflict; 
(c) Failing that, general principles derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that 
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles 
are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally 
recognized norms and standards. 
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions. 
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with 
internationally recognized human rights…. 
This article displays the supremacy of the Rome Statute as it governs the running of 
the Court; it also recognises other sources of law that may be used to fill existing 
gaps in the Rome Statute, Elements of Crimes or the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.
159
Subsequently, in the light of the above provisions, the Court should 
establish whether the Security Council resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) 
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deferrals requests complied with the hierarchy of the applicable laws and make a 
determination on the same.
160
 So far, it has not done this. 
     The authors of the Rome Statute envisaged that deferrals to be used sparingly, 
when the pursuit of justice would interfere with the attainment of peace. But the 
exercise and conduct of the Security Council through resolutions 1422(2002) and 
1487(2003) does not reflect what the drafters envisaged.  I am of the opinion that the 
Court should in future ignore deferral requests from the Security Council resolutions 
on this basis. 
      The Security Council resolutions has a wide discretion to take suitable action in 
maintaining international peace and security pursuant to article 39 of the Charter. 
Being an international organisation it is subject to constitutional limitations set out in 
its constitutive body and it has to act within the confines of the Charter as it is not 
above the law.
161
    
      As a subject of international law, the United Nations is bound to conform to the 
rules of international law. Generally, member states to the United Nations have 
obligations arising from the Security Council resolutions to comply with its 
decisions. Article 25 states: ‘The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present 
Charter.’  
     Nonetheless, these obligations are binding on member states only if the Security 
Council resolutions adopted the resolutions in good faith in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the Charter.
162
 Evidently, the Security Council resolutions 
1422(2002) and 1487(2003)  deferrals were not adopted in good faith as they did not 
conform to the provisions of the Rome Statute neither did they uphold or respect 
human rights. Further, the Security Council is further not a state, so the requests of 
the Security Council resolutions should in principle not be obligatory.   
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    The Court has the power to review Security Council resolutions passes a deferral 
which does not conform to the provisions of the Rome Statute and the principles of 
international law.
163
  When acting pursuant to Chapter VII powers under the Charter, 
the Security Council has an obligation to respect universal human rights instruments 
like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations 
Declaration on Human Rights, the Universal Bill of Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Political Rights and international humanitarian 
law. The deferral resolutions did not respect human rights law because it grants 
impunity to violators of human rights and it does not recognise the rights of victims 
in the affected areas. Therefore, member states and the Court in particular should 
question the validity of the said resolutions and if need be refuse to comply with 
deferral requests that are contrary to the aforementioned international law 
Conclusion 
In passing resolution 1422(2002) and renewing it through 1487(2002) the Security 
Council did not conform to the provisions of article 16 of the Rome Statute which 
lays out the conditions to be exercised before a deferral is passed. The deferral 
requests were passed in theoretical terms in the absence of a threat to peace, breach 
of peace or an act of aggression. Moreover, these deferral requests had an automatic 
renewal providing for a renewal after the lapse of 12 months on condition that 
conditions under article 39 of the Charter are present. Lastly, in providing for an 
automatic renewal; the Security Council resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) 
attempted to alter the provisions of the Rome Statute. Therefore, the Security 
Council acted in an ultra vires manner. 
      In granting blanket immunity to peace keepers who are non-state parties to the 
Rome Statute, the Security Council defies the general principle of equality which 
encourages different laws to be used among peacekeepers, depending on whether 
they have ratified the Rome Statute or not. 
      When assessing the need to defer investigations or prosecutions the Security 
Council should respect its primary objectives and those of the Court to ensure that 
the legitimacy and credibility of both of the offices are upheld. The Security Council 
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resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487(2003) put the relationship between the Court and 





















CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This thesis has shown that the crafters of the Rome Statute envisaged a close 
interaction between the Court and the Security Council, demonstrated through the 
latter’s exercise of referrals and deferrals of situations to the Court. However, the 
Security Council’s exercise of referrals and deferrals has been inconsistent with the 
Relationship Agreement, the Charter, the provisions of the Rome Statute and the 
intention of the drafters. As a result, this has negatively affected the relationship 
between the Court and Security Council. 
     This chapter is divided into two parts; the first section makes a conclusion of the 
issues that arose in the Security Council’s exercise of referrals and deferrals while 
the second part, recommends on how the Security Council may defer and refer in a 
way that sustains the relationship between the Security Council and the Court. 
5.2 Conclusion 
Cooperation and enforcement are two aspects that are required for a successful 
referral.  The Security Council’s referrals of the situations in Darfur and Libya to the 
Court has shown that the latter lacks a proper enforcement mechanism. Although the 
Security Council has an enforcement role to play when it refers situations to the 
Court, the former has not performed this role pursuant to article 87(7) of the Rome 
Statute. This is evident when the Security Council failed to impose sanctions on 
recalcitrant states which failed to cooperate with the Court in arresting Al-Bashir and 
the Security Council’s inaction to respond to the lack of Libya’s failure to cooperate 
with the Court in surrendering Al-Islam to the Court. At the time of writing this 
dissertation, the Court has been unable to exercise jurisdiction over Al-Bashir nine 
years after the Security Council referral. Similarly, the Court has been unable to 
prosecute Al-Islam three years after the Security Council referral of the situation in 
Libya to the Court. This has lowered the credibility and legitimacy of the Court.  
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      In passing deferral resolutions 1422(2002) and 1487 (2003), the Security Council 
did not conform to the intention of the authors of the Rome Statute. This is evident 
when the Security Council passed deferral resolutions in the absence of a threat to 
peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression. Moreover, the Security Council 
did not act in accordance with the conditions laid out in both the Charter and the 
Rome Statute before exercising of these deferrals.  
      Through the exercise of referrals and deferrals, the Security Council has failed to 
promote a close relationship with the Court contrary to the intention of the authors of 
the Rome Statute, the Relationship Agreement, the Charter and the Rome Statute 
itself. 
      In passing the deferral resolutions, the Security Council weakened the 
relationship between the Court and the Security Council contrary to what was 
envisaged by the crafters of the Rome Statute and the Relationship Agreement. 
Consequently, both of the independent international organisations fail to fulfil their 
mutual objective which lowers the credibility of both the Court and the Security 
Council. 
5.3 The way forward 
There is a need to strengthen the relationship between the Court and the Security 
Council  to ensure that both entities fulfil their mutual objectives of prosecuting 
serious international crimes and maintaining international peace and security 
pursuant to the provisions if the Rome Statute and the Charter respectively. 
      When referring situations, the Security Council should stress in the referral 
resolutions the importance of all states to cooperate with the Court. This will impose 
obligations on all states to collaborate with the Court for successful referrals. Also, 
the Security Council should be ready to help the Court to enforce cooperation 
requests by imposing sanctions on states that fail to fulfil these obligations. 
      The Court and the Security Council have to cooperate effectively in order to 
fulfil their roles of fighting the culture of impunity and maintaining peace and 
security. Nonetheless, the failure of the Security Council to cooperate with the Court 
in enforcing decisions after a referral or failing to conform to the conditions of 
deferral lowers the credibility and legitimacy of the Court.  
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      The Security Council should employ soft and hard measures pursuant to 40 or 41 
of the Charter to compel recalcitrant states to cooperate with the Court as a way of 
maintaining peace and security as it simultaneously enforces the Court’s decisions. 
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